Manthei v. HeimerdingerManthei v. Heimerdinger
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delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant, Fred Manthei, filed his complaint against Lewis G. Heimerdinger and the Freeport Motor Casually Company under the provisions of the Dram Shop Act seeking to recover damages for injuries which he alleged he sustained on August 9, 1943, when an automobile in which he was riding as a passenger was struck by another automobile negligently driven by Jan Kerch at the intersection of East Linden street and West Galena avenue in the City of Freeport. The defendant, Heimerdinger, is charged with having previously, on that day, furnished Kerch with intoxicating liquors causing her to become intoxicated and the Freeport Motor Casualty Company is made a defendant as the owner of the premises in which Heimerdinger conducted his tavern business.
The defendants filed a joint answer admitting the ownership of the tavern and premises but denied
The record shows that the plaintiff filed a motion to strike this fourth affirmative defense, as well as the second and third affirmative defenses, and counsel for both appellant and appellees, in their briefs state that the court overruled that motion. Neither the abstract or record show any order entered by the court in connection with plaintiff’s motion to strike but does show that a reply was filed by the plaintiff in which he denied that the defendant, Freeport Motor Casualty Company, as lessor of the premises, was liable as guarantor of the defendant, Heimerdinger, but avers that this defendant is liable as owner and lessor of the premises as provided by the Dram Shop Act. He admitted that the Insurance Company which insured Kerch
With the pleadings in this condition it was stipulated by the attorneys representing the parties hereto that the Pennsylvania Insurance Company, prior to the commencement of this suit, for and on behalf of Jan Kerch, issued a draft for $3,000 and delivered the same to the plaintiff herein, Fred Manthei, and in consideration thereof received from him a general release releasing Jan Kerch of and from any and all liability arising out of the accident upon which this proceeding is based. Thereupon the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings alleging that plaintiff’s reply to defendant’s fourth affirmative defense admits the allegations therein. Hpon a hearing the trial court held that it appeared from the pleadings, that plaintiff received a single, indivisible injury in a single accident and had received $3,000 therefor from one wrongdoer. That the plaintiff had executed a release to her for that injury and it therefore followed that defendants were entitled to judgment. Accordingly the court sustained defendant’s motion and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff in bar of the action and for costs. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals.
Counsel for appellant, in support of their contention that the release executed by the plaintiff to Jan Kerch
In order to sustain the judgment of the trial court appellees insist that it is immaterial whether defendants in the instant action and Jan Kerch are regarded as joint tortfeasors or not, that whatever their relationship may be called, the law is that a release of one operates to release all, so long as it is shown that their wrongful acts produced a single, indivisible injury. Counsel state that their fourth affirmative defense is grounded on the theory that where one receives a single injury for which a number of people are legally liable to respond in damages for the entire injury that then a release of one is a release of affjbut counsel insist that inasmuch as the plaintiff contested this theory by a motion to dismiss this fourth affirmative defense and the trial court having overruled that motion and plaintiff having then elected to file a reply, thereto admitting the’ facts set forth in defendants’ fourth affirmative defense that the question whether the release executed by the plaintiff which released Jan Kerch from any demands plaintiff had against her also released the defendants, is not presented to this court for review.
There is no merit in this contention. The record shows that this motion to dismiss or strike the fourth affirmative defense was not passed upon by the court. Whether it was or whether plaintiff abandoned it is immaterial. A motion to strike or dismiss under our present practice is the same as a demurrer under our former practice and it is true as stated in Nordhaus
In the Philips-Aretz case the plaintiff, a minor, brought a suit against a dram shop keeper and the surety on his bond to recover damages for the death of his father. The complaint charged that the defendant dram shop keeper, in violation of an ordinance of the village which licensed him to engage in business and in violation of the statutes of that State, sold liquor to the plaintiff’s father resulting in his intoxication, that on his way home, because of his intoxicated condition, he was struck by a passing motorist, named Costigan, and died a few hours later. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the portion of the answers of the defendants which alleged that shortly after the death of the father, his wife, as administrator of her husband’s estate, instituted suit against Costigan to recover under the wrongful death act of that State, claiming that her husband’s death was caused by the negligence of Costigan; that thereafter she settled that action and received from Costigan $3,250 in consideration of which she executed and delivered to him a “full release from said cause of action and a dismissal of said action with prejudice and without costs to either party.” The answers of the defendants further alleged that $702.23 of the proceeds of the settlement was, under the direction of the court, set aside for the benefit of the minor plaintiff in the instant suit. In affirming the action of the trial court, the Supreme Court stated that no one questioned the soundness of the cases cited which held that one injured party who has accepted satisfaction from any source cannot recover again for the same injury. The
“As we have seen, these statutes are wholly unrelated in scope and purpose. In the action by the administratrix against Costigan, his negligence was the sole basis upon which that cause was founded. In the instant case the liquor dealer’s liability to plaintiff does not involve that issue at all. Bather, and only, his liability is a means of ‘punishment . . . for having violated the law’ and is not based on a ‘wrong done to plaintiff. ’ Mayes v. Byers, supra. Thus defendants’ theory of avoiding liability on the ground that Aretz and Costigan were ‘joint’ or ‘concurrent’ tort feasors in causing Bertrem’s death cannot be sustained in this kind of action, which is one to enforce a penalty under a statute which ‘contains no implication that the prohibited act must be done knowingly or wilfully’ or that defenses such as contributory negligence, lack of guilty knowledge, or the like are essential elements of the case. . . . We think, and so hold, that recovery here ‘is allowed not for a tortious wrong . . . but as a means of enforcing- the penalty imposed on the dealer’
The factual situation in the instant case is entirely different from the factual situation in Philips v. Aretz, supra. Where an intoxicated person is killed there is, as suggested by counsel for appellees, always a possibility that two actions may be asserted, one under the wrongful death act where the suit is brought for the benefit of the next of kin to recover for pecuniary loss and the other, an action under the Dram Shop Act by a husband, wife, child or other person who has sustained injury in person or property or means of support. In such cases different questions arise, the plaintiffs may be different persons, the nature of the claims are not the same and the measure of damages is different. In the death case the cause of action is the wrongful act, neglect or default causing death and not the death itself. In the instant case it was the negligence of the intoxicated person, Jan Kerch, which caused the injuries for which plaintiff seeks to hold these defendants liable. In this State the Dram Shop Act provides a remedy to one injured in his person or property by the tortious act of an intoxicated person against the tavernkeeper and his landlord in order to compensate such injured person for the damage sustained. In Minnesota the recovery is allowed as a means of enforcing a penalty imposed on a liquor dealer. Our Dram Shop Act does not’ create a right of action for all acts of intoxicated persons but only for the tortious acts of intoxicated persons. Hill v. Alexander, 321 Ill. App. 406. Under both counts of the complaint in the instant case the extent-of the damages which the plaintiff could recover against the defendant would be only such an amount as would compensate him for the injuries he sustained. He could not recover exemplary damages, (Austin v. Bass, 206 Ill. App. 435) and the measure of damages appellant could have recovered from Jan Kerch for her negligence
Counsel for appellant also cite and rely upon McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. (2d) 659. In that case the plaintiffs, Helen M. McKenna and her husband Royal T. McKenna, brought suit against Theodore Austin to recover damages for personal injuries which Mrs. McKenna sustained while riding as a passenger in a taxicab. This taxicab was owned by Independent Taxi Owners Association and William L. Driscoll. The defendant, Austin, owned the automobile which collided with the taxicab in which Mrs. McKenna was riding. One of the defenses interposed by Austin,, was that plaintiffs had made full accord and satisfaction with the owners of the taxi in which she was riding and executed a release which the defendant Austin insisted was a bar to the suit brought against him. The release is set out as a foot note on page 660 of the reported case. By it the plaintiffs acknowledged the receipt of $3,000 and covenanted not to sue the owners of the taxi on account of the injuries or losses resulting from the collision and discharged them from any liability in connection therewith. It contained this clause: “this instrument is not maintained as, and shall not be deemed a release of any cause of action that the undersigned may have against Theodore Austin.” The plaintiffs insisted this was not a release from substantive liability but a covenant not to sue the owners of the taxicab in which she was riding at the time she was injured. It was further insisted that the owners of the taxicab and the defendant, Austin, were not joint tortfeasors, but acted independently and that. the court should
Under the authorities in this State there is a substantial distinction between a release and an instrument denominated a covenant not to sue. (Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Averill, 224 Ill. 516, 521, 522; City of Chicago v. Babcock, 143 Ill. 358, 366; 23 R. C. L. 408, Release, sec. 37.) “When a technical release under seal or on satisfaction being made for the injury, is given by the injured party to one of several joint wrongdoers, the courts have quite uniformly held this to release all, and to be a bar to an action against those not named in the release. In the case of a release under seal, its meaning cannot be controlled by parol evidence and the law raises a conclusive presumption that it was given in full satisfaction in fact for the injury, and on a sufficient consideration. . . . The question of whether a release to, or a satisfaction from, a person not shown to be liable as a joint wrongdoer comes within the rule that a discharge of one joint wrongdoer is the discharge of the others is attended with no little difficulty, on principle, and the authorities are more or less conflicting. Many cases hold that the rule applies only where the money is paid by, or the release executed to, one who is himself actually guilty of the wrong.” (23 A. C. L. Release, sec. 35, pp. 405, 406.) “The injured party” continues the text (sec. 36, p. 407) “is entitled to full compensation for his injuries, and to but one compensation. When therefore he receives a full compensation in fact from one of two or more joint wrongdoers, or when he enters into such a contract with one that the law raises a presumption that he has received such full compensation from him, such receipt of compensation, or such agreement, is bar to an action
In the instant case the instrument executed by appellant was a technical general release which is defined as the giving up or abandoning of the claim or right to the person against whom the claim exists. A release is itself a discharge of the claim or obligation. A receipt is only evidence that the debt has been paid or the claim satisfied. Not so of a written release. It is not only evidence of the extinguishment of the debt or claim but is the extinguisher itself. If the party injured, for ‘a consideration, has surrendered to the party in whose favor a contract runs, which contract purports to be a satisfaction for the wrong and a release of the wrongdoer, jointly liable with others on account of the tort, then there can be no further proceeding, for the right of action is gone. (23 R. C. L. Release, sec. 2, pp. 375, 376.)
Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 414, was an action brought by the administrator of the estate of Edward Dillon to recover damages against the City of Chicago for his wrongful death. It appeared that Dillon was working for one McKay as a teamster and while driving a wagon along the street received injuries from which he subsequently died. The iron
“The Appellate Court, in dealing with the question, expressed the opinion that the cause of action released or satisfied by the instrument was an entirely different one from the statutory cause of action; that the release had no relation to the case and was erroneously admitted in evidence, and was therefore properly ignored in the instructions. This view of the law erroneous and not in accord with the authorities. There was but one cause of action and there could be but one recovery or satisfaction. A cause of action in suits for damages arising from negligence is the act done or omitted to be done by the defendant affecting the plaintiff which causes a grievance for which the law gives a remedy. (Swift & Co. v. Madden, 165 Ill. 41.) In suits like this, the cause of action is the wrongful act, neglect or default causing death, and not merely the death itself. (Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131; Crane v. Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Co., 233 id. 259.) The statute gives a right unknown to the common law in cases where the wrongful act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages. One condition upon which the statutory liability depends is that the deceased had a right of recovery for the injuries at the time of his death, and there is no right in the administrator to maintain an action unless the deceased had the right to sue at the time of his death. There being but one
Following the case of Young v. Anderson, 33 Idaho 522, 196 Pac. 193, an Idaho case reported in 50 A. L. R. 1056 is an exhaustive annotation and many cases are cited and commented upon. On page 1100 it is said: “The majority of cases sustain the following conclusion: ‘A release to one liable with another, or others, for the same injury releases the other or others, where each of the tortfeasors is liable for the entire damages suffered by the injured party; it is immaterial whether they are jointly liable.’ ”
The court in Brown v. City of Cambridge, 3 Allen (Mass.) 474, cited in McKenna v. Austin, supra, said:
“It is an ancient doctrine that a release to one joint trespasser, or a satisfaction from him, discharges the whole. The same doctrine applies to all joint torts, and to torts for which the injured party has an election to sue one or more parties severally. . . . If it were not so, a party having a claim against several persons on account of a single tort might sue one and settle the suit,-receiving damages; he might then sue another and settle in the same way, and repeat the proceeding as to all but one, and then sue him and recover the whole damage, as if nothing had been paid by the others. A door would thus be opened to a class of speculations that do not deserve encouragement. The rule of law which makes one satisfaction or release a bar to further claims for the same tort is founded in go^d reason.”
This case has been cited by our courts many times and the foregoing excerpt from the opinion appears in Chapin v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., 18 Ill. App. 47. In that case the plaintiff was a passenger on a train operated by the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific
“Whether they were joint tortfeasors or not we do not deem it important, in the view we take of the case, to decide. It is enough if they were both liable for the same injury. . . . Plaintiff, in this case, had a right of action against either company for the injury he received, whether he could have maintained a joint action or not. If this be so, then a release to one discharged both.” See also Wallner v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 245 Ill. 148.
In Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hilligoss, 171 Ind. 417, 86 N. E. 485, 131 Am. St. Rep. 258, the conductor of a street railway car was injured when his street car was struck by defendant’s train at a street crossing. It appeared that the plaintiff had executed a release discharging the street car company, his employer, from any liability because of the accident. The court held that such release operated to bar plaintiff’s action against the railroad. In the course of its opinion the court said:
“It is an ancient and well established rule almost without exception in England and America that for a single injury there can be but one recompense. When more than one unite in the commission of a wrong, each is responsible for the acts of’ all and for the
Brown v. Kemp, 71 Ind. App. 281, 124 N. E. 777, was an action to recover from a liquor dealer and his bondsmen for the death of plaintiff’s husband, whose death was alleged to have been caused by defendant’s unlawful sale of liquor to him, the husband having been killed by a railroad train while intoxicated. It appeared that the plaintiff had settled with the railroad company and executed an instrument releasing it. Under the authority of Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hilligoss, 171 Ind. 417, supra, it was held that the release of the railroad company operated to release the defendants, the court stating that although the defendants and the railroad company were acting independently and without concert, still their wrongful acts combined to produce decedent’s death and each was liable therefor.
At common law it was not a tort to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to a strong and able bodied man and such act was never held to be culpable negligence that would impose legal liability for damages upon the vendor or donor of liquor. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 234. Under certain circumstances a liability has been imposed by statute not only upon
The trial court correctly held that the general release executed by Jan Kerch extinguished appellants’ right of action and the judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.