66 Ind. 78 | Ind. | 1879
On the 14th day of April, 1879, the appellee’s relator, John Lee, filed in the court below his complaint, duly verified, against the appellant Mahlon D. Manson, Auditor of State of the State of Indiana, as sole defendant, and thereon moved the court for an alternative writ of mandate, in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. On the same day, the appellant Manson voluntarily appeared and waived the issuing of such alternative writ of mandate, and filed his demurrer to the relator’s verified complaint, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against him, or to warrant the relief prayed for therein. On the 18th day of April, 1879, the court overruled the demurrer to the complaint, and to this decision the appellant Manson excepted.
On the 24th day of April, 1879, the appellant Manson
“ Comes now Mahlon D. Manson, Auditor of State, respondent, and, for answer to said petition or complaint, says he has no interest whatever in the proceedings of said relator, except to see that his warrant for said salary shall be issued [by him], as such Auditor of State, to the proper person entitled by law to receive such warrant and salary, as such prison director, and therefore he respectfully prays the judgment and direction of this honorable court, in the premises.”
On the same day last named, the appellants Robert Dykes and John W. Baker filed in said, cause their verified petition, in substance, as follows:
“ The undersigued represent to the court that they have a real and substantial interest- in the matters involved in this cause ; that they were duly elected, commissioned and qualified as directors of the northern prison, in said State of Indiana, and have been and are now serving as such directors, under their said election by the General Assembly of said State to the said position; that they have served as such director’s, are now serving as such, and have been ever since the 12th day of March, 1877, and that they are now lawfully entitled to have paid to them the salary of said office of prison directors, which salary, in said cause, is claimed by the relator. Wherefore they pray that- they may be made parties defendants hereto, and be permitted to plead and answer as defendants in said cause.”
The prayer of said petition was granted by the court, and,, on their own application, the appellants Dykes and Baker were made parties defendants in this cause, and allowed and directed to answer the relator’s complaint.
No amendment was made by the appellee’s relator to his verified complaint, but the appellants Dykes and Baker demurred thereto, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
The appellants Dykes and Baker then answered the relator’s complaint: First, by a general denial thereof; and, secondly, by an affirmative or special paragraph, the substance of which we will give hereafter. To this second paragraph of answer the relator replied in two paragraphs, the first of which was a special reply, and the second was a general denial,
Upon the affidavit of the appellants Dykes and Baker of the bias and prejudice of the presiding judge of the court below, the cause was removed from before him, and, “ with the consent and approval of the parties,” the Hon. Livingston Howland was duly appointed as special judge “ to hear, try and determine said cause.”
The issues joined were tried by the coui’t without a jury, and a finding was made that the relator, John Lee, by virtue of his election and qualification as director of the Indiana State Prison North, mentioned in the appellee’s complaint, was, on the 11th day of March, 1879, entitled to the office of director of said prison, and then was in„the possession of said office, and in the exercise and performance of the duties thereof; that the relator was subsequently wrongfully excluded from said prison, and from the performance of the duties of said office, by the appellants Dykes and Baker; that, ever since the last named date, the relator had been and then was entitled to the office of director of said prison, and to exercise the duties and receive the salary of said office ; that the terms of office of the appellants Dykes and Baker, as directors of said prison, ceased and determined on the said 11th day of March, 1879, and that their subsequent exercise of the duties of said offices of directors of said prison, and their exclusion of the relator and Frederick Hoover from said
The appellants jointly moved the court for a new trial, which motion was overruled, and to this ruling they severally excepted, and judgment was then rendered by the court upon and in accordance with its finding, from which judgment this appeal is now here prosecuted.
In this court, the appellant Manson separately, and the appellants Dykes and Baker jointly, assigned as errors the decisions of the circuit court in overruling their respective demurrers to the relator’s verified complaint, and all the appellants jointly assigned as error the decision of the court in overruling their motion for a new trial.
It is necessary, we think, to a proper understanding of the questions presented and discussed by counsel* in this case, and of our decision of those questions, that we should first give a summary at least of the facts alleged by the appellee’s relator, in his verified complaint.
The relator alleged, in substance, that, in pursuance of an act of the General Assembly of this State, approved March 5th, 1859, entitled “An act to provide for the erection of a new prison north of the National Road, election of officers therefor, making appropriations, and for the regulation of the same,” the Governor of Indiana, on or about
The appellee’s relator further averred, that after the said board of directors had been organized by said Lee, Wile and Hoover, arid after the said Luther, Dykes and Baker had been informed thereof, and after the said Luther, Dykes and Baker had ceased to be directors of said prison, as the relator was advised, believed and charged, the appellants Dykes and Baker, on the afternoon of the said 11th day of March, 1879, held a pretended meeting in some unusual place in said prison, in which they pre
The relator further averred,-that, after the organization .of said board of directors, composed of said Lee, Wile and Hoover, on the 11th day of March, 1879, and before the election of said Murdock as warden, the name of said Charles Mayne was presented to said board as a candidate for re-election, with his knowledge and consent, and at the election of warden by said board he received one vote, to wit, the vote of said Wile, and failing to be elected by said board he recognized the said Dykes and Baker as being the board óf directors of said prison and accepted an election at their hands, and afterward, on the 12th day of March, 1879, through the prison guards and in combination with the said Dykes and Baker, he excluded the said Lee, Wile and Hoover, and the said Murdock, by locking them out of the prison as aforesaid.
The relator further averred, that afterward, on the 1st day of April, 1879, the said Simon Wile joined the combination to extend the terms of office of the said Dykes and Baker as directors, and of the said Mayne as warden of said prison, and on the same day the said Dykes, Baker
The first question presented by the appellants’ counsel, as arising under the demurrer of the appellant Manson, is thus stated in the able and exhaustive brief of counsel, who claim to represent all the appellants: “Whether a mandate for the payment of a salary lies against an accounting officer of the state government, by one claiming an office and its salary, who is not in the possession of the office, and who admits that another is in possession thereof, discharging its duties and claiming its emoluments, and also whether the title to an office may be tried aud determined in such a proceeding?” It is evident, we think, that the question stated could only arise under the demurrer of the appellant Manson, and could only be insisted on by him, and not by his co-appellants, Dykes and Baker. .If we understand the answer of the appellant Manson, and the brief of the Attorney General in his behalf, “He wishes to waive any mere technicalities, and have the question as to who is entitled to receive the pay, as directors of the northern prison, fairly disposed of.” The Attorney General has submitted the ease to this court, “ on behalf of the appellant Manson, with the statement that, having no interest in the case except to know his duty in issuing the warrant demanded, he awaits the order of the court in the premises.” To the same effect, as we have seen, in the answer of the appellant Manson, he expressly disclaimed any interest whatever in this suit, except to see that his warrant for the salary of director of the northern prison was issued to the person entitled by law to re
It is evident, we think, that the appellant Manson has no desire to present for our decision the foregoing questions ; but that, on the contrary, his only wish in this case is, that this court will pass upon and fiually determine the important questions presented by the record, as to what law governs the election of directors of the northern prison, and what is the duration of the terms of office of such directors ? These latter questions are the only ones, as it seems to us, in this case, in which the appellants Dykes and Baker have or can have any possible interest. Certainly, they do not and can not have any interest whatever in the questions above quoted from the bi'ief of their counsel; for, if it were conceded that the proceeding by mandate would not lie against the appellant Manson as an accounting officer of the State, under the circumstances stated in said questions, he alone could object to the proceedings on this ground, and could waive, as we think he has waived, in this ease, any such objection.
The appellants Dykes and Baker claimed that the appellee’s relator, John Lee, was not a director of the noi-thern prison, and was not entitled to the salary of such a director. They did not deny that Lee, Wile and Hoover, had been elected, commissioned and qualified, as alleged in the relator’s complaint; but they claimed, that they, the said Dykes and Baker, had been elected directors of said prison by the General Assembly of this State, at the regular session thereof in 1877, and that their terms of office as such directors would not expire until the 11th day of March, 1881, and that, until then, they were’ entitled to the salary of such directors to the exclusion of the appellee’s relator. These were the grounds, upon which the appellants Dykes and Baker asked to be made defendants
There is but little controversy between the appellee’s relator and the appellants .Dykes and Baker about the facts of this case. The question at issue between them is purely a question of law. The relator claimed, that all the directors of the northern prison had been elected by the Geiieral Assembly, under and pursuant to the provisions of an act entitled “ An act to provide for the erection of a new prison north of the Rational Road, election of officers therefor, making appropriations, and for the regulation of the same,” approved March 5th, 1859; that this act prescribed the number of such directors and the mode of their election, and provided that “ Said directors shall hold their office for the term of two years, and until their successors are elected and qualified that at every regular session since the passage of said act, under its provisions, the General Assembly had elected three directors, who held their offices for the term of two years, and until their successors were elected and qualified; that accordingly, at the regular biennial session in 1877 of the Legislature, the appellants Dykes and Baker, and Charles B. Luther, were duly elected by the General Assembly, under the provisions of said act, as the three directors of said northern prison, and were duly commissioned by the Governor as such directors, for the term of two years from and after the 11th day of March, 1877, and were qualified as such directors, and, on said last named day, entered upon the dischai’ge of their official duties ; and that accordingly, also, the General Assembly, at the regular biennial session thereof, in 1879, elected the appellee’s relator, John Lee,
We do not understand that the appellants Dykes and Baker controvert or dispute the existence of any of the above recited facts. They claim, however’, that .the above entitled act, of March 5th, 1859, was passed merely for the temporary purpose of securing the erection of a new prison, which should be and was merely a branch of the •old prison, which then and before that time was located at Jeffersonville, Indiana; that during the erection of such new prison, and until the same was fully completed, the directors thereof, as to-the time and mode of their election and their terms of office, were to be and were governed and controlled by the provisions of the above entitled act; but that, as soon as the said new prison was fully erected and completed, to wit, on the 18th day of December, 1867, the above entitled act became inoperative, at least so far forth as the terms of office of the directors of said prison were concerned; and that thereafter the terms of office of said directors, as to the length thereof, were governed and controlled by the provisions of an act entitled “An act to provide for the government and discipline of the state-prison, and to repeal ‘An act to provide for the government and discipline of the state-prison,’
The appellants Dykes and Baker found their claim to a four years’ term of office, as we understand the argument of their learned counsel, upon the provisions of section 13 of the act of March 5th, 1859, which provided for the erection of a uew prison, which section reads as follows :
“ Sec. 13. All laws and regulations in force in reference to the government of the convicts, officers, and other matters in the present state-prison, be continued in force in reference to the management aud control of this prison, as far as the same can be made applicable.” 1 G. & II. 472.
It is earnestly insisted by the appellants’ counsel, that, under aud by force of this section, after the erection of the new prison, the directors thereof and their terms of office were thereafter to bo and were governed and controlled by the laws aud regulations in force in reference to the government of the old prison. It seems to us, however, that the language of this section is not open to any such construction. It will be seen that it is not provided that the laws and regulations governing the old prison should thereafter come in force, for the management and control of the new prison, upon the erection thereof or the happening of any other future event, but they were at once continued in force, as far as the same could be made applicable. It is very clear, we think, that the provisions of this section were not intended to and did not govern either the mode of election or the terms of office of the directors of the new prison; for these matters were
’We have now fully considered and decided the important questions presented in and by the record of this cause. It has seemed to us that those questions are pre
The judgment is affirmed, at the appellants’ costs.