75 Me. 509 | Me. | 1883
William Mansfield, who died in 1874, left a will, executed in 1872, and since his death duly probated, whereby he devised to his beloved- wife Grace, one of the complainants, all his "property and estate of any description and wherever situate, to hold the same so long as she shall remain [his] my widow. ” By the second item he devised to his son William H. the respondent here, two-thirds of the same property and estate " upon the termination of the estate of my wife therein, " upon condition that he pay to a daughter of the testator one hundred dollars, " when he comes into possession of said property. ” By the third item he- gave to this daughter one hundred dollars, to be paid to her by the son, " out of the property devised to him in the second article. ” In the fourth item he devises to another daughter " one-third part of all my property and estate upon the termination of the estate of my wife therein; ” and in the fifth and last item, he appointed his son executor. By the inventory, it appears that the testator left something less than seventeen hundred dollars in personal ■ property, and real estate appraised at fifty-four hundred and thirty-three dollars.
The bill charges that the income of the estate under prudent management has been insufficient for the reasonable support of the widow — that the personal estate which was left after payment of debts and charges of administration has been consumed for her support —- that she is unable to make sale of the real estate because the respondent claims that she has not a fee, but only a life estate therein. Whereupon she and the daughters claim that it was not the true intent of the testator that she should be thus left dependent upon charity, and therefore they call upon the court for such a construction of the will as shall give to the parties concerned a knowledge of their legal rights in the premises. The chief interest which the parties have in the question presented relates to the character of the estate which the wife took in the realty.
It is true that, by R. S., c. 74, § 16, "a devise of land must be construed to convey all the estate of the devisor therein unless it appears by his will that he intended to convey a less estate. ” But the provisions above quoted abundantly suffice in accordance with repeated decisions of this court and well settled rules of construction, to show that this testator intended to give to his wife at best but an estate for life and to make a devise over in fee, upon the wife’s death or marriage, to his son and one of the daughters in unequal proportions, the «on’s portion being
" If a man grant an estate to a woman dum sola fuit, durante viduitate, or quamdiu se bene gesserit ... for any like incertaine time, which time, as Bracton saith, is tempus indeterminatum; in all these cases, if it be of lands or. tenements, the lessee hath, in judgment of law, an estate for life determinable.” Co. Litt. Lib. 1, c. 6, § 56; First Part Hargraves’ Ed. p. 42. And Blackstone describes and illustrates in like manner a certain species of tenancy for life. Black. Comm. Yol. H, p. 121.
See also besides the cases above cited from 69 and 72 Maine, Warren v. Webb, 68 Maine, 133; Fox v. Rumery, id. 121, 126-128; Stuart v. Walker, 72 Maine, 145; Green v. Hewitt, 97 Ill. 113; Cooper v. Pogue, 92 Penn. 254: Bradly v. Westcott, 13 Vesey, Jr. 445; Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291; Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169, 178; Dumey Schoeffler, 24 Mo. 170.
Decree in conformity herewith.
No costs for either party.