DAVID MANSBERY v. REBECCA BACH
No. 96471
Cоurt of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
December 22, 2011
2011-Ohio-6627
BEFORE: Boyle, P.J., S. Gallagher, J., and E. Gallagher, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. D-324151
Anne C. Fantelli
Stafford & Stafford Co., L.P.A.
55 Erieview Plaza, 5th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Andrew A. Zashin
Christopher R. Reynolds
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A.
55 Public Square, 4th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Rebecca Bach, appeals the trial court‘s judgment dismissing her motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities. She raises two assignments of error for оur review:
{¶ 2} “[1.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by dismissing the appellant‘s motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities.
{¶ 3} “[2.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by dismissing the appellant‘s motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities without holding a hearing.”
Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶ 5} Bach and plaintiff-appellee, David Mаnsbery, were married in August 2005, in Phoenix, Arizona. They had two children born as issue of their marriage — a girl in October 2006, and a boy in October 2007. They lived in California after they were married, but moved to Brecksville, Ohio, in the summer of 2008. In December 2008, Mansbery filed a complaint for legal separation after Bach “dramaticаlly” returned her wedding ring to him and told him that she was moving back to California. Mansbery later amended his complaint for legal separation to a complaint for divorce.
{¶ 6} After a three-day hearing before a magistrate in September 2009, Mansbery was awarded temporary parental rights and responsibilities of the parties’ two minor children. At that time, Bach was living in California, and the magistrate found that Bach had “no plans to move anywhere else even if to do so would place her closer to the children.” Based on the magistrate‘s recommendation, the trial court set forth a temporary visitаtion schedule where the children would be shuffled back and forth between Cleveland and California every few weeks, with Mansbery being responsible for all travel costs.
{¶ 7} The magistrate held a final seven-day divorce trial on all issues in December 2009 and January 2010, issuing his decision in April 2010. The magistrate found that the court‘s expert, Dr. Deborah Koricke, Ph.D., opined that Mansbery
{¶ 8} On May 17, 2010, the parties entered into an agrеed judgment entry that incorporated the magistrate‘s decision as the court‘s own findings and conclusions of law, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The trial court granted the parties a divorce on the grounds of incompatibility and designated Mansbery as the residential parent and legal custodian of the children. It set forth a visitation schedule in accordance with the court‘s October 2009 temporary orders. It further ordered that Bach was entitled to a lump sum of $920,000 pursuant to the parties’ prenuptial agreement and ordered that Mansbery be responsible for $75,000 of Bach‘s attorney fеes.
{¶ 9} On August 26, 2010, Bach moved the court to modify parental rights and
{¶ 10} Mansbery opposed Bach‘s motion and moved to dismiss it, claiming that Bach failed to meet the requisite standard under
{¶ 11} In October 2010, the parties entered into an agreed interim visitation schedule where Bach had increased visitation with the children during the pendency of her motion before the court.
{¶ 12} A magistrate issued a decision on Bach‘s motion to mоdify parental rights and responsibilities in December 2010, recommending that it be dismissed. The magistrate found that all of Bach‘s stated reasons for a change in circumstances “were
{¶ 13} As for the magistrate‘s previous observance that if Bach moved closer to the children, it “should constitute a change in circumstances that would weigh heavily toward the adoption of a shared parenting agreement,” the magistrate found that the language was “extraneous to the specific issue that was before the court at the time and, therefore, not entitled to any weight whatsoever.”
{¶ 14} Overruling Bach‘s objections to the magistrate‘s decision, the trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision in its entirety, and granted Mansbery‘s motion to dismiss. It is from this judgment that Bach appeals.
R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)
{¶ 15} In her first assignment of error, Bach argues that the trial court erred when it adopted the magistrate‘s decision recommending that it dismiss Bach‘s motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities. The magistrate relied upon
{¶ 16} “The cоurt shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child, the child‘s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree, and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying these standards, the court shall retain the residential parent designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting decree, unless a modification is in the best interest of the child and one of the following applies:
{¶ 17} “(i) The residential parent agrees to a change in the residential parent or both parents under a shared parenting decree agree to a change in the designation of residential parent.
{¶ 18} “(ii) The child, with the consent of the residential parent or of both parents under a shared parenting decree, has been integrated into the family of the person seeking to become the residential parent.
{¶ 19} “(iii) The harm likely to bе caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the child.”
{¶ 21} “The clear intent of that statute is to spare children from a constant tug of war between their parents who would file a motion for change of custody each time the parent out of custody thought he or she could provide the children a ‘better’ environment. The statute is an attempt to provide some stability to the custodial status of the children, even though the parent out of custody may be able to prove that he or she can provide a better environment.” Id., quoting Wyss v. Wyss (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 412, 416, 445 N.E.2d 1153.
Standard of Review
{¶ 22} “[I]n determining whether a change in circumstances has occurred so as to warrant a change in custody, a trial judge, as the trier of fact, must be given wide latitude to consider all issues which support such a change.” Id. at 416-417. Aсcordingly, the trial court‘s determination on such issue should not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
{¶ 23} Bach first argues that the trial court erred when it adopted the magistrate‘s decision because “the parties entered into an Agreed Judgment Entry of Divorce which contained an express provision thаt [Bach‘s] relocation to Ohio should constitute a change in circumstances that would weigh heavily towards the adoption of a shared parenting arrangement.” She maintains that “the parties’ agreement as memorialized in the Agreed Judgment Entry of Divorce controls the issue[,]” not
{¶ 24} We disagree. Although the parties’ divorce decree is titled “Agreed Judgment Entry of Divorce,” this court cannot determine what, after а seven-day, highly contested trial, if anything, the parties agreed to. And even if there was some provision the parties agreed to — that we cannot determine from the record — the trial court still made clear in the “Agreed Judgment Entry of Divorce” that the magistrate‘s decision was incorporated into thе agreed judgment entry “as the court‘s own findings.”
{¶ 25} Further, the magistrate‘s finding that Bach relies upon so heavily here (that if she “chooses to reside near the children, this should constitute a change in circumstances that would weigh heavily towards the adoption of a shared parenting arrangement“) was just that — a finding. Although thе trial court adopted the
{¶ 26} Therefore, we must determine under
Analysis
{¶ 27} In support of its decision dismissing Bach‘s motion, the trial court relied on a Second District case, Buckingham v. Buckingham, 2d Dist. No. 1626, 2004-Ohio-1942. In Buckingham, like the instant cаse, the father had been named the child‘s residential parent. The father lived in Ohio and the mother lived in Arizona. When the mother moved to Ohio, she filed a motion to modify visitation, but later amended it to a motion for “increased companionship time.” Id. at ¶ 8. The trial court modified the father‘s primary parental rights and responsibilities to a shared parenting plan, with equal parenting time to the mother and father, finding that it was in the child‘s best interest.
{¶ 28} The Second District reversed, finding that the trial court erred in doing so. The appellate court explained that in modifying parental rights and responsibilities, the trial court needed to first determine if there had been a “change of substance” in the circumstances of the child or the residential parent. Id. at ¶ 19. Since the “only
{¶ 29} This court agrees with the Second District‘s decision in Buckingham. Thus, we also agree with the trial court that Bach‘s move to Ohio was a change in her circumstances, not a change in the children‘s or Mansbery‘s. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Bach‘s motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities.
{¶ 30} Bach‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
Evidentiary Hearing
{¶ 31} In her second assignment of error, Bach maintains the trial court erred by dismissing her motion without a hearing. We disagree.
{¶ 32}
{¶ 34} “The trial court need not hold a hearing every time a parent moves for modification of custody. Wherе the motion does not include allegations that meet the threshold legal requirements that permit the court to consider the modification, the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities is not truly ‘contested,’ and the hearing requirement *** is not triggered. See, e.g., Wysong v. Wysong, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-06-011, 2002-Ohio-562 (‘Because appellant fаiled to allege a change of circumstances which would permit a modification of parental rights and responsibilities under
R.C. 3109.04 , we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding no change of circumstances and denying an evidentiary hearing on the matter.‘); see also Bebout v. Vittling (Nov. 19, 2000), 5th Dist. No. 2001 CA00169 (finding no abuse of discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing when trial court found that the movant‘s allegations were similar to those litigated during the previous custody hearings).”
{¶ 35} Accordingly, we find no error on the part of the trial court for not holding an evidentiary hearing since Bach did not meet the threshold requirement of change in circumstances.
{¶ 36} Bach‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR