Case Information

*1 NO. 03-15-00294-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS MANOR INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

Appellant

DEYDRA STEANS

Appellee From the 200 Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas

__________ APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY

______

Appellant, Manor Independent School District (“MISD”), asks the Court for an emergency stay of jury trial pending interlocutory appeal.

1. MISD requests that this Court grant an emergency stay of the jury trial of this case pending MISD’s interlocutory appeal of the denial of MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction.

2. On May 12, 2015, the trial court denied Defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity on claims under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code.

3. On May 13, 2015, MISD filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal with the Travis County District Clerk, pursuant to Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

4. This case is currently set for trial this coming Monday, May 18, 2015. 5. On May 13, 2015, after determining that Plaintiff opposes a stay (they also oppose a continuance), MISD filed a Motion for Stay or for Continuance in the district court. Counsel has been informed that the district court will not be able to have the motion heard in the district court before 9:00 a.m. on May 18, 2015, and that it is in the discretion of the district judge assigned at that time whether to even consider the motion prior to trial. Thus, MISD seeks this emergency relief here.

6. Even assuming the automatic stay provided for in Section 51.014(b) does not apply to stay all proceedings ^[1] , the stay of the trial should be granted pursuant to Rule 29.5 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Allowing a trial to proceed pending the interlocutory appeal would interfere with or impair the jurisdiction of the appellate court or effectiveness of any relief sought or that may be granted on appeal, which is prohibited by Rule 29.5. Specifically, the relief *3 sought on appeal is a dismissal of the claims over which MISD asserts the trial court lacks jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. Such immunity is immunity from suit. See, e.g., San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas , 13-0966, 2015 WL 1873217, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 24, 2015); City of Houston v. Williams , 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011). Thus, if MISD is immune from suit, as it argues, and is asking this Court to decide, it should not be subject to the burdens of a trial. If the trial court continues to assert jurisdiction and conducts a trial, the effectiveness of this Court’s remedy finding of a lack of jurisdiction will have been impaired and rendered null. Not only would a trial on the merits at this point frustrate the purposes of immunity to the detriment of MISD, but it also could result in a needless waste of the trial court’s judicial resources in conducting a jury trial over which it has no jurisdiction.

P RAYER

For the reasons stated in this motion, Appellant asks the Court for an emergency stay of jury trial pending interlocutory appeal. *4 Respectfully submitted, By:___________________________ Jennifer A. Powell Texas Bar No. 00783554 Abraham F. Barker Texas Bar No. 24073241 4201 W. Parmer Lane, Suite A100 Austin, Texas 78727 512/476-9944 512/472-2599 fax Attorneys for Manor Independent School District CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE On May 13, 2015, I conferred with Gary Bledsoe, attorney for Plaintiff, and he stated that he is opposed to a stay of the trial.

_________________________ Jennifer A. Powell CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been sent via court-generated electronic means and/or email on May 14, 2015, to the following:

Gary L. Bledsoe

Alondra Johnson Potter Bledsoe, LLP 316 West 12 Street, Suite 307

Austin, Texas 78701 Attorneys for Deydra Steans

______________________________ Jennifer A. Powell

[1] That section provides for an automatic stay of all proceedings if the plea to the jurisdiction is filed and requested for hearing within 180 days of the filing of the appropriate responsive pleading. Defendant could not file its plea to the jurisdiction within that time frame because it was based on jurisdictional facts and, thus, required discovery, which was delayed for various reasons, including an informal agreed stay pending protracted settlement discussions. The plea was filed within a reasonable amount of time following the close of discovery (filed March 4, 2015 after last depositions signed January 8, 2015).