Opinion by
From the granting of defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. y. in this action of trespass for damages to an automobile owned by plaintiff, she .has brought this appeal. The damages complained of resulted.from a right-angle collision between her -automobile and One-owned *395 and operаted by defendant. Her car, in which she was riding, was being operated by her brother-in-law, E. L. Strucher. The collision occurred at the intersection оf Fourth Street and the east lane of Mohawk Drive in the City of Erie. Plaintiff’s car was proceeding east on Fourth Street, an unpaved street 26 feet wide, and defendant’s car was proceeding north in the east lane of Mohawk Drive, a 51-foot divided boulevard, with two traffic lanes, eаch 18 feet wide, separated by a grass plot, also 18 feet in width.
The collision happened about one o’clock in the afternoon of November 7,1917, and there was nothing to prevent the driver of either machine from seeing the other in ample time to have avoided the collision. As stated by Linn, J., later Mr. Justice Linn, in
Brayman v. DeWolf,
As the verdict was for plaintiff, she is entitled to the benefit of the testimony most favorable to her, not only on her own side, but alsо on the side of the defendant.
Holland v. Kohn,
She testified that she herself first saw defendant’s automobile 200 feet south of Fourth Street when her automobile was 18 feet west of the westerly line of Mohawk Drive. When she first saw it, she didn’t pay any attеntion to how fast it was going. When she next saw it, it was 50 to 75 feet away and going “about forty miles an hour”; her car was then “almost past the center оf the boulevard” going about “twelve miles an hour.”, Ac *396 cording to her testimony they continued at that rate of speed until just before the collision, when she told her brother-in-law that she didn’t think defendant was going to stop, and that he, Strucher, then “applied his brakes and turned left” but too late to prevent colliding with the other car. Defendant testified that as he neared the intersection he was driving only 20 miles per hour; and as that may be considered more favorable to plaintiff than her own testimony that he was driving twice that fast, she is entitled to the benefit of it, for whatever it may bе worth.
The question as thus resolved is whether plaintiff’s car had reached the intersection so far in advance of defendant’s, which had the right оf way since it was approaching from the right, as to afford reasonable time to clear the crossing. It is abundantly clear that it had not and it was the duty of the court to so declare.
Brayman v. DeWolf,
supra;
Weber v. Greenebaum,
Defendant testified that Strucher told him that he never saw his car before the collision — that may аccount for his not being called by plaintiff — and two police officers testified that practically all of the damage was on the lеft side of defendant’s car and the front end of plaintiff’s. She herself testified “the whole front end of it was jammed in.” As stated by the learned president judgе of the court below: “The facts in the case . . . are not complicated. Robert G-. Lamberton was proceeding north on Mohawk Drive, a fifty-four foot boulevard, and when he was thus proceeding at a speed of forty miles per hour., [twenty miles according to his testimony],' his car was plainly visible to . . . [the] driver of the Man-nix car, for an admitted distance of two' hundred feet. *397 When the Lamberton car was first sighted, the Mannix car was about to enter the intersection on Fourth Street, which is a twenty-six foot street, and, obviously, the driver of the Mannix car was charged with knowledgе of an impending collision, unless reasonable precaution was taken. Nevertheless, the Mannix car continued to proceed . . . across the boulevard into the path of the oncoming car of the defendant until the inevitable occurred.”
Plaintiff testified that she had bеen living with her sister and brother-in-law, but at the time of the accident the brother-in-law was driving her “to a new apartment . . . that . . . [she] had just rented.” Since he wаs driving the car, in which she was a passenger, at her request and on her business, his negligence would bar her from recovery. In that respect the сase is strikingly similar to
Von Cannon v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.,
The Court continued (page 342) : “The remaining question is whether upon this record as it stood at the conclusion of the testimony the trial judge should have held that the contributory negligence of aрpellee’s driver was imputable to her as a matter of law. Here, as in McMahen v. White, supra [
Rodgers v. Saxton,
Judgment affirmed.