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Manning v. State
704 S.W.2d 825
Tex. App.
1985
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*2 AKIN, Before HOWELL, GUILLOT and case is without merit. charge The set JJ. forth the elements of stand trial in language tracking the statu- AKIN1, Justice. tory definition. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. Keith Dwight Manning appeals his con- 46.02(l)(a) (Vernon 1979). ANN. art. This murder, for murder, victions attempted language clearly sets forth those facts three counts aggravated robbery, of all jury stated, which the must find. As so arising hold-up from the of a convenience charge fundamentally was not errone- Manning store. received two life sentences error, any, ous since if deny appеl- did not attempted murder and murder and impartial lant a fair and trial. fifty-year three aggrava- sentences for the Appellant further contends that the robbery ted Appellant convictions. asserts charge failed to properly place the burden grounds error, three of none of which were proof. case, ordinary of In the the burden preserved by proper objection at trial. All proof is on of the defendant to show incom concern claimed errors in the trial court’s petence by preponderance of the evi charge, and all are asserted to be funda- dence. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. mental error. alleged Because none of the (Vernon 46.02(l)(b) 1979). art. That section fundamental, errors are we affirm the of the statute states: judgment of the trial court. (b). presumed A competent defendant is instance, In each apply we must the tests compe- stand trial and shall be found for fundamental error set forth in Alman proved tent to stand trial unless incom- za v. (Tex.Crim.App. petent by preponderance of the evi- 1984). Appellant’s ground first of error is [emphasis dence added]. case, common to all five cases. In each he Appellant apparently complains in his charge given brief jury asserts that the to the Manning’s pretrial competency hearing erroneously presumed that the trial court fundamentally defective because it both incompetence placed the burden of proof” “misstated the burden of proof upon upon the State rather than apply very the law to the facts “fail[ed] provided Ap- defendant as in the statute. of the case.” pellant cannot by erroneously be harmed receiving presumption. the benefit of a charge objected The now to states say, any Needless to such error cannot be pertinent part: fundamentally erroneous. person Under our law no can be tried for Nevertheless, a criminal offense while a state of a differ- dissent raises present tency by the State to n preponderance credible n is, by testimony. incompetency. The competency [*] prove [*] greater weight of the defendant’s in this case is [*] n evidence; upon [*] of ent first mitment to Rusk asserts that argument presented notes that to this due to to stand trial. on behalf of appellant’s previous was based his brief. this presumed Hospital, on finding unvacat- dissent dissent from com- year incompetency, ed the bur- provides person Our law that a is deemed den of incompetent on the issue of to stand trial he does not have present ability sufficient to consult shifts to the State. then fur- The dissent lawyer degree with his with a persua- reasonable ther would hold that the burden of or, understanding; of rational a rational sion is now shifted to the State and that understanding as well as a factual “beyond burden was the a reasonable proceedings against [emphasis him add- doubt” standard rather cases ed]. “by than the the evi- charge given jury dence” standard in the Appellant’s charge contention that apply failed to the law to the fаcts of the here. Because an incorrect standard was opinion originally assigned 1. This to the dissenter. indicate, there

given jury, ney’s questions in the would the dissent question asserts on behalf that funda- as to the effect of such be a error been has shown and that on the burden of prior adjudication jury finding must over- support cases would lend Prior Texas agree. turned. We cannot prior adjudica proposition that such a presump incompetency creates the tion of Initially we notе that is no clear there *3 continuing incompetency. In such a tion of evidence in the record us the before of situation, required would then be the State appellant’s prior of to nature commitment competent the defendant at the prove to competency The Rusk. evidence at State, 583 S.W.2d v. time of trial. exclusively the state- consisted of Schaffer However, witness, 627, (Tex.Crim.App.1979). medical 630 ments of the State’s a specializing psychiatry. by in No of doctor as statеd the Texas Court Criminal banc, any adjudication incompetency of parte in Ex Yar record of en Appeals, sitting testimony in the record. The of the is (Tex.Crim.App. borough, 607 S.W.2d 565 clearly fails to establish the reason witness 1980) change presumption of does not this incarceration at Rusk. change of The State the standard respect, this the doctor testified that sanity ac only need “establish the appellant, year prior in the by preponderance of the evidence.” cusеd a case, tency hearing in this was “sent Yarborough, 607 S.W.2d at 566. in- Hospital criminally for the Rusk State Admittedly, Yarborough is somewhat stayed Fort He there sane from Worth. case. The court in Yar- different from our days when he out of the about 18 broke borough construing previous provi- in building ... and he has not been back which re- sion of the Mental Health Code hospital period since that time.” La- of in- continuing presumption of moved the ter, “[tjhere this witness testified that is no discharge competency upon patient’s indication at all that this ‍​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‍man has ever been hospital, that the issue from the mental so mentally During ill.” cross-examination proper standard there did not concern witness, attorney this the defense stated Further, shifts. once the burden that “there was a out of a Fort quoted above refers to sani- the statement him Worth court that sent to Rusk State defendant, competency. not ty of the incompetent; is Hospital that said he was it replied that correct?” The witness Nevertheless, Yarborоugh is pertinent in attorney, The defense later was. First, re- reasons. the cases here for two cross-examination, asked the witness to ex- “beyond for use of upon by lied the dissent judg- plain “why there is that unvacated proper standard doubt” as reasonable incompetency.” The witness re- ment of v. cases. See Morrow insanity all are also plied the doctor in Fort Worth tended 481, State, 21, 224 S.W.2d 154 Tex.Crim. everybody schizophrenic,” “call State, Murray v. (1949); 147 Tex.Crim. 484 with that was sent to Rusk Herring v. 475, (1944); 474, 477 182 S.W.2d diagnosis. 416, State, 281, 148 S.W.2d 141 Tex.Crim. State, v. (1941); 139 Gunter Tex.Crim. If the basis for incarceration 116, (1940). illness,” 145, Other as the witness’s S.W.2d Rusk was “mental v. Glover testimony quoted point above and later include initial cases on this earlier schizophrenia indi regarding 605, statements 125 Tex.Crim. cate, 125, not be a determination this would Witty v. (1934) Tex.Crim. incompetency to stand trial. mental The other 1147-48 153 S.W. (Tex.

Leyva v. 552 S.W.2d support its cited dissent case State, v. Crim.App.1977); Ainsworth Tuttle, contention, (Tex.Crim.App.1973). only (Tex.Crim.App.1969) concerns and not to the State the shift in burden incompeten finding If the basis is true applied. same to be trial, standard dissent assumes cy to stand as the the defense attor responses and as Schaffer Second, insanity concerning the standard of incompetency to stand should, any defense cases different from thé court of criminal has rec cases, that in be more strin ognized that the statute as then codified gent rather than less. If a applicable affected the common law rules of the evidence is a sufficient burden for September to that issue. From 1959 to issue, insanity the State when is at no more when all recent cases relied on should be when is at Yarborough Paul as well as dissent issue. We need not decide what the stan decided, were article 5547-83 stated: dard of should be when the issue (a) judicial determination under this insanity raised is the defense. It person mentally incompe- Code that a that once reasonable to hold presumption tent per- creates that the must, presumed, the as an element mentally incompetent son continues tо be crime, prove beyond a reasonable doubt discharged until he is from the mental that the defendant was sane at the time the hospital or until his mental crime was committed. But *4 by redetermined a court. crime, is stand trial not an element of a and 30, 1959, 409, 1, May Act of ch. § hearing on this issue is civil in nature. 887, by amended Tex.Gen.Laws Act of State, Parker v. (Tex.App. 667 S.W.2d 185 ref'd), 27, 1983, 47, 1, April ch. 1983 Tex.Gen. § denied, 1983, ert. pet. -Texarkana - c 211, Laws 261-62. The statute now reads -, U.S. 105 S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d pertinent part: in State, Lingerfelt v. 629 S.W.2d 216 ref’d). (Tex.App. pet. competency presumed Mental is in the - Dallas contrary judicial absence of a determina- No valid reason exists to hold that provisions tion under Texas competency in the standard to stand trial Probate Code. cases should be the same of the State for criminal elements of a crime. We need not determine whether this ‍​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‍Apart placing from an unreasonable bur change prior in the statute reverses the holding den on the such a as the incompetency pre- rule in Texаs that is dissent would have us make is not constitu adjudication an sumed to continue once tionally United logically required. nor incompetency has been obtained since in Makris, (5th States v. 535 F.2d 899 Cir. case, placed the trial court this denied, 1976), rehearing 540 F.2d competency to show on the State. denied, cert. 430 U.S. S.Ct. However, because the issue Makris L.Ed.2d 803. The court relied on distinguishable from a claim of the “element of the crime” test as estab defense, by as a the cases cited the dissent lishing the line whiсh between those issues persuasive question are not on the of stan- proved by beyond must be the State therefore, conclude, dard of We reasonable doubt and those which need substantially charge given that was only by be shown of the correct, and, plac- in that if the court erred evidence. appel- ing the burden of on the Furthermore, 5547-83, article the statute lant not have been could harmed. Conse- previously relied on some Texas courts quently, it could not be fundamentаl error. holding that the burden of shifts to Appellant in and asserts his second has been amended. some grounds charge third of error that cases, recent the court of criminal jury phase of the trial in the criminal apparently previous ver has relied on the (1) failing apply in law erred abstract continuing presumption both sion as to facts, (2) particular of alibi to the and de and as to termination fine “without effective consent.” Neither e.g., presumption upon discharge. points of these were raised the trial Paul v. (Tex.Crim. court, ground and thus cannot be a parte Yarborough, App.1976); they reversal unless are found to constitute By relying S.W.2d 565. on this statute to no fun- in cases “fundamental error.” We hold that determine burden of shifts Hospital and petent sent to Rusk State damental error is shown under the Alman- za standard. that the at the time of trial was unvacated respect with to the de instant case.

fense alibi read: notes, at majority the evidence As the A defense submitted the defendant in heаring consisted exclu- this case what known law as an of the State’s witness. sively of statements alibi, is, if the offense was testimony and portions of his The relevant committed, alleged, the defendant follow: was, cross-examination at the time of the commission there- of, place another different from year [appellant] Last witness:] [The that at which such offense was commit- Hospital crimi- to Rusk State for the sent therefore, and, ted and could not not nally from He insane Fort Worth. person have been the who committed the he stayed days there about 18 when same. managed building of the broke out Now, you have a doubt as reasonable scale a fence.... But he did this and he presence of the defendant at the hospital been in the since has not back committed, place where the offense was period of time. committed, if an offense was at the time thereof, you of the will commission then Q right. essentially All The reason guilty. find the defendant not having is be- why we’re this paragraph We hold that the second out cause there was a *5 charge adequately applies the law to Fort Worth Court that sent him to error, any, egre- facts and was not so Hospital he Rusk that said was gious deprived appellant have as to of a incompetent; is that correct? impartial fair and trial. A That’s correct. Appellant’s ground third of error Q why And the reason we’re here is to only aggravated robbery relates to the two again competency? his detеrmine note convictions. We that the court includ Yes, A sir. following ed the definition: “Effective consent” includes consent Q you theory Okay. You said had a person legally authorized to act for the Rusk; why they about sent him to is that owner. if in- Consent is not effective correct. force, duced threat or fraud. Yes, A sir. general statutory This definition of this, Q may regret right. All And I effective consent set forth in the Penal Doctor, but, what basis of that is the TEX. PENAL ANN. Code. CODE that theory? questions That’s one of the 1.07(a)(12)(A)(Vernon 1974). The court’s § here is unva- why we have there is that negative, if error at failure to define incompetency. judgment cated all, category of funda- would not rise your theory as to that? What’s mental error. happen psychiatrist A I to know the Affirmed. him in and he who examined Fort Worth tendency everybody call great has a HOWELL, J., opinion. dissenting files a this, in he did. schizophrenic. And fact Justice, HOWELL, dissenting. And Fort Worth has a little different they use system that use than what we I dissent because I believe that sending in terms of some cases to Rusk. State’s burden of at the hearing governed by sent with that the standard So that he was to Rusk beyond diag- diagnosis. reasonable doubt. Rusk did not find that added) (emphasis nosis at all. appellant’s competency from

The record appel- The witness confirmed twice that during year previ- reflects that subject trial, lant was the of a adjudicated ous to his he was incom- insanity” judgment. “present rather spoke The witness further confirmed in terms of judgment that the was unvacated and the the in competency, but than terms рurpose competency hearing of the instant capacity quiry identical —the appellant’s compe- was to redetermine Morrow time of trial. the accused at the tency. states: majority appear placed the does not to find The careful trial court these statements sufficient to constitute beyond proof upon the State to show of a reasonable doubt prior adjudication ‍​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‍clear evidence of a only appel not Rather, incompetency. they seem to read alleged time of the lant was sane at the the statements of the State’s witness that offense, but also at the time of psychiatrist in Fort tended Worth he had been on account of the fact that everybody schizophrenic” “call and that County found insane in the Tarrant diag- to Rusk with that was “sent Court_ instruction such We think judgment showing nosis” as that the proposition correct law. See was a Fort Worth court was without foundation. 145, v. Gunter 139 Tex.Cr.R. We cannot revise None оf this is relevant. 116; Tex. Herring v. S.W.2d court, final of the Fort Worth 281, 148 S.W.2d 416. Cr.R. erroneous or not.1 Morrow, (emphasis add at 485 S.W.2d psychiatrist in a The role of the Tuttle, ed). See also is not tency hearing legal to make (notes (Tex.Crim.App.1969) determination, present psy- relevant but stating stan without burden is on the State opinion relating to the ac- chiatric evidence following involv proof). cases dard of to the trier of cused’s mental condition ing of the offense hold insanity at the time competen- legal fact. Thе determination of of the defendant’s instances cy province the trier of fact. is the beyond burden is adjudication, the State’s Incompetency, 18 BAY- Mental Magnus, State, v. Murray reasonable doubt: (1966). A fair LOR L.REV. 40-41 read- (1944); Tex.Crim. ing does not of the witness’s statements Herring v. 141 Tex.Crim. any create conflict or confusion (1941); Gunter at Rusk nature of incarceration *6 139 Tex.Crim. S.W.2d incompetency. on the basis of (1940). “competency the history The of majority, quoted by As and discussed the Town thoroughly discussed doctrine” is competеncy charge placed the the burden (Tex.Crim. send v. proof Clearly, of the under the on State. the rule App.1968). noted that The court shown, court circumstances the trial was incompetent person is against trying an However, required to do so. the writer from the long can be traced established and agree preponderance cannot of the times_” Town common law earliest proper From evidence was the burden. send, at 58. S.W.2d times, Ap of earliest the Court Criminal read majority appears The adjudi peals prior has the (Tex.Crim. Yarborough, compe prove such as this to cation cases (en banc) reducing App.1980) as the State’s See tency beyond doubt. a reasonable That defend preponderance. to a burden Morrow v. 154 Tex.Cr.R. adjudicated insane previously ant had been TEX (1949); Teague, 2 M. S.W.2d offense respect to the time of the both with PRACTICE GUIDE 53.- AS CRIMINAL § was later dis and the time of trial. He prior years, the cases 04[3] hearing, jury App.1982). at which the Additionally, majоrity At the the would read the wit diag preventing incompetent, psychiatrist ness’s statements as someone a found Futch to be being schizophrenic severely psychotic from also sub nosed as was a testified that Futch ject adjudication to an of precise to stand are not schizophrenic. The conditions chronic Such factual situation exclusive; trial. involved at the first diagnosis, mutually a medical one is competency hearing in by law. the other a test defined (Tex.Crim. Futch v. charged hospital from the mental where he TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 1.27 (Vernon 1977). noted, previously had been There committed. was no hear As ing as sanity. to the restoration of his from the com- doctrine stems Construing provision Thus, of the Mental law. the commonlaw standard mon Code, Health the court declared that dis requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt charge alone presumption terminates the of apply. of trial must at time incompetency. say: It on to went illogical it is majority urges prove caрacity

Prior the State to mental an unvacated burden of insanity presumption beyond established a a reasonable doubt whereas the continuing insanity, shifting thus prior defensive in the absence of burden of to the State to establish adjudication by preponderance. is Inso- sanity prepon- of the accused capacity at the time far as mental of the However, derance the evidence. concerned, requirement offense is 5547-81(b), enactment of Article V.A.C.S. beyond рrobably doubt a reasonable presumption continuing abolished the enjoys protection. constitutional Mental patient mental where the incapaci- capacity presumed to exist until (citations omitted) discharged, ty proven. destroys A presumption contrary and creates the (emphasis at 566 Yarborough, part incapacity. As a of its presumption added). Although relying on this lan- prove beyond constitutional burden guage, majority concedes it to be dicta. culрa- the existence of a reasonable doubt Dicta, submitted, it should in- never be state, prove must mental the State men- ble terpreted overruling as established authori- capacity tal at the time offense ty. majority higher standard. Our takes Yarborough sup- Neither do the citations position pre-trial that at a on port a the evidence test. capacity to the defendant’s mental stand Clark, Tuttle, Amos, simply and McGee higher is not constitu- standard prior adjudication state shifts the bur- However, tionally Perhaps, so. mandated. den to the already State.2 noted, As the old- criminal has made no the court of er cases employ the term “insanity” regard- the burden of Wherever distinction. ing both criminal responsibility (insanity as a concerning capacity has devolved defense) and competencyto stand (pres- trial imposed has upon the the court ent insanity). Townsend, 427 61; S.W.2d at beyond doubt. We test of a reasonable Comment, Both Issues: Insanity and rulings disregard the of that court cannоt Incompetency, 22 BAYLOR L.REV. 230 by labeling “illogical.” simply them (1970). The Morrow dealt with men- significance in the majority finds capacity tal both at the time of the offense of the Men- article 5547-83 amendment of *7 and at the time of trial and made no distinc- say, the shift- Health Code. Suffice ‍​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‍tal tion in the standard of Mor- long before there ing burden rule existed row, 224 S.W.2d at 485. The fact that a mental health code. Code is silent as newest version of the the governed by are Competency hearings shifts cannot be the burden to whether of Criminal Proce- 46.02 of the Code article repeal long of a taken as the affirmative nor the standard Neither the burden dure. Furthermore, rule. standing common law in cases of no distinction be- amendment draws the provided else- therein. It addressed capacity at the time of the tween pro- fails to Code where the] “[where of trial. To inter- the time offense and at any particular in procedure a rule of vide providing for no arise, the amendment as pret rules of cаse which state concerning capacity at govern.” shift of the burden applied and law shall be common 8). p. ion majority specifically notes this with re- Tuttle, (opin- gard S.W.2d at 194 to Ex grave specific al or the State constitution in the the time of the offense would raise questions. interpret importance constitutional To does not diminish its instance abolishing as the shift in the amendment safeguard against unjust imprison as a in one instance and not the other would ment. The decisions of our court оf crimi credulity.3 strain long provided higher have nal previously standard of to those who Nothing in the of Criminal Proce- Code adjudicated lacking in mental were be dure or the Mental Health Code varies capacity, incapacity whether that be labeled laid down Morrow and sim- requirement charge incompetency. ilar cases. It follows that as or reliance in error as this ease was upon the decisions of the court of criminal persuasion. appellant apрeals, it should be held that impartial was denied a fair and trial.

Having con determined wrong proof, such tained the standard of appeal I dissent. The should be abated of Alman light error must be evaluated in the case remanded for a new and (Tex.Crim. za v. 686 S.W.2d tency hearing.4 App.1984) requires which a determination of whether claim of fundamen egregious

tal error is “so created such and appellant fair and

harm that has not had a degree must

impartial trial.” The of harm light jury charge judged in of the entire Almanza, of the evidence. state should hold

686 S.W.2d at 171. This court egregious did sustain harm COWETT, Appellant, Linda Brine him fair deprive as to of a of such nature charged impartial trial where the court v. upon the evidence BRINE, Appellee. T. Nadene charged upon it should have be whereas No. 9399. higher doubt. The bur yond a reasonable repeatedly has been extolled den of Texas, Appeals Court ‍​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‍accused, right a corner as a basic Texarkana. Leland v. process. criminal due stone of 19, 1985. Nov. 790, 802-03, 72 Oregon, 343 U.S. S.Ct. (1952) (Frankfurt 1002, 1009, L.Ed. 1302 17, 1985. Rehearing Dec. Denied Winship, dissenting); see In re er, J., 1068, 1071-72, 358, 362-63, 90 S.Ct. U.S. or not the Whether L.Ed.2d 368 feder guaranteed

higher standard determine, granted question part Iant is now of an 3. The amendment fact, competent whether he was after the Health Code and revision to the Mental overall Garcia lengthy report he was tried and convicted. time legislative filed a committee the along (Tex.Crim.App.1980); adoption. for its a recommendation with (Tex. State, 599 S.W.2d "ambiguous, Brandon v. out- The old code was described dated, (en banc); Crim.App.1979) Caballero v. in- with court decisions and in conflict (Tex.Crim.App.1979). Ret rights." described as ex- volving patient It was depend possible rospective are determinations mentally rights clarifying panding *8 quality ing upon of each case and the facts as an the committee intimate Nowhere does ill. United quantity available. See of evidence objective, revision of the burden Cir.1976), Makris, (5th F.2d 899 States crimi- incapacity connection with U.S. 97 S.Ct. cert. denied ON PUBLIC HOUSE COMM. nal causes. (1977). L.Ed.2d ANALYSIS, HEALTH, 68th TEX. S.B. BILL Therefore, appeal re- Leg. abate the I would the trial case with instructions mand the Brandon, 599 proceed with require in accordance authority court ample 4. There is appel- at 578. fully process met if of due ments

Case Details

Case Name: Manning v. State
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Nov 5, 1985
Citation: 704 S.W.2d 825
Docket Number: 05-84-00816-20-CR
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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