In February 1979, Gregory W. Mannhard (the skier) was killed as a result of a snow avalanche triggered by him and two companions skiing in an out-of-bounds area at Loveland Basin Ski Area. The area was leased, controlled, and maintained by defendant, Clear Creek Skiing Corporation (the operator). Claiming that the skier’s injuries and his subsequent death were caused by the negligence of the operator, the skier’s wife, plaintiff, Judith A. Mann-hard, brought this wrongful death action on behalf of herself and their two minor children. The operator denied liability and claimed that the accident had been caused by the negligence of the skier. It was undisputed that any negligence of his would be imputed to the plaintiff.
After a jury trial, a special verdict was returned finding both the skier and the operator to have been 50% negligent. Accordingly, judgment was entered dismissing plaintiff’s claim. She appeals. We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff contends the court erred (1) in refusing to give her tendered jury instruction which would have informed the jury that the operator owed the highest degree of care because it was engaged in an “inherently dangerous activity,” and (2) by giving, instead, an instruction advising the jury that the operator’s duty was “reasonable care.” We conclude that the rulings on the instructions were proper.
In arguing for a higher standard of care, plaintiff does not claim that the operator’s activities were “highly dangerous” or “ultrahazardous” — such as blasting or impounding of water — for which there is strict liability.
See, e.g., Garden of the Gods Village, Inc. v. Hellman,
In
Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co.,
As to the first criterion, the phrase “inherently dangerous activity” implies some sort of action or affirmative act which would
create
a dangerous situation for others, such as transmission of electricity, as in
Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co., supra,
or delivery of liquified propane gas, as in
Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc.,
We have not been referred to, and we have not found, any Colorado case law in which the “inherently dangerous” classification has been applied to passive activities or inaction pertaining to already existing dangerous natural conditions. We see no need so to extend the concept. Therefore, we hold that, with the exception of the ski tows themselves, which are not involved here, there was no activity engaged in by the operator, and it brought nothing on the land, that was inherently dangerous to the public.
As to the third criterion, the testimony, including that of the skier’s companions, indicated that avalanche danger is a phenomenon of which the public is generally aware, and that conditions under which avalanches are likely to occur are easily recognized by most skiers so they can be avoided. These factors were fully known and appreciated by the skier himself.
Summit County Development Corp. v. Bagnoli,
Under the circumstances of this case, the court was correct in giving the standard reasonable care instruction, CJI-Civ.2d 12:4 (1980), and in refusing to impose a higher standard.
II.
Plaintiff also contends that the jury’s finding that her damages were $100,-000 was so disproportionate to the evidence that it indicated passion, prejudice, and mistake, and requires the court to grant a new trial on all issues. We do not agree.
A finding of $100,000 in damages, on conflicting evidence as to plaintiff’s net pecuniary loss, is not “grossly and manifestly inadequate” nor an amount “so small as to clearly and definitely indicate that the jury ... [was] influenced either by prejudice, passion or other improper considerations.”
Lehrer v. Lorenzen,
Judgment affirmed.