MANNERS v. 5 STAR LODGE AND STABLES, LLC et al.
A18A1227
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
October 23, 2018
McFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
FIFTH DIVISION, MCFADDEN, P. J., RAY and RICKMAN, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk‘s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
Manners appeals the grant of summary judgment to 5 Star and owner Butler. She argues that the shooting occurred in the course and scope of Sisson‘s employment, so 5 Star and Butler are liable for the shooting. She also argues that whether she was on the premises as an invitee or as a licensee is a jury question,
1. Factual background.
“To prevail at summary judgment under
So viewed, the record shows that 5 Star is a lodge and horse-boarding facility that hosts weddings, corporate retreats, and family reunions. After he purchased 5 Star, Butler hired Roxanne Young to manage the lodge and stables, to manage the boarding of horses, and to start leading trail rides. Young and Sisson, her boyfriend, lived in an apartment on the property. Manners and her boyfriend, Keri Wilson, were friends with Young and Sisson, whom they had met at a wedding years before the shooting.
Dorothy Hunt, a friend of Young‘s, was also in the barn at the time of the shooting. She was at 5 Star to take care of the horses during the weekend because Young would be busy with weddings on Saturday and Sunday. Hunt testified that Young had told her that Manners and Wilson were going to help park cars for the weddings as they had done before, although Hunt did not speak with Manners or Wilson about that prospective assignment. There is no evidence that, at the time of the shooting, Manners was engaged in any business at 5 Star, and she testified that she had no plans to return to the property later that weekend to work or for any other reason.
2. Respondeat superior.
“Every person shall be liable for torts committed by his wife, his child, or his servant by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business, whether the same are committed by negligence or voluntarily.”
Manners argues that Dorothy Hunt‘s testimony that Manners and Wilson, her boyfriend, were at the premises to help with the weddings — even though Manners and Wilson did not know that — is evidence that “the gathering [in the barn] before the shooting was at least in part a 5 Star business meeting where Young and Sisson
The evidence is undisputed, however, that whatever the plans may have been for later that weekend, they were not discussing work at the time of the shooting. So there is no evidence that Sisson was engaged in 5 Star‘s business at the time he accidentally shot Manners. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the respondeat superior claim.
3. Premises liability.
Manners argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her premises liability claim because some evidence would allow a jury to find that Manners was on the premises to work and was therefore an invitee, and that 5 Star and Butler breached the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep Manners safe. We disagree.
“The elements of legal liability of the owner of premises for injuries occasioned to persons thereon vary according to whether the person injured was, at the time of the injury, a trespasser, a licensee, an invitee express or implied, or a person standing
As detailed above, whatever the plans may have been for later that weekend, it is undisputed that at the time of the injury, when Sisson accidentally shot Manners, Manners was engaging in a social visit. Under Georgia law, social guests are licensees, not invitees. Thompson v. Oursler, 318 Ga. App. 377, 378 (733 SE2d 359) (2012). So at the time of the injury, 5 Star and Butler only owed Manners the duty not to injure her wantonly or willfully.
Wanton conduct is conduct that “is so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences as to be the equivalent in spirit to actual intent to do harm or
[I]t is also usually wilful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care to prevent injuring a person who is actually known to be or may reasonably be expected to be, within range of a dangerous act being done or a hidden peril on one‘s premises. In other words, a possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if, (a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and (b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and (c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.
Thompson v. Oursler, 318 Ga. App. 377, 378 (733 SE2d 359) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). “Where a licensee has equal knowledge of the dangerous condition or the risks involved, there is no wilful or wanton action on the part of the owner and there is no liability to the licensee.” Trulove, 271 Ga. App. at 682 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).
Judgment affirmed. Ray and Rickman, JJ., concur.