76 Ala. 60 | Ala. | 1884
— The defendant was indicted under the first section of “ An act to prevent, in certain cases, the sale, exchange, and transportation of cotton in the counties of Montgomery, Bullock, Dallas, Russell, Lowndes, Wilcox, Sumter, Autauga, and in beats Nos. one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight and nine of Líale, and of cotton produced in said counties.” — Acts 1878-9, 206. In Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58, where the constitutionality of the second section of the act was in question and considered, it was held, that the legislature of the State has tlie same plenary power of legislation as the British Parliament, except as restrained by the Federal and
It is not urged that the section is prohibited by the provision of the amendment that forbids any State to deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. This was determined adversely to appellant in the cases of Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, and Davis v. State, supra, as respects til's limitation upon the legislative power by the State constitution. And in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, C. J. Waite, after considering the term “due process of law,” as previously understood, observes: “From this it is apparent that, down to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property, necessarily deprived an owner of his property, without due process of law. Under some circumstances they may, but not under all. The amendment does not change the law in this particular; it simply prevents the State from doing that which will operate as such deprivation.”
The proposition pressed by counsel is, that the first section of the act is obnoxious to the inhibition of the amendment, that “no State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Without reference to the history of the amendment, the circumstances under which, and the special purpose for which it was adopted, it is manifest that it does not create or confer any new or additional privileges or immunities. It operates on those already existing, and which may be conferred or recognized by the States — the privileges and immunities meant and embraced by the same terms as elsewhere and previously used in the constitution. In Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, Miller, J., said : “But the most liberal advocates of the rights conferred by that amendment have contended for nothing more, than that the rights of the citizen previously
It must not be supposed, however, that the State government is without power to give the adequate protection, which is its “ sole object and only legitimate end.” The constitution does not inhibit the police power, as generally received and understood, without which the government would be powerless to perform its proper and legitimate functions. This power is necessary for the protection of the lives, health and comfort of persons, and for the protection of property. Every member of the community, over which there is an established and organized government, assumes the obligation to so use his property as not to interfere with or injure the enjoyment of their property by other members, having equal rights. “Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such limitations in their enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.” — Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53.
We will not undertake, what others have found difficult, to fix the boundaries and define the limits of the police power. The line of demarcation between the legitimate exercise of the
The right to dispose of property is not an absolute and unqualified right. It had its origin in the needs and exigencies of organized societies, and is subject to such restraints and regulations as may be necessary to the general peace and good order. — Dorman v. State, supra; Davis v. State, supra. On. this principle is based the validity of all laws regulating the sale of spirituous or vinous liquors, the alienation and conveyance of property, establishing markets and market hours, regulating the sampling and weighing of cotton, prohibiting the carrying on business without a license, and many others, unnecessary to mention. The first section of the act under consideration does not destroy the property in the cotton, nor does it deny the right to sell, use, and enjoy it. It leaves unimpaired and unabridged the substantial right of sale and enjoyment. The prohibition is restricted to “cotton m the seed.”
Affirmed.