8 Paige Ch. 475 | New York Court of Chancery | 1840
I think the surrogate erred in this case, in supposing that the circumstances of the appellant were so precarious as not to afford adequate security for his due administration of the estate of the decedent; according to the true construction of the provision of the revised statutes under which this proceeding was instituted. (2 R. S. 72, § 18.) It certainly could not have been the intention of the legislature, to prohibit the granting of letters testamentary to any executors except such as are possessed of property, of their own, to the full value of the estate which the testator has authorized and appointed them to administer ; or that an executor should be superseded in his trust, or required to find security, whenever his property was reduced below that of the decedent. Such a construction of the statute would render it almost impossible for a man of a large property to select an executor who would be both able and willing to assume the execution of the trust. The obvious meaning of the statute is, that an executor may be required to give security, whenever the surrogate is satisfied that his circumstances are such as to render it doubtful whether the property will be safe in his hands; to be disposed of, or administered, as directed by the will.
Here the testimony shows that the executor is a prudent
For these reasons, the order or decree of the surrogate which is appealed from must be reversed, with costs to be paid by the respondent; and the petition to the surrogate