*4 R ICHARD J. S ULLIVAN and W ILLIAM J. N ARDINI , Circuit Judges , joined by D EBRA A NN L IVINGSTON , Chief Judge , and J OSÉ A. C ABRANES and M ICHAEL H. P ARK , Circuit Judges , concurring in the order denying rehearing en banc :
Unsurprisingly, we concur in the order denying rehearing en banc – we are, after all, the members of the majority that voted to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint in this matter. We add this brief concurrence only to explain our belief that the dissents misapprehend the nature and consequences of the panel majority opinion, which reflects a heartland application of the plausibility pleading standard that has been the law of this Circuit for more than a decade. Put simply, we see no reason to fear that requiring Title VII plaintiffs to allege a plausible link between their chosen statistics and the qualified labor pool for the jobs in question will fundamentally alter the existing Title VII architecture.
The thrust of the dissents’ argument is that statistics concerning the general
population can be used to “nudge” a disparate impact claim “across the line from
conceivable to plausible” at the pleading stage.
Post
, Chin,
J.
, dissenting from
denial of rehearing
en banc
, at 6 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted);
see also post
, Pooler,
J.
, dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc
, at 3. As a
general proposition, we agree.
See Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc.
,
At the pleading stage, a Title VII disparate impact complaint must plausibly
allege that (i) a specific employment practice or policy exists, (ii) a disparity exists,
and (iii) there is a causal connection between the two.
Id.
at 207–09. While
reference to statistics frequently satisfies this pleading burden, both caselaw and
common sense make clear that not just any statistics will do.
Id.
at 209–11. After
all, “statistics come in infinite variety and . . . their usefulness depends on all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances.”
Malave v. Potter
, 320 F.3d 321, 327 (2d
Cir. 2003) (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr.
,
Naturally, information about these particular groups may be difficult to
obtain during discovery, let alone at the pleading stage. So we often allow
plaintiffs to rely on surrogate statistics to prove disparities between comparator
groups that they otherwise could not measure directly. In many cases, this
includes statistics for the general population.
Mandala
,
As the panel majority opinion concludes, general population statistics may
be used only when there is reason to think that they will reflect the qualified labor
pool for the positions in question.
See Mandala
,
Of course, as Judge Chin’s dissent indicates, and as the panel majority
opinion acknowledges, “at the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not prove the
accuracy of a statistical study’s findings or the rigor of its methodology; he need
only generally allege the facts that, accepted as true, make his alleged injury
plausible.”
Post
, Chin,
J.
, dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc
, at 13–14
(brackets omitted) (quoting
John v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.
,
In affirming the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint, the panel majority opinion reasoned that Plaintiffs had failed to provide any connective tissue between their proffered statistics and the qualified labor pool in question (indeed, just the opposite). The dissents assert that the panel majority opinion arrived at this conclusion by impermissibly drawing inferences against Plaintiffs. Not so.
To start, Judge Chin’s dissent suggests that the panel majority opinion’s
conclusion was premature because “the applicant pool . . . has not yet been
defined,”
post
, Chin,
J.
, dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc
, at 23, and
because we don’t yet know whether the “Salesforce developer” and “web
developer” positions at issue here require specialized training or education not
shared among the general population,
id.
at 24–25.
[2]
But Plaintiffs’ complaint says
*9
otherwise. For one thing, “the positions’ titles alone . . . reflect that they require at
least some educational or technical experience that is not shared by the general
population.”
Mandala
,
Next, the dissents suggest that, even if the qualified labor pool in question is more educated than the general population, that does not prohibit Plaintiffs from pleading a plausible claim based only on general population statistics. Post , Chin, J. , dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc , at 25–26; post , Pooler, J. , dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc , at 3–7. Again, we disagree.
Conviction rates and educational attainment are nearly certain to be
inversely correlated on an absolute basis.
See Mandala
,
suggest any particular causal relationship between education and a decrease in conviction rates; there is simply a longstanding link between the two. In other words, the conviction rates for African Americans (and, for that matter, individuals of any race) will fall as we control for higher educational attainment.
This conclusion is not, as Judge Pooler’s dissent suggests, “a negative
inference [drawn] against the complaint that was not in the record.”
Post
, Pooler,
J.
, dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc
, at 4. “The determination of whether
a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is ‘a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’”
EEOC
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.
,
Of course, as Judge Chin’s dissent points out, that absolute conviction rates will fall as we consider more highly educated segments of the population does not mean that the disparity between the conviction rates for African Americans and whites will necessarily disappear. Post , Chin, J. , dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc , at 26. But what it does mean is that, based on the allegations in the complaint, we have no idea what the difference between African American and white conviction rates will be once we limit our focus to highly educated individuals. And that is precisely the point. All we know is that, for highly educated individuals of any race, their conviction rates are unlikely to look like the rates for the general population. Without more, then, the disparities observed in general population statistics are merely consistent with Plaintiffs’ disparate impact theory and do not make their claim plausible. [3]
*12
As the panel majority opinion was careful to explain, this does not mean
that national statistics can never be used in disparate impact cases involving
skilled positions. Plaintiffs simply need to “provide additional allegations to
explain why their chosen national statistics are in fact likely to be representative
of [the] qualified applicant pool” in question.
Mandala
,
While that is sufficient to resolve the matter, it bears noting that new facts introduced by an amicus brief filed in support of rehearing the case confirm this conclusion and underscore the limited impact of the panel majority opinion. Specifically, a brief submitted by several criminology and sociology professors, Dkt. No. 146, identifies a study indicating that “Black men with some college education have imprisonment risks that are seven times greater than white men with some college education (4.9% for Black men compared to 0.7% for white “general population statistics have no application to Plaintiffs[’] claims” because “only qualified individuals” are subject to the at-issue policy), and at length during oral argument.
men),” post , Chin, J. , dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc , at 9 (quoting Kurlychek Amicus Br. at 9); see also post , Pooler, J. , dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc , at 6. In other words, the very figures that might have rendered Plaintiffs’ claims plausible not only exist but also are publicly available; Plaintiffs simply failed to include them in their pleadings. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. , 768 F.3d at 258 (noting that “imprecise pleading is particularly inappropriate where the plaintiffs necessarily had access, without discovery, to specific information from which to fashion a suitable complaint” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
As a result, we see no reason to believe that the panel majority opinion will become “a dangerous precedent” that shuts the courthouse door to disparate impact claims. Post , Chin, J. , dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc , at 28. The fact that such publicly available statistics exist indicates that there is ample factual material on which future litigants may rely to plead plausible disparate impact claims.
* * *
To be clear, we do not take issue with the dissents’ descriptions of the significance of Title VII. See, e.g. , post , Pooler, J. , dissenting from denial of *14 rehearing en banc , at 7–8. Indeed, just the opposite. But even on matters of great importance, we are required to apply the pleading standards as set forth by the Supreme Court and this Court, and under those standards, Plaintiffs’ complaint falls short.
For decades, Title VII claims – just like all other claims – were subject to a
plaintiff-friendly notice pleading standard.
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
, 534
U.S. 506, 512 (2002). That changed with the Supreme Court’s announcement of the
plausibility pleading standard in
Twombly
and
Iqbal
. For better or for worse, that
standard made it harder for all plaintiffs, not just Title VII plaintiffs, to state a claim
for relief. Although one can surely debate the merits of this approach, neither the
Supreme Court nor this Court has ever suggested that Title VII claims are
somehow exempt from the plausibility standard.
See Vega v. Hempstead Union Free
Sch. Dist.
,
I join fully in Judge Chin’s thorough and compelling dissent from the order denying rehearing en banc. I write separately to emphasize two key issues. First, the panel opinion takes the wrong approach to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)’s plausibility standards by making inferences favoring the Defendants while declining to make obvious inferences for Plaintiffs that would rebut the central basis of the panel majority’s reasoning. Second, they take this flawed approach in the context of a Title VII lawsuit, undercutting one of the most important pieces of legislation in this country’s history.
The principal flaw in the panel opinion is its inversion of the traditional
standard applied to pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage. As our court has
once before, this panel opinion has imposed a heightened standard for
employment discrimination against the instructions of the Supreme Court.
See
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
,
These beliefs are accurate reflections of the state of criminal justice in this
country. We should be clear. Black Americans are more likely to be arrested,
convicted, and sentenced more harshly than are whites. In 2019, black Americans
represented 13.4% of the U.S. population but 26.6% of all arrests by law
enforcement, whereas whites represented about 76.3% of the population and
69.4% of arrests.
[2]
The panel opinion does not deny this but instead uses a
statistical sleight of hand to hide the clear implications of NTT’s blanket policy.
*17
Plaintiffs in this case offered general statistical studies showing the
disparate conviction rates among the general population between black and
white individuals. Joint App’x at 15. In
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
, the
Supreme Court recognized that “where figures for the general population might .
. . accurately reflect the pool of qualified candidates, . . . we have . . . permitted
plaintiffs to rest their prima facie cases on such statistics.”
In response, the panel majority points to only one salient distinction
between the general population and the applicant pool: education levels.
See
Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc.
,
The panel majority explicitly acknowledges that it assumes what the data will show regarding education levels. In stating it is “not much of a stretch to imagine that arrest and conviction rates are negatively correlated with education (at least to some degree),” the majority draws a negative inference against the complaint that was not in the record. While statistics provided in amicus briefs reveal that the panel majority is likely correct that as education levels rise arrest and conviction rates fall, it is not clear why the panel majority considered it *19 appropriate to amend the record nostra sponte. Nor does the opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc offer further insight as to where this determination may be found in the record. Instead, the opinion assures us that the court is “nearly certain” about this relationship, “there is simply a longstanding link between the two” factors, and “conviction rates for African Americans . . . will fall as we control for higher educational attainment.” Concurring Op. at 6. The concurrence concludes that this judicial determination was merely a matter of “common sense.” Id . at 7.
I am quite willing to agree that education levels and conviction rates are
likely negatively correlated. However, I am equally certain that racial disparities
will continue to exist even after education levels are considered. It is “nearly
certain” that this disparity will continue to exist, given the longstanding link
between conviction rates and race across education levels, and conviction rates
for black Americans remains higher than for whites as we control for higher
educational attainment. While the concurrence argues that its assumptions
regarding the relationship between education levels are a matter of “common
sense,” that ability to use common sense and judicial experience to draw
conclusions is absent once race enters the equation. In the next paragraph the
*20
concurring judges profess ignorance of how race will interact with education,
“[B]ased on the allegations in the complaint, we have no idea what the difference
between African American and white conviction rates will be once we limit our
focus to highly educated individuals. . . . All we know is that, for highly
educated individuals of any race, . . . conviction rates are unlikely to look like the
rates for the general population.” Concurring Op. at 8. Applying the same
common sense that most Americans exercise in their views of the criminal justice
system and our judicial experience overseeing that system, we know more than
this. We know that racial disparities in conviction and arrest rates will persist
across all education levels. Indeed, as set forth in another amicus brief, the data is
quite clear on this point.
See
Brief for Megan C. Kurlychek et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants,
Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc.,
If the panel majority felt comfortable making its own assumptions regarding how education levels interacted with arrest and conviction rates, it is unclear why they did not feel comfortable making the equally obvious *21 assumption that racial gaps remain as education levels increase. I see no valid principle that permits the court to draw one inference but not the other, particularly at the motion to dismiss stage, all reasonable inferences must be drawn to favor plaintiffs. Our precedent clearly required the panel majority to either make both assumptions or neither, but the majority elected instead to employ its own standards to dismiss this case.
The concurrence notes that the availability of statistics regarding the interaction between race, education, and conviction rates offer sufficient facts for future litigants to successfully plead plausible disparate impact claims. I encourage both future litigants to bring such cases and the Plaintiffs here to move under Rule 60 for relief from the district court’s judgment in order to file an amended complaint that includes statistics incorporating the continued racial gaps in conviction rates as education levels rise. While I hope the district court will allow such amendments and other courts will hear similar cases incorporating these statistics, it should not fall to litigants to correct for the panel majority’s failure to apply the proper standards.
The flaws in the panel opinion are particularly important for our Court to
remedy because they undercut Title VII. Title VII may be this century’s most
*22
important piece of remedial legislation. Title VII struck a body blow to the race-
based caste system that defined this country for centuries, and its promise of fair
treatment has now thankfully been extended to the LGBT community.
See Bostock
v. Clayton County
, --- U.S. ---,
After months of protests, violence, and threats to the Nation’s most storied institutions and principles, more citizens than ever have questioned how different standards of treatment under law for black and white Americans have persisted from our founding to today. Instead of following our precedents and allowing this case to proceed for an examination of the consequences of these inequities, our Court has implemented a novel approach to shut the courthouse doors on plaintiffs. I respectfully dissent.
D ENNY C HIN , Circuit Judge , joined by R OSEMARY S. P OOLER , R OBERT A.
K ATZMANN , R AYMOND J. L OHIER , J R ., and S USAN L. C ARNEY , Circuit Judges , dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc :
By denying the petition for rehearing en banc , the Court ignores a question of exceptional importance: the adverse impact of an absolute convictions bar on individuals seeking employment -- an impact disproportionately borne by African Americans. The heightened pleading standard created by the panel majority for disparate impact cases brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq . ("Title VII"), presents a risk that many meritorious civil rights cases will not be reached on the merits. This is particularly troubling now in light of the implications for the struggle for racial equality that Title VII reflects, as the nation continues to address the issue of systemic racism.
As the panel majority observes, "[f]acts are stubborn things,"
see Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc
.,
As alleged in their complaint, plaintiffs-appellants George Mandala and Charles Barnett were offered jobs by defendant-appellee NTT Data, Inc. ("NTT") -- Mandala a position as a software consultant in New York and Massachusetts, and Barnett a position as a web developer in Kentucky. NTT withdrew the offers, however, after learning that Mandala and Barnett had previously been convicted of crimes. NTT did so pursuant to its blanket policy of denying employment to job applicants based solely on the fact of a prior conviction, without considering individual factors such as the nature and circumstances of the crime, its age, its bearing (if any) on the applicant's ability to perform the job sought, and evidence of rehabilitation and post-conviction good conduct.
Mandala and Barnett, who are African American, brought this action, alleging that NTT's policy of rejecting applicants for employment because of prior convictions without individualized consideration has a disparate impact on African Americans seeking employment, in violation of Title VII. Plaintiffs *25 supported the allegations in their class action complaint with statistics showing that, on a national basis, "African Americans are arrested and incarcerated for crimes at higher rates than Whites, relative to their share of the national population." Joint App'x at 15.
The district court granted NTT's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court rejected plaintiffs' reliance on national statistics, holding that the statistics "do not indicate whether the individuals in the general population cited shared qualifications that would make them viable candidates for either of the positions offered to Plaintiffs." Joint App'x at 70.
The panel majority affirmed. It largely adopted the district court's
reasoning, holding that plaintiffs "provide no allegations to demonstrate that
national arrest or incarceration statistics are in any way representative of the pool
of potential applicants qualified for a position at NTT."
To support its reasoning, the panel majority observes that "[a] simple example of this pitfall would be to apply national height averages to certain subgroups of the population, say NBA players and horse-racing jockeys." Id . at 211. But this case does not involve unique subgroups such as NBA players and horse-racing jockeys, elite athletes who indisputably are at opposite extremes of the height scale. Rather, the case involves two everyday individuals who received job offers for the not uncommon positions of software consultant and web developer, in different parts of the country, from a company with some 18,000 employees in North America and over twenty offices in the United States. *27 While NTT's applicant pool may be different in some respects from the nationwide general population, it is certainly plausible that the workforce at NTT is not substantially different from the general population, and that any differences that do exist are not so significant as to render the national statistics irrelevant. The panel majority concludes otherwise -- even though the issue arose at the pleading stage, before any discovery, when information about NTT's applicant pools was not available.
Even assuming, as the panel majority suggests, that the relevant applicant pool should be limited solely to the web developer and software consultant positions (which is likely unwarranted given the policy's blanket nature and geographic reach), it is certainly plausible -- even probable, as explained below -- that the racial disparity in conviction rates does not dissipate with education. And even if education serves to narrow the racial gap in conviction rates, there is no basis to conclude that education eliminates that disparity.
In hypothesizing that NTT's applicant pool is so different from the
general population that national arrest and conviction statistics must be
inapposite, the panel majority draws an inference
against
plaintiffs, disregarding
*28
governing pleading standards, controlling caselaw, and the well-settled principle
that "[o]n a motion to dismiss, the question is not whether a plaintiff is
likely
to
prevail, but whether the well-pleaded factual allegations
plausibly
give rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination,
i.e.
, whether plaintiffs allege enough to
'nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'"
Vega v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.
,
For these and the further reasons discussed below, I respectfully dissent.
I. The National Statistics
As plaintiffs plausibly allege and national statistics show, "African Americans are arrested and incarcerated for crimes at higher rates than Whites, relative to their share of the national population." Joint App'x at 15. The complaint cites statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI"), the *29 U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"), and scholars, as follows:
● as of 2010, 40% of prisoners in the United States were African American, while African Americans represented only 13% of the overall U.S. population (Prison Policy Initiative study) [2] ; ● some 26.9% of arrests are of African Americans, double their percentage of the general population (FBI and Census statistics);
● projections based on recent trends in
incarceration estimate that one out of every three Black males born today will go to prison, compared to just one out of every seventeen White males, see Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration , 91 Prison J. 87S, 88S (2011);
● audit studies conducted by researchers at Harvard and Princeton found that African Americans with criminal records were particularly disadvantaged in the job market compared to Whites with criminal records, Joint App'x at 15 (citing scholarly journals); and
● the Department of Justice found that Blacks are arrested and convicted at higher rates than Whites, leading the EEOC to conclude that "[n]ational data . . . supports a finding that criminal record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national origin." Joint App'x at 15.
*30 Department of Justice statistics, noted in the EEOC Enforcement Guidance, show that, as of 2010, Black men were incarcerated at almost seven times the rate of White men: Black men were imprisoned at the rate of 3,074 per 100,000, while White men were imprisoned at the rate of 459 per 100,000. [3] And much of this disparity cannot be attributed to the conduct of the individuals subjected to incarceration. For example, studies show that White and Black Americans are equally likely to use drugs and that White Americans are more likely to deal them; yet, Black Americans are arrested for drug crimes at far higher rates. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, A Tale of Two Countries: Racially Targeted Arrests in the Era of Marijuana Reform , at 28-29 (2020) (https://www.aclu.org/report/tale-two-countries-racially-targeted-arrests-era- marijuana-reform); Christopher Ingraham, White People Are More Likely to Deal Drugs, But Black People Are More Likely to Get Arrested For It , Wash. Post (Sept. 30, 2014) (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/30/white- people-are-more-likely-to-deal-drugs-but-black-people-are-more-likely-to-get- *31 arrested-for-it/); see also Kurlychek Amicus Brief at 11 ("[W]hite youth are more likely than minority youth to use marijuana, [but] studies continually show that minority youth are more likely to be arrested for such crimes, particularly marijuana possession.").
While the panel majority speculates that the applicant pools for NTT
are more highly educated than the general population and that racial disparities
in arrest and conviction rates will decrease with education (drawing the
inferences
against
plaintiffs),
see
Statistics also show that a criminal record has a substantially larger impact on Black Americans than on White Americans. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record , 108 Am. J. Soc. 937, 959 (2003) ("The effect of a criminal record is . . . 40% larger for blacks than for whites."); Devah Pager, Bruce Western, & Naomi Sugie, Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records , 623 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 195, 196 (2009) (finding "a significant negative effect of a criminal record on employment outcomes, and one that appears substantially larger for African Americans"). Some states, including New York, recognize the harm that blanket criminal history screens can cause, forbidding companies from denying *33 employment solely because a job applicant has a criminal record, and instead requiring employers to engage in an individualized consideration. [5] As the Eighth Circuit recognized many years ago:
We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place every individual convicted of any offense, except a minor traffic offense, in the permanent ranks of the unemployed. This is particularly true for blacks who have suffered and still suffer from the burdens of discrimination in our society. To deny job opportunities to these individuals because of some conduct which may be remote in time or does not significantly bear upon the particular job requirements is an unnecessarily harsh and unjust burden.
Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.
,
*34 II. Plaintiffs Properly Relied on National Statistics
As the majority acknowledges, national statistics
can
be probative of
whether a challenged policy has a disparate impact.
Mandala
,
Likewise, in
Malave v. Potter
, this Court rejected the district court's
holding, on a summary judgment motion, that plaintiffs were required to
provide statistical information as to "the applicant pool or the eligible labor
pool."
In the context of a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff has even more
latitude in relying on national statistics. We have held that "[a]t the pleading
stage, [a plaintiff] need not prove the accuracy of [a statistical study's] findings or
the rigor of its methodology; he need only generally allege the facts that,
*36
accepted as true, make his alleged injury plausible."
John v. Whole Foods Mkt.
Grp., Inc.
,
Numerous courts have applied these principles to deny motions to dismiss disparate impact claims that rely on general population statistics to challenge such policies, concluding that plaintiffs plausibly stated a disparate impact claim under Title VII. [6] And the EEOC has specifically found that national *37 data "supports a finding that criminal record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national origin." EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra .
Here, plaintiffs did not rely solely on general population statistics nor did they rely on statistics in a conclusory or abstract fashion. Rather, they alleged specific facts and circumstances showing that NTT's blanket convictions bar had an adverse impact on them personally.
Mandala applied for a salesforce developer position while residing
in Rochester, New York, and he was offered a position as an application software
development senior principal consultant in Wellesley, Massachusetts (to work
remotely). Barnett applied for a web developer position while residing in
Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
, No. 4-15-cv-38,
Frankfort, Kentucky, and was offered employment designing websites for the Kentucky Department of Education. Both received offers of employment from NTT, but had their offers withdrawn once NTT learned that they had prior convictions. NTT never asked Mandala and Barnett for information about their convictions, rehabilitation, or post-conviction conduct. Barnett, for example, had obtained two degrees, including a master's in computer science technology -- after his conviction. He also worked for four years for the Commonwealth of Kentucky doing technology and administrative work -- after his convictions. NTT did not consider these post-conviction developments because of its blanket policy.
Mandala and Barnett were clearly qualified for the NTT positions -- they were offered employment -- but the policy barred them from employment without any individualized consideration of the circumstances of their convictions, the relationship between their criminal history and their ability to perform the jobs, or their efforts to rehabilitate and post-conviction conduct. Both were impacted by NTT's policy even though they lived in different parts of the country and applied for different jobs. After Barnett's offer was withdrawn, he "sought to apply for other positions with NTT," but NTT would not consider *39 him for any position because of its policy. Joint App'x at 14. Mandala and Barnett are striking examples of the adverse impact a blanket convictions bar can have on individuals and their families.
In addition to these specific individual allegations, the complaint asserted broader allegations: NTT's policy "systematically eliminates qualified African American applicants based on their race, color or national origin" throughout the United States, Joint App'x at 8, and NTT is a "global" information technology services company with some 18,000 employees in North America and over twenty offices in the United States. In light of the breadth of NTT's blanket policy -- it applies to all jobs, at all levels, all across the country -- plaintiffs' reliance on national statistics at the pleadings stage was eminently reasonable, and the national statistics surely made plaintiffs' claims of disparate impact discrimination even more plausible.
III. The Panel Majority Misapplied the Pleading Standards
On a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff is required only to prove that
"a facially neutral employment policy or practice has a significant disparate
impact" on members of a protected group -- the plaintiff need not prove intent to
discriminate.
Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc.
,
At the pleadings stage, a plaintiff is required only to allege facts
giving rise to a
plausible
inference of a disparate impact based on race -- a
plausible inference that an employment practice "has the effect of denying
members of a protected class equal access to employment opportunities."
M.O.C.H.A. Soc'y, Inc. v. City of Buffalo
,
Here, the district court misapplied the standards applicable to Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Although it acknowledged the "plausibility
standard" in discussing the "general legal principles," Joint App'x at 67-68, in
determining whether the complaint stated a plausible claim, the district court
relied on a decision setting forth the standards for
proving
-- not
pleading
-- a
*43
disparate impact case, Joint App'x at 69 (citing
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R.
,
By affirming the district court's decision, the panel majority adopts the district court's deeply flawed reasoning that plaintiffs were required to provide, at the pleadings stage and before discovery, statistics as to conviction *44 rates for NTT's specific applicant pool. [9] In doing so, the panel majority makes numerous fundamental errors:
First, it rejects plaintiffs' reliance on national statistics, when
numerous courts -- including this Court and the Supreme Court -- have held that
national statistics
can
support a disparate impact claim. At the pleadings stage in
particular, plaintiffs are to be given some latitude in relying on statistics.
See, e.g.,
John
,
Second, the panel majority ignores the likelihood that, even if
specific applicant pool statistics turn out to be more precise in the end, general
population statistics would still be relevant and a logical starting point for the
analysis.
See Williams
,
Third, the majority holds that plaintiffs should have provided statistics pertaining to NTT's applicant pool -- "more granular data," Mandala , 975 F.3d at 212 -- when the applicant pool (assuming the relevant applicant pool is something other than the national workforce) has not yet been defined and plaintiffs have not yet had discovery. Even assuming that statistics as to a specific applicant pool, e.g., salesforce developers in upstate New York, software consultants in Massachusetts, web developers in Kentucky, or -- in the majority's words -- applicants "representative of the pool of potential applicants qualified for a position at NTT," id. at 211, turn out to be more accurate in the end, the absence of such statistics at the motion-to-dismiss stage should not be fatal to plaintiffs' claims, as the appropriate applicant pool cannot be defined until after discovery, when more details about NTT's job requirements and applicant pools would become available. Indeed, as the panel majority acknowledges, see id. at 212 (recognizing that plaintiffs are "undoubtedly working from an informational *46 disadvantage at this early point in the proceedings"), some of this information surely is only in NTT's possession and not publicly available. [10]
Fourth, the panel majority fails to acknowledge the reasonable likelihood that the relevant applicant pool is the national workforce, given that plaintiffs sought employment with NTT in different parts of the country and for different positions, NTT is a global company, with some 18,000 employees and twenty offices in the United States, and its blanket policy applies to all jobs, at all levels, all across the country. The panel majority focuses on "salesforce developer" and "web developer" positions, jobs it speculates "require at least some educational or technical experience that is not shared by the general population." Id. at 211-12. It is not apparent, however, that "salesforce developer" and "web developer" positions, whatever they may be, require such specialized training or education as to make general population statistics *47 inapplicable. Moreover, the panel majority's focus on the two positions ignores plaintiffs' allegations that after Barnett's offer was rescinded for the "web developer" position, he "sought to apply for other positions with NTT" but was told he would not be considered for "other positions because of his felony convictions." Joint App'x at 13-14. Plaintiffs' claims are not limited to salesforce developer and web developer positions, but the panel majority chooses simply to ignore this fact.
Fifth, the panel majority speculates that NTT's applicant pool is more educated than the national population, when it is plausible, given NTT's size and geographic reach, that any differences in education levels are insignificant.
Sixth, the panel majority assumes the existence of a "confounding
variable" and "imagine[s]" that "arrest and conviction rates are negatively
correlated with education (at least to some degree)," without acknowledging the
likelihood that racial disparities will continue to exist to some degree within the
qualified applicant pool, even as the level of education increases.
Seventh, the panel majority surmises that the national statistics do not, "without more, make it plausible that an African-American web developer with the educational and technical qualifications to work at NTT is more likely to have been convicted of a crime than his Caucasian counterpart," id. at 212, when it is perfectly plausible, in light of the statistics discussed above (and, indeed, the experience of the two plaintiffs in this case), that a college-educated African American applying for a position at NTT is more likely to have been convicted of a crime than his college-educated Caucasian counterpart.
And finally, instead of drawing the reasonable inferences in
favor
of
plaintiffs, the panel majority draws inferences
against
them, and chooses the
inferences it prefers.
See Menaker v. Hofstra Univ.
,
In short, the panel majority holds plaintiffs to a heightened pleading standard, requiring them to provide statistics relating to a specific applicant pool, even though a specific applicant pool has not yet been defined and plaintiffs have not yet had access to NTT's records. In concluding that plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim of disparate impact discrimination, the panel majority rejects national statistics that clearly are a logical starting point for the analysis, because of its assumption that education is a "confounding variable" and its surmise that racial disparities in arrest and conviction rates dissipate as education increases.
At the end of the day, after discovery and an opportunity to be heard, plaintiffs' claims may ultimately fail. But in light of the national statistics as well as plaintiffs' allegations with respect to their specific circumstances and their allegations with respect to NTT generally, their claim -- that NTT's blanket policy of denying employment to job applicants based solely on the fact of a prior conviction, without considering individual circumstances, has a disparate impact on African Americans -- is anything but implausible.
IV. Conclusion
Our Court has long recognized the importance of Title VII and the
rights it protects.
[11]
By denying the petition for rehearing
en banc
, the Court is
now leaving in place a decision that will become, I am afraid, a dangerous
precedent, as it will permit courts to dismiss what may be meritorious disparate
impact civil rights claims because plaintiffs, who may be working "from an
informational disadvantage,"
We should rehear this case en banc , vacate the judgment, and remand for plaintiffs to proceed with their claims.
*51 R AYMOND J. L OHIER , J R ., Circuit Judge , joined by R OSEMARY S. P OOLER , R OBERT A. K , ARNEY C L. USAN S and , HIN C ENNY D [*] , ATZMANN Circuit Judges , dissenting from the order denying rehearing in banc:
Although I have very rarely voted to proceed in banc, for the reasons expressed by Judge Chin and Judge Pooler in their opinions dissenting from the denial of rehearing in banc, I dissent. The majority suggests that this case is about no more than applying the plausibility pleading standard set by Iqbal and Twombly to disparate impact cases under Title VII, and that substantive rights under Title VII itself remain unaffected. But a pleading is the key to the courthouse door. When, as here, the standard for pleadings is raised arbitrarily high or subjected almost entirely to the uneven vagaries of judicial “experience” and “common sense,” then those substantive rights that reside just behind the door wither and die.
Mark the panel majority’s decision as one that will need to be revisited and corrected by us, or by Congress, in the future.
Notes
[1] The Supreme Court’s decision in
Dothard v. Rawlinson
does not counsel otherwise. To be sure,
the plaintiffs in
Dothard
were permitted to rely on national height and weight data even though
the defendants argued that the only relevant data was that of the Alabama-based pool of
applicants for the corrections-officer position in question.
[2] Judge Chin’s dissent also suggests that the panel majority opinion overlooks the fact that Plaintiffs’ claims apply to positions other than just Salesforce developer and web developer. Post , Chin, J. , dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc , at 5, 24–25. But the complaint contains factual
[3] Judge Chin’s dissent asserts that the panel majority opinion simply invented this “confounding
variable” rationale on its own.
See post
, Chin,
J.
, dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc
,
at 4 n.1. Again, not so. That the general population statistics in question do not single-handedly
render Plaintiffs’ claims plausible was addressed in the district court’s opinion,
see Mandala v.
NTT Data, Inc.
, No. 18-cv-6591 (CJS),
[1] See, e.g. , Drew Desilver, Michael Lipka & Dalia Fahmy, 10 Things We Know About Race and Policing in the U.S. , Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Jun. 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/03/10-things-we-know-about- race-and-policing-in-the-u-s/ (“Majorities of both black and white Americans say black people are treated less fairly than whites in dealing with the . . . criminal justice system as a whole. . . . 87% of blacks and 61% of whites said the U.S. criminal justice system treats black people less fairly.”)
[2] See U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts: Population Estimates (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219; Fed. Bureau
[1] Notably, the concept of a "confounding variable" formed the core of the panel
majority's original decision.
See
[2] The Prison Policy Initiative study reports racial disparities in incarceration rates not just nationally but in every state. See Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity , Prison Pol'y Initiative (May 28, 2014) (https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html).
[3] See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (April 25, 2012) (https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-consideration- arrest-and-conviction-records-employment-decisions) (citing U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Just. Stat., Prisoners in 2010 , at 27 tbl.14 (2011) (https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ p10.pdf)).
[4] As amici note, Black Americans have disproportionately more contact with police officers than White Americans in the context of stop-and-frisks and traffic stops -- situations where the educational level of the person being stopped or pulled over is not apparent. See Kurlychek Amicus Brief at 8-9. Amici also point to several examples of prominent, highly educated African Americans who have experienced disparate treatment based on race -- Professors Ronald S. Sullivan and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., of Harvard University and South Carolina Senator Tim Scott, who has reported that he has been pulled over by police seven times in one year. See id. at 8-10 & n.14 (citing Tanzina Vega, For Affluent Blacks, Wealth Doesn’t Stop Racial Profiling , CNN (July 14, 2016) (https://money.cnn.com/2016/07/14/news/economy/wealthy-blacks- racialprofiling/index.html)).
[5] The New York statute, for example, provides that an employer may not deny employment because of an individual's prior conviction unless (1) there is "a direct relationship" between the offense and the position sought or (2) the granting of employment would present an "unreasonable risk" to property, specific individuals or the general public. N.Y. Correct. Law § 752 (McKinney 2019). In making this determination, the employer "shall consider," inter alia , the "bearing, if any," the offense will have on the applicant's fitness or ability to perform his duties, the time elapsed since the conviction, the applicant's age at the time the offense was committed, and information concerning rehabilitation and good conduct. N.Y. Correct. Law § 753 (McKinney 2019); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Correct. Law § 750 et seq. (McKinney 2019). As a New York resident, Mandala asserted state law claims, but the district court did not reach them.
[6]
See, e.g.
,
Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co.
,
[7] Our cases have held that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case has
only a "'minimal burden' of alleging facts 'suggesting an inference of discriminatory
motivation.'"
Vega
,
[8] There is, of course, a lack of precision as to what is "plausible" for purposes of Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), and different panels of this Court have interpreted the standard in different ways. By denying the petition for rehearing en banc , the Court also misses an opportunity to resolve whatever intra-circuit conflicts exist among these decisions regarding the standard. What is clear is that the plain meaning of "plausible" is, inter alia , appearing worthy of belief, or superficially fair or reasonable, or credible -- not "probable" or likely to succeed. See, e.g ., Plausible , Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plausible?src=search-dict-hed. The fact that several of my colleagues and I believe that plaintiffs have plausibly asserted a claim of disparate impact discrimination would suggest that, indeed, the claim of disparate impact discrimination is credible, at least superficially fair or reasonable, and crosses the line from "conceivable to plausible."
[9]
See, e.g.
,
[10] Discovery would shed light on, for example, the following questions: what were the positions in question? what were the qualifications necessary for those positions? what was "the pool of qualified candidates?" what was the appropriate geographic area to be considered? was NTT considering applicants on a national basis because successful candidates would work remotely? what are the contours of NTT's criminal history screen? what were the demographics of the individuals in the pool of qualified candidates? what were the demographics of those who applied? were there individuals who did not apply because of the blanket policy? and what were their demographics?
[11] See Matthew Diller & Alexander A. Reinert, The Second Circuit and Social Justice , 85 Fordham L. Rev. 73, 110 (2016) (reviewing Second Circuit's social justice case law and observing that "the deeper significance of the Second Circuit's jurisprudence is its nuance and sensitivity to fundamental power inequality . . . . In 1951, Chief Judge Learned Hand captured the Second Circuit's tradition with brevity and eloquence: 'If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou shall not ration justice.'").
[*] Judge Katzmann concurs in Judge Lohier’s view that: “When, as here, the standard for pleadings is raised arbitrarily high or subjected almost entirely to the uneven vagaries of judicial ‘experience’ and ‘common sense,’” corrective action by the courts or Congress is in order.
