167 Conn. 89 | Conn. | 1974
On February 3, 1971, Local 1199, Drug and Hospital Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O. (hereinafter referred to as the union) filed a petition with the Connecticut state board of labor relations (hereinafter referred to as the board). The petition, seeking certification of the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for a unit of employees in the dietary department of the Manchester Memorial Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the hospital), was heard on March 9, 1971, by the board pursuant to § 31-106 (b)
On April 5,1971, the board issued a supplemental decision and amendment of direction of election in which it classified the executive chef ,as a “supervisor” "within the meaning of § 31-101 (13) of the General Statutes,
On April 8, 1971, the election was conducted by the board and won by the union. The hospital filed objections to the election pursuant to § 561-11 of the general regulations of the board and on April 30,1971, and May 5,1971, a hearing was held before the board. On June 30, 1971, the board issued an order and certification of representative in which the objections to the election were overruled, and the union was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative in the unit previously found to be appropriate. On or about July 8, 1971, the union requested that the hospital commence bargaining with the union but the hospital refused to comply.
On September 22, 1971, the board issued a decision and order in which it concluded as a matter of law that the hospital’s refusal to bargain with the union violated § 31-105 (6)
By its assignment of errors and the arguments in its brief, the hospital makes three claims. The first is that the court erred in reaching the conclusion that “[t]he order and action of the defendant Board was not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or in abuse of discretion.” “The trial court’s conclusions are tested by the finding; State v. Villafane, 164 Conn. 637, 638, 325 A.2d 251; Brauer v. Freccia, 159 Conn. 289, 293, 268 A.2d 645; and they must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the ease. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, 162 Conn. 201, 205-206, 292 A.2d 899; Johnston Jewels, Ltd. v. Leonard, 156 Conn. 75, 79, 239 A.2d 500.” Roby v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 166 Conn. 395, 397, 349 A.2d 838. We have applied this test to the conclusion attacked by the hospital and find that it must stand. The finding contains no facts which are legally or logically inconsistent with the conclusion. It does, however, indicate that the executive chef was ordered to refrain from any election campaign activities because of the uncertainty of his status as either an employee or a supervisor. It further indicates that on April 5, 1971, the board did determine that the “Executive Chef is a ‘supervisor’ within the meaning of Section 31-101 (13) of the General Statutes,” excluded him from the bargaining unit and
We next turn to the claim of the hospital that the board “violated the . . . [hospital’s] federal and state constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.” In its brief, the hospital argues that when the board silenced its principal supervisor during the election campaign it effectively silenced the employer. We do not agree.
The trial court concluded that the order of the board w.as “not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.” It has been demonstrated above that this conclusion must stand. Furthermore, in the context of a labor election campaign wherein the status of the executive chef was uncertain, ,an order such as that issued by the board cannot be fairly characterized as an impermissible burden on the employer’s freedom of speech. In such campaigns the essence of the employer’s first amendment right to be protected is the employer’s freedom to communicate to his employees his views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618, 89 S. Ct. 1918, 23 L. Ed. 2d 547, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 35, 24 L. Ed. 2d 123; N.L.R.B. v. Henriksen, Inc., 481 F.2d 1156, 1162 (5th Cir.); Amalgamated Local Union 355 v. N.L.R.B., 481 F.2d 996, 1004, n.13 (2d Cir.); E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 480 F.2d 1245, 1247 (4th Cir.); Singer Co. v. N.L.R.B., 480 F.2d 269, 271 (10th Cir.).
In its brief the hospital cites several eases for the proposition that “it has long been recognized that publicizing the facts respecting a labor dispute by pamphlet, banner or word of mouth is regarded as a right of free communication guaranteed by the Federal Constitution,” but the uncontested facts of this case in no way suggest that the order of the board foreclosed the hospital’s right to utilize any of these means to communicate its views to its employees. The hospital admits that no Connecticut eases characterize orders such as the one issued by the board in the present case as a “deprivation of an employer’s constitutional freedoms of speech and expression,” but it then asserts that “numerous cases decided under the Federal Act have done so.” It cites none of these “numerous cases” in its brief, and our research has failed to uncover them elsewhere. Those cases which it does cite are clearly distinguishable from the fact pattern of the present case and do little to advance the claim of the hospital. On the basis of the uncontested facts and applicable law, we therefore conclude that the order of the board did not violate the hospital’s federal or state constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
“[General Statutes] Sec. 31-106. election oe representatives. . . . (b) When it is complained by an employee or his representative that there is a question or controversy concerning the representation of employees, the board shall hear the matter and order an election, or use any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives. When it is complained by an employer or his
“[General Statutes] Sec. 31-101. definitions. . . . (13) 'supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment . . . .”
“[General Statutes] Sec. 31-105. unfair labor practices. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer: ... (6) to refuse to bargain collectively -with the representatives of employees, subject to the provisions of said section 31-106 . . . .”
Subsection 8c of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 158c, was enacted for the sole purpose of protecting the employer’s right to free speech in labor matters. U. S. Code Congressional Service, 80th Congress, First Session, 1947, p. 1151.