206 Conn. 439 | Conn. | 1988
The plaintiff, John Malvicini, appeals from a judgment in favor of the defendants, Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., and United National Cor
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. The plaintiff checked into the defendant Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., on July 6, 1977, at about 9 p.m. Before retiring that night, he took a shower. The shower was in a tub enclosed with a glass or plastic door. He awakened the next day, went into the bathroom, turned on the shower and “regulated” or “adjusted” the water. He then went to the toilet. A minute or two after he had first turned on the water he got into the shower. It is his standard procedure “all the time” to turn on the shower, adjust it, feel the water and then get in. Once he got into the shower, he did not make any adjustment to the knobs at all. At that time, the water was “pleasant,” he “soaped up,” and after “about a minute or two” he heard a “pssst” sound and he was hit with steaming hot water. He fell at least twice in the tub, hitting various parts of his body. Thereafter, having apparently opened the shower door, he found himself on the floor of the bathroom. There was a hole in the shower door and the plaintiff had “all kinds of chips on [himself].”
The plaintiff alleged that he had received first degree burns on his chest and neck, a concussion and three herniated discs. He also testified on direct examination that “there were no strips, no skid strips, no mat, no nothing,” just a shower and bathtub that was enclosed in glass on the morning of his alleged accident. On cross-examination, he testified that the night before, when he had taken his shower, there had been no skid
The defendants’ front office manager, Agnes Lowery, who was on duty at the desk when the plaintiff checked out, testified that after he complained about the general quality of the bathroom, she immediately went up to the plaintiff’s room with one of her fellow workers
The jury found for the defendants and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The plaintiff filed a request to charge on res ipsa loquitur and took a timely exception. We find no error.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, literally “the thing speaks for itself,” permits a jury to infer negligence
“We have frequently stated the three conditions under which the doctrine might apply: (1) The situation, condition, or apparatus causing the injury must be such that in the ordinary course of events no injury would result unless from a careless construction, inspection or user. (2) Both inspection and user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party charged with neglect. (3) The injurious occurrence or condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the party injured.” Schurgast v. Schumann, supra; Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 320, 175 A. 679 (1934); Stebel v. Connecticut Co., supra, 26; 4 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, supra. Whether the doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law for the court. See Ryan v. Lilley Co., supra, 31; Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 449, 207 N.E.2d 305 (1965); Kaufman v. Fisher, 230 Or. 626, 639, 371 P.2d 948 (1962); Fleege v. Cimpl, 305 N.W.2d 409, 413 (S.D. 1981).
The plaintiff pleaded and claims to have proved the conditions required for invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. He maintains that the first condition was fulfilled because water from a shower does not ordinarily become scalding hot in the absence of someone’s negligence. A number of jurisdictions agree. See, e.g., Terrell v. Lincoln Motel, Inc., 183 N.J. Super. 55, 60, 443 A.2d 236 (1982); Wolfe v. Chateau Renaissance, 141 N.J. Super. 59, 65, 357 A.2d 282 (1976); Watson v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 147 Misc. 697, 699, 264 N.Y.S. 570 (1932); Brooks v. Utah Hotel Co., 108 Utah 220, 224, 159 P.2d 127 (1945); see generally annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 247, 279. The defendants argue that the weight of the evidence contradicting the plain
The third condition required in Connecticut is that the injury must have occurred irrespective of any voluntary action by the plaintiff. The defendants’ brief does not contest this requirement. One noted treatise observes that “[w]hat is needed here is that [the] plaintiff’s own negligence, along with that of anyone else for whom [the] defendant is not responsible, be eliminated as to the principal cause of the accident, so as to complete the basis for an inference that the negligence of which the thing speaks for itself is probably that of the defendant.” 4 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, supra, § 19.8, p. 58. If, for example, the water in the shower had suddenly turned hot because of a defect in the boiler, shower equipment or plumbing system, such a circumstance would not have been attributable to the plaintiff’s act of negligence. It is also worthy of note that in a jurisdiction that utilizes the doctrine of comparative negligence, such as Connecticut, the emerging rule is that any negligence by the plaintiff should not bar liability but should merely reduce damages. See, e.g., Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66, 70 (Colo. 1980); Watzig v. Tobin, 292 Or. 645, 650 n.4, 642 P.2d 651 (1982); Turtenwald v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 55 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 201 N.W.2d 1 (1972). Commentators have suggested that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should survive under Connecticut’s comparative negligence law. See G. Saden, “Comparative Negligence Adopted in Con
The plaintiff’s claim of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur fails, however, because it does not satisfy the requirement that the instrumentality that caused the injury be within the exclusive control of the defendants.
“The point of requiring control by the defendant is, as indicated by Prosser, to provide the basis for an inference that whatever negligence was involved may properly be charged to the defendant.” Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 454, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977); see W. Prosser, supra, § 39, pp. 219-21. For the control condition of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, the plaintiff must adduce evidence from which the court, as. a matter of law, can properly determine that a jury could reasonably draw an inference that it is more probable than not that the person whose negligence caused the injury was the defendant and not some other party or agency. To do otherwise, permitting a “less-than-fair-probability” standard on control would sanction the permissibility of drawing of an “inference” of control that was not the permissible inference required and would be mere conjecture. A permissible inference rests upon premises of fact; conjecture does not. The plaintiff contends that he satisfied the control portion of the res ipsa loquitur formulation and that it was, therefore, reversible error not to have charged the jury on the doctrine. The trial court disagreed. We agree with the trial court.
There was evidence that the plaintiff adjusted or regulated the faucets on the day in question; he also had done so the night before when he had taken a shower. There was no evidence of the nature or method of operation of these faucets. There was no evidence of any mixing valve or mixing device in this shower
Giving the evidence that arguably points to the defendant its fairest construction, we cannot say that it rises to the quality of “more probable than not” on the control condition of the doctrine to justify submitting the issue of res ipsa loquitur to the jury. We have pointed out the evidence that was introduced, as well as relevant matters on which there was no evidence. Certainly the evidence that was before the trial court was not, as it decided, such that it could properly support a jury inference that “[b]oth inspection and user must have been at the time of the injury in control of the party charged with neglect.” Schurgast v. Schumann, supra.
Moreover, the trial court, in viewing all of the evidence, could not reasonably assume that the lack of evidence going to the control condition of the doctrine could be supplied by the jurors from their own experience. It is true that the trier of fact is entitled to draw all reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence. See Hennessey v. Hennessey, 145 Conn. 211, 214-15, 140 A.2d 473 (1959). “Jurors are not ‘expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own obser
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
There was a conflict in the testimony about whether the plaintiff called the desk for assistance as the result of his alleged accident. He maintains that he did so. The defendants’ front officer manager, Agnes Lowery, testified no such request was received. The plaintiff testified that, in response to his request for medical assistance, a bellboy came up and picked up his bag and started to leave his room. The plaintiff followed him. He also maintained that he had asked the woman on the desk, who was the front office manager, for medical help but all that she kept saying was that someone was going to have to pay for the broken door in the shower. She testified that he had never said that he had had an accident but that he had said: “Well, you have lousy bathrooms. I don’t like your bathrooms. I’ll never stay here again.”
The plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged that the defendants “owned, controlled, operated and/or maintained a hotel in the City of Bridgeport.” The defendants admitted this allegation.
It also alleged seven acts of negligence against the defendants, each of which was denied.
A later paragraph of the plaintiffs amended complaint alleged: “The water heating facilities, shower facilities and plumbing facilities were within the sole and exclusive control and management of the [named] defendant, its agent and employees and said occurrence and consequent injuries would not have occurred but for the negligence of the defendants.” This allegation was denied.
We note that the trial court did charge the jury on the allegations of negligence in the amended complaint and that its charge also included instructions on circumstantial evidence.