Movant, Kelvin Shelby Malone, challenges the dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 27.26 wherein he sought to vacate his conviction for capital murder and death sentence imposed in the State of Missouri. Movant’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in
State v. Malone,
On appeal, movant asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion because: (1) the trial court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law, and (2) the failure to make findings and conclusions violates the Eighth Amendment’s mandate of heightened accuracy in the administration of the death sentence. Mov-ant asserts alternatively, if it is deemed that the trial court made findings and conclusions, then the summary dismissal of his motion, based uрon the reasons contained in the state’s motion to dismiss, is erroneous because: (3) his Missouri sentence is not contingent upon the completion of his California sentence, and (4) it denies mov-ant his right to the remedy of habeas corpus. Affirmed.
On June 30,1987, at a prehearing conference held on movant’s 27.26 motion, the state presented a handwritten motion, оn a pre-printed court form, to dismiss movant’s claim. The state’s motion recited:
Movant appears through his attorney Dorothy Hirzy, State appears through Keith Lamer. State moves to dismiss Movant’s Motion 27.26 for the reason that Movant is presently incarcerated in the State of California, and therefore, Movant is not “in custody ” under sentence for purposes of invoking Rule 27.-26 in Missouri. As the Movant is not in actual custody in Missouri under a Missouri sentence but instead is confined elsewhere, Rule 27.26 does not require a hearing and State moves for dismissal. Davis v. State,600 S.W.2d 182 (Mo.App.1980); Lalla v. State,463 S.W.2d 797 (Mo.1971).
The trial judge signed the state’s motion underneath the form’s pre-printed state *697 ment “SO ORDERED.” A notation identical to the state’s motion was entered in the court’s minutes of the proceedings dismissing movant’s 27.26 motion.
Prior to the prоsecution of movant in Missouri for the capital murder offense which underlies the basis of his 27.26 motion, movant was incarcerated in California under a death sentence rendered in that state. Missouri lodged a detainer against movant. Pursuant to Article III of the Agreement on Detainers, movant filed a request for the disposition of the Missouri charge. § 217.490, RSMo (1986) (all further refеrences shall be to RSMo (1986)). Pursuant to Article V of the Agreement, the California Department of Corrections made an offer to deliver temporary custody of movant to Missouri so that he could be brought to trial on the Missouri charge. Temporary custody of movant was accepted by the prosecuting attorney of St. Louis County, Missouri.
On April 26, 1984, following movant’s capital murder trial in Missouri, the trial court sentenced movant to death in accordance with the verdict of the jury and directed that movant be delivered to the Warden of the State Penitentiary at Jefferson City, Missouri, to await execution. However, the trial court on the same day, amended its order after being advised that movant remained in the custody оf the Department of Justice Services of California under a temporary custody agreement of detainer with Missouri. The trial court declared:
The Court’s Order of April 26, 1984, is hereby amended, directing that said [movant], Kelvin Shelby Malone, be transported to the Department of Corrections, San Quenton State Prison, Tamal, California, pursuant to the agreements mаde between the State of California and the Prosecuting Attorney of St. Louis County, Missouri, until such time as the Supreme Court of Missouri shall set the time for execution of such death sentence, at which time said [movant] shall be returned to the Warden of the State Penitentiary at Jefferson City, Missouri, in accordance with the agreement of de-tainers between the Statе of Missouri and the State of California.
On June 17,1986, after the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on mov-ant’s direct appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court entered an order setting movant’s execution for July 22, 1986. The terms of the order provided that “[u]pon the condition that [movant] shall on or before July 17, 1986, file his Rule 27.26 motion in the appropriate court, ... the execution shall be stayed until August 21, 1986.” The order also provided that:
[a]ny further stay of the execution herein ordered shall be granted only upon the following conditions:
(a) That application therefor be made to this Court with notice to the warden of the Missouri State Penitentiary, to the attorney general, and to Kelvin Shelby Malone; and
(b) That said application contain a certificate from the presiding judge of the Circuit Court in which the Rule 27.26 motion is pending certifying the time necessary for disposition of the matter, not to exceed one 90-day stay;
(c) Any additional stays granted shall be upon the same terms and conditions but not to exceed 30 days each;
(d) If an appeal of the ruling on the 27.26 motion is filed and notice thereof given to this Court, the warden of the Missouri State Penitentiary, the attorney general, and Kelvin Shelby Malone, the execution shall be stayed until the further order of this Court.
Movant filed his 27.26 motion pro se on July 3, 1986. The motion shows that mov-ant is currently incarcerated at a correctional institution in Tamal, California under a California sentence. Following consultation with appointed counsel, an amended 27.26 motion was filed which raised twenty-two claims including: the denial of due process, equal protection and fair trial by the trial court’s failure to dismiss the case as not having been brought within the 180 day limit under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law; the denial of equal protection in the state’s use of pеremptory strikes to exclude all blacks from movant’s jury; the denial of effective coun *698 sel under the Sixth Amendment; and the denial of constitutional rights in the restriction of mitigating evidence. On June 30, 1987, movant’s 27.26 motion was dismissed. On July 15, 1987, the Missouri Supreme Court entered an order providing that “[a]ppellant’s [movant’s] motion for stay of execution sustained pending disposition of Rule 27.26 motion.”
In his first point on appeal, movant claims that the trial court erred in failing to make any findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 27.26(i) and
Fields v. State,
It is well settled that Rule 27.26(i) requires that the motion court “shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented, whether or not a hearing is held.”
See Fields v. State,
The purpose of findings of fact аnd conclusions of law is to provide for meaningful appellate review of the motion court.
Leigh v. State,
We have carefully examined the cases upon which movant relies. In
Brauch v. State,
“Cause called: movant appears by [counsel]; state appears [by counsel]; state’s motion to dismiss is presented, argued and submitted to the court; the court being fully advised in the premises does hereby sustain state’s motion to dismiss. It is so ordered.”
Id.
at 67. The same result was reached in
Tammons v. State,
State’s Motion to Dismiss called. Defendant appears with counsel Paul Fox. State appears through Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Nancy Smith. Argument heard.
After a review of the underlying files in this cause and the transcript of the plea and sentencing, and the Court being duly advised in the premises, Stаte’s Motion to Dismiss is SUSTAINED.
Id. at 553.
The cases relied on by movant are clearly distinguishable. In none did the motion court actually express a reason for the dismissal. The orders ambiguously referred to extraneous motions, files, and transcripts. Here, the dismissal was predicated on the specific reason set forth in the state’s motion to dismiss — i.e., movant is not in Missouri custody under Missouri sеn
*699
tence — a legitimate ground for dismissal without prejudice under
Lalla v. State,
Having concluded that the findings and conclusions of thе motion court sufficiently meet the requirements of Rule 27.26(i), movant’s second point — i.e., the trial court’s failure to make findings and conclusions violates the Eighth Amendment’s mandate of heightened accuracy in the administration of the death penalty — is not meritorious.
We now reach the dispositive issue in the case: whether the motion court erred in dismissing movant’s 27.26 motion fоr the reasons contained in the state’s motion to dismiss as adopted by the motion court. Existing precedent indicates that the dismissal was proper.
In
Lalla v. State,
Here, movant argues Lalla is distinguishable because Missouri claims an immediate right to control his liberty and incarceration for the purpose of executing him. Movant argues that the amended trial court order of April 26, 1984, and the Supreme Court’s order dated June 17,1986, demonstrates that Missouri has asserted control over movant and has claimed the authority to have movant produced at any time his execution date is set and, therefore, movant is in “custody” for purposes of Rule 27.26.
We are not persuaded that the orders to which movant refers have the efficacy which he claims. It is undisputed that movant was brought to trial in Missouri pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers. Article V, Section 4 provides in pertinent part:
The temporary custody referred to in this agrеement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction.
*700 § 217,490, RSMO. Article V, section 5 providеs that “[a]t the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner will be returned to the sending state.” Id. Article V, section 7 provides in pertinent part:
For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state....
Id. (emphasis added). “Sending state” is defined as the “state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final disposition [of an indictment, information or complaint, pending in another state] ...” Article II, section 2 Agreement on Detainers. Id. There is no provision in the Agreement on Detainers that provides for the return of a prisonеr to a receiving state, for the purpose of serving a sentence imposed by the receiving state. “Receiving state” is defined as “the state in which the trial is to be had on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to ... the agreement.” Id.
In Lalla, decided prior to the enactment of the Agreement on Detainers, our Supreme Court assumed that a detаiner was filed by Missouri with the federal authorities to obtain custody over Lalla, for the purpose of subjecting him to sentence, subsequent to his return to federal authorities after his Missouri trial. The court rejected Lalla’s argument that the detainer constituted constructive custody and went on to state that:
It must be conceded that the return of this defendant to Missouri uрon any writ issued by Missouri courts would be purely discretionary with the United States Attorney General. Little v. Swenson (DC Mo.),282 F.Supp. 333 and cases cited; Title 18 U.S.C., § 4085; and the request for any such return is required to come from the Governor or “the executive authority” of the state, not from the courts.
Lalla,
Likewise, the return of movant herein to Missouri upon any writ issued by Missouri courts would be a discretionary matter with California аuthorities. As a general rule the jurisdiction of a state does not extend beyond its boundaries.
Gerhard v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n of St. Louis,
Notwithstanding, movant argues that the Missouri Supreme Court’s order dated June 17, 1986, authorized him to file his 27.26 motion before his return to Missouri custody. Movant argues further that the dismissal of his 27.26 motion herein will operate to bar a subsequent reassertion of his right to post conviction relief under Rule 29.15(m). Rule 27.26 was replaced by Rule 29.15, effective January 1,1988, which provides in pertinent part:
This Rule 29.15 shall apply to all proceedings wherein sentence is pronоunced on or after January 1, 1988. If sentence is pronounced prior to January 1, 1988, and no prior motion has been filed pursuant to Rule 27.26, a motion under this Rule 29.15 may be filed on or before June 30, 1988. Failure to file a motion on or before June 30, 1988, shall constitute a complete waiver of the right to proceed under this Rule 29.15. If a sentence is pronounced prior to January 1, 1988, and a prior motion under Rule 27.-26 is pending, post-conviction relief shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Rule 27.26 in effect on the date the motion was filed.
Rule 29.15(m).
However, Rule 29.15(a) provides:
A person convicted of a felony after trial claiming that the conviction or sentence imposed violate the constitution and laws of this state or the constitution of the United States, that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law may seek *701 relief in the sentencing court pursuant to the provisions of this Rule 29.15.
(emphasis added). As is apparent, there is no requirement under Rule 29.15 that a person convicted after trial be in Missouri custody in order to institute proceedings under Rule 29.15. See J. Morris, Postcon-viction Practice Under the “New 27.26,” 43 J. Mo. Bar 435, 437 (1987). Thus, even though an inmate is incarcerated in another state under a sentence imposed in that state, he may nevertheless seek relief under Rule 29.15 if “convicted of a felony” in Missouri.
In the instant case, movant’s 27.26 motion was properly dismissed under the rule announсed in
Lalla.
The trial court was without jurisdiction to vacate the judgment under Rule 27.26.
Davis v. State,
Under Rule 29.15(m), if sentence is pronounced prior to January 1, 1988, as here, and no prior motion has been filed pursuant to Rule 27.26, a motion under Rule 29.15 may be filed on or before June 30, 1988. Although a motion has been “filed” by movant pursuant to 27.26, its dismissal without prejudice has not affected his right to proceed under Rule 29.15, so long as a motion is filed thereunder on or before June 30, 1988.
For the foregoing reasons the order of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.