This is an action upon two checks, the face amount of each being $2,185, or a total of $4,370. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence, both parties moved for a directed verdict. The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff for the amount ■ of the checks, together with interest. Defendant, George M. Overall, has appealed.
Plaintiff’s petition named George M. Overall, William F. Becklew and Bernadine Owen as defendants, alleging that they were partners doing business as the Mo-Kan Auto Sales. It being admitted that defendant Overall was the sole owner of the Mo-Kan Auto Sales, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant Becklew, and plaintiff dismissed as to defendant Owen.
Plaintiff Mallory Motor. Company, is the successor of the Oakley Motor Company of St. Louis, Missouri.
The facts are not in dispute. Defendant Overall is a dealer in automobiles in Kansas City, Missouri. On August 23, 1949, he called Mr. Robert Sanders of the Oakley Motor ’Company on ’ the " telephone ■ and agreed to purchase from the Oakley Company two 1949 Mercury automobiles. Following'the telephone conversation, Overall made out'the'two-checks sued oh: It is admitted that they are in his handwriting. They are dated August 24, 1949, are drawn on the City National Bank & Trust Company, at Kansas City, Missouri, payable to the Oakley Motor Company, eách in the amount of $2,185. On the back of each check .defendant Overall wrote: . “Full payment 49 Mercury -2 Dr. Mtr ,N°- 9 C M-Title papers attached.”
On August 23, 1949, defendant delivered the two checks to his agent, Leonard Stice. That night Stice took the train for St. Louis. The next day he appeared in the office of the Oakley Company. Stice inspected the two cars, and took their motor numbers. He then wrote on the back of the two checks in the blank, spaces, after “9 C M,” the following: On one check, “252489 Blue,” on the other, “230967 Green.”
In the telephone conversation between defendant and Sanders (representative of the Oakley Company) it was understood that both cars were to be equipped with white sidewall tires. Upon ■ inspection, Stice found that one of the cars did not have those tires.; By reason of that fact an adjustment was made. The Oakley Company issued its check in the amount of $15, payable to the- Mo-Kan Auto Sales and delivered the same to Stice. ,
Bills of salé covering the two cars were executed by the Oakley Company. One shows the automobile described therein was “Sold to Bernadine Cooper”, the other to .“Georgia Barton.” This wás doné'at defendant’s 'request. Bernadine' Cooper (Owen) was his bookkeeper and Georgia Barton was a “girl friend” of the bookkeeper. Defendant’s counsel at the trial admitted “this was his (defendant’s) deal, and his, entirely.”
Stice delivered the two checks sued on to the Oakley Company. ■ The latter in turn delivered possession of the two cars to *534 Stice. ■, He fastened the cars together and started to drive them to Kansas City. When he got .within a few miles of his destination he ran the cars' off the highway into a ditch and wrecked them.
On August 25, 1949, defendant notified the bank upon which the checks were drawn to dishonor them. The bank complied with his request and thus the basis for .this suit was laid.
Defendant's first cohterition is' that the court erred in not directing a verdict for him at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, his claim being that he “never acquired any title to the automobiles.”
It is apparent that defendant recognizes that': “It is a well-settled rule that the loss of goods destroyed by accident falls upon him who at the time holds the title.” Turner Looker Co. v. Hindman,
In the instant case, not only was possession of the cars delivered to defendant’s agent, Stice, but bills of sale covering them were' executed by the Oakley Company, plaintiff’s predecessor.
It was early held in this State that: “As a matter of law a bill of sale is not necessary to pass the title to personal property. A delivery of the possession of goods under a contract to purchase passes the title, and from that time they belong to the vendee' and are his risk.” Gatzweiler v. Morgner,
Under the common law, no
present
delivery was essential to the passing of title in the sale of a chattel-. As said in the case of Wheless v. Meyer-Schmidt Grocer Co.,
Our statutory law pertaining to the sale of new automobiles by a dealer is found in Section 301.200 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., which provides: “Dealers shall execute and deliver bills of sale in accordance with forms prescribed by the director of revenue for all new cars sold by them.”
In the instant case bills of sale for the two cars were executed by the business manager of the Oakley Company on behalf of that company. The manager’s- signatures were made under oath before a notary. Both instruments bear the latter’s signature and seal. These bills of sale show a present transfer of the automobiles, specifically describe them, and recite the consideration paid. They contain every element deemed essential under all of the decisions that we have been able to find. It was hot disclosed by either the pleadings or the proof that the director of revenue had - prescribed forms of bills of sale for use by dealers in new cars. There was evidence, however, showing that the director had issued certificates of title upon ■presentation of bills of sale similar in form to those here involved.
The evidence shows that after the bills of sale were executed, they were, in compliance with defendant’s express written direction, attached to the two checks. The cars were then delivered to defendant’s agent, and, while in the latter’s possession, they were wrecked. We hold as did the learned trial court, that defendant, having had both the title and possession, should bear the loss.
*535
It should be pointed' out that the situation appearing in the case at bar' is’ entirely different from those shown in the many cases construing what is now Section 301.210 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., That section says that the sale of any motor vehicle which has been
registered,
“without the assignment of such certificate of ownership, shall he fraudulent and void.” That section applies1 to the sale of “used”, and
not
“new” motor vehicles such as are here involved. See Vetter v. Browne,
Defendant’s next point is that the court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff because “plaintiff’s title and right to sue upon the checks were in issue.”
Plaintiff introduced voluminous records to show its acquisition of the assets of the Oakley Company, including the checks, sued on. Defendant made no objection to the introduction of any of this evidence. These documents were identified and introduced through Mr. Emig, business manager of both the Oakley and Mallory Companies. Defendant’s counsel did not ask Mr. Emig a single question on cross-examination relative to plaintiff’s title to the checks and the assignment thereof by the Oakley Company to plaintiff. From the entire record it is clear that defendant did not seriously controvert plaintiff’s right to" sue upon the checks.
In the case of Furth v. Cafferata, Mo.App.,
Defendant makes two additional points. The first we need not consider. It is not specific, and thus does not comply with Rule 1.08 of our Supreme Court, 42 V.A.M.S. The second is not preserved for review inasmuch as it was not called to the trial court’s attention in the motion for new trial.
The judgment is áffirmed.