Malgapo v. DerwinskiMalgapo v. Derwinski
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Farley
Lead Opinion
ORDER
PER CURIAM.Appellant’s Notice of Appeal stated that her Notice of Disagreement (NOD) was filed at the’ Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) on March 15, 1989. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs then moved to dismiss and attached a preliminary record indicating that appellant filed NODs on June 16, 1988, and September 22, 1988. The Court then ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant’s response of November 28, 1990, does not address the NOD jurisdictional issue. In her response, appellant also moved for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act,
Because the Court required further documentation in order to determine jurisdiction under Whitt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 40 reh’g en banc denied 1 Vet.App. 94 it ordered the Secretary to provide a supplemental preliminary record including (1) the filing dates of any correspondence which might be construed as an NOD filed by appellant, (2) copies of all adjudicative determinations made by the VARO and its hearing officers after September 22, 1988, and (3) copies of any correspondence from the VARO referring to such determinations.
In his response, the Secretary stated that appellant had filed after November 18, 1988, no document which might be construed as an NOD. The Secretary also argued that appellant’s motion for extraordinary relief should be denied.
On March 8, 1991, this Court entered an order dismissing appellant’s appeal because “appellant filed her NOD prior to November 18, 1988, and because, under the provisions of Pub.L. No. 100-687, § 402, the Court does not have jurisdiction unless an appellant filed an NOD on or after November 18, 1988”. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub.L. 100-687, Div. A, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988) (VJRA). On April 22, 1991, appellant filed a pleading styled “Appellant’s request for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act”, which the Court deems to be a motion for review by a panel of the Court of the March 8, 1991, order.
Upon consideration of that pleading and order and the supplemental preliminary record, it is
ORDERED that appellant’s motion, as so deemed, is granted and that the Court’s March 8, 1991, order is vacated, except for its last paragraph.
Upon further consideration of that pleading and record, the Court holds that appellant’s April 7, 1989, VA Form 1-9, expressing disagreement with the decision, made by the Director, Compensation and Pension Service of VA’s Veterans Benefits Administration, “that the evidence does not justify a change in the decision with which you *399have [previously] expressed disagreement” is a jurisdictionally valid NOD under
ORDERED that the appeal proceed under the Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure and that appellant file a statement of issues under Rule 6 of those Rules not later than 60 days after the date of this order.
Before NEBEKER *, Chief Judge, and KRAMER, FARLEY*, MANKIN, HOLDAWAY, IVERS, and STEINBERG *, Associate Judges.ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REVIEW EN BANC
PER CURIAM.On July 17, 1991, the Court issued an order, granting appellant’s motion for review of the Court’s March 8, 1991, order which dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction. The July 17, 1991, order asserted jurisdiction and ordered that the case proceed. On July 31, 1991, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for review en banc of the July 17, 1991, order.
Upon consideration of the Secretary’s motion for reconsideration and the Secretary’s alternative motion for review en banc, it is by the panel *
ORDERED that the Secretary’s motion for reconsideration is denied. It is by the Court en banc,
ORDERED that the Secretary’s motion for review en banc is denied.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I write to make two points in response to the dissent of Judge Kramer, infra. First, the parenthetical phrase “(hereafter referred to as the ‘agency of original jurisdiction’)” in
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I would grant the appellee’s motion for review en banc, not because of the rationale expressed in the motion, but because the July 17, 1991, per curiam order in this case deviates from the precedent that this Court established in Whitt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 40, reh’g en banc denied, 1 Vet.App. 94 (1990). In Whitt, we held that a notice of disagreement (“NOD”) which meets the requirements of
The per curiam order in the instant case, however, stated that the regulation is too narrow and that
[The NOD shall] be filed with the activity which entered the determination with which disagreement is expressed (hereafter referred to as the “agency of original jurisdiction”).
I cannot accept a rationale which permits a valid NOD to be filed with “any activity”. By implication, the majority order “un-Whitt ingly” permits a valid NOD to be filed to a Board of Veterans Appeals’ decision and thus completely obliterates the already shaky rationale expressed in the per curiam statement in Sudranski v. Derwinski, U.S.Vet.App. No. 90-451 (order denying motion for reconsideration or review en banc, Sept. 12,1991) even before the ink thereon has dried.