allegedly sustained by plaintiff when his car was struck from behind as he slowed or stopped on a highway preparatory to making a left turn into a roadside gas station and restaurant. Jury verdict was for plaintiff in the sum of $2,000. Plaintiff moved for nеw trial on the issue of damages only or, in the alternative, on all issues. The mоtion was granted, but new trial was limited to the issue of damages only. Defendant аppeals.
Some five months after the accident, plaintiff underwent surgеry to effect a spinal fusion. Medical expenses were $1,980.65. The trial сourt, in granting the limited new trial, found that his loss of wages amounted to “over $5,000,” and thеre is medical evidence that the type of work he can perfоrm is now limited.
The defense introduced medical evidence that the back condition was wholly the result of a congenital anomaly. Plaintiff’s doctоr, on the contrary, attributed the back condition and the necessity of surgеry to the accident. The injuries other than that to the back were negligiblе, and plaintiff does not suggest that the jury could value them, alone, a.t a figure approaching $2,000. The trial judge made clear his belief that the surgery and the long incapacity for work resulted solely from the injury.
“When the jury fails to сompensate plaintiff for the special damages indicated by the evidence, . . . the only reasonable conclusion is that the jurors compromised the issue of liability, and a new trial limited to the damages issue is improper.”
(Rose
v.
Melody Lane,
We recognize, of course, that limitation of new trial may be justified when the evidence of defendant’s negligence is “overwhelming”
(Rose
v.
Melody Lane, supra,
But the evidence here does not meet that standard. Plaintiff testified that he activated the electrical, turn signal of his car when defendant’s automobile was half a mile to his rear. Defendant!' testified that he saw no signal, and that plaintiff brakеd abruptly. Although there were eyewitnesses of the accident, none- wаs in a position to see whether plaintiff’s turn signal was operating. Thus the only еvidence upon this crucial issue is found in the contradictory testimony of thе two parties. In this respect, our casé is difficult to distinguish from
Kralyevich
v.
Magrini,
We sympathize fully with the desire of a busy trial cоurt to expedite dispositions (see
Leipert
v.
Honold, supra,
Brown (H. C.), J., and Caldecott, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied October 24, 1969, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 19, 1969. Peters, J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
