46 So. 768 | Ala. | 1908
The facts of this case in brief are these: The plaintiff, an old man, on January 7, 1907, went to the station of the defendant, at Castleberry, a regular station of the railroad company, for the purpose of becoming a passenger on one of defendant’s trains from Castleberry to Evergreen, another regular station on defendant’s road; the two being 12 miles apart. There was a regular passenger train, operated by the defendant over its road, which was due at Castleberry at 5:00 a. m., and which usually stopped at that station to take passengers. The defendant had a station agent at Castleberry, whose duty it was to sell tickets to
In the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to determine the contraversy between the litigants in respect to the nature of the action — whether the complaint is in assumpsit or in tort. All the cases hold that a passenger, injured through the negligence or carelessness of the carrier, may proceed either upon the contract, alleging the careless or negligent acts of the defendant as a breach of the contract, or proceed in tort, making the carelessness and negligence of the company the ground of his right of recovery; and, if he proceed for the tort, it becomes necessary on the
Taking the complaint as in case, the ground upon which plaintiff, bases his right of recovery is the negligent failure of the defendant to stop its train at Castle-berry and receive the plaintiff as a passenger to be transported to Evergreen. It'is elementary that there must be established the legal relation of cause and effect between the particular negligence and wrong described — the walk and injuries incident thereto. In Western Railway Co. v. Mutch, 97 Ala. 194, 196, 11 South. 894, 21 L. R. A. 316, 38 Am. St. Rep. 179, this extract from 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (1st Ed.) p. 431, was quoted approvingly: “To constitute actionable negligence, there must be not only causal connection between the negligence complained of and the injury suffered; but the connection must be by a natural and unbroken sequence — without intervening efficient causes — so that but for the negligence of the defendant the injury would not have occurred. It must not only be a cause, but it must be the proximate cause; that is, the direct and immediate efficient cause of the injury.” — Alabama Great Southern R. R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600, 605, 2 South. 337. No difficulty arises in
The question, then, is: Did the act of the defendant in failing to stop its train produce the injuries complained of? Did the injuries result directly from such act? We have a class of cases where the carrier has been held liable to the passenger for injuries to health, etc., incident to walking back to a station after having been carried beyond it, or the point of destination (A. G. S. R. R. Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9, 9 South. 875, 30 Am. St. Rep. 17; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Dancy, 97 Ala. 338, 11 South. 796); but the theory worked out in those cases is that the carrier, by its wrongful act, placed the plaintiffs in a position where it was necessary for them to act, to avoid the consequences of the wrongful act of the carrier, and, acting with ordinary prudence and care, to the end of extricating themselves from the difficulty in which they had been placed, they sustained the injury. The injury was, therefore, traceable directly to the carrier’s negligence as its cause, and as its proximate cause. Passengers wrongfully put short of, or beyond, the destination stipulated for, -would be most likely to walk to the point to which they desired to go, if no other convenient way was presented or was open to them;
But Ave find no trouble in distinguishing the case in judgment from that class of cases. Here it is made to appear that the carrier had nothing to do with placing the plaintiff in the position in which he found himself after the failure of the trains to stop. He was in the same position he occupied before he purchased his ticket, and we cannot perceive that injuries resulting from the walk by the plaintiff to Evergreen were a natural sequence of the failure of the agents of the carrier to stop the trains at Castleberry. As was said in I. B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Birney, 71 Ill. 391, a case strikingly similar to the case in hand: “That he should be delayed in reaching that point was a natural consequence, as there Avas no other known means by which the space could be overcome in so short a time as by a train of cars; but that the appellant should walk through the extreme cold to that point, and thus injure his health, was by no means a necessary result.” As was further said in that case, had he procured a carriage and horses to make the trip, the company would no doubt have been liable for reasonable compensation for its use and for a driver, or had he Avaited the next train, and gone on it, he would have been entitled to nominal damages, at least, for necessary expenses incurred whilst waiting the arrival of the train, and loss, if any, by failure to meet the engagement. — Gulf, etc. R. R. Co. v. Cleveland (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. 687; Francis v. Transfer Co., 5 Mo. App. 7; Fvcms v. St. L. etc. Co., 11 Mo. App. 463. In the light of the foregoing principles, and applying them to the facts of this case, the court is of the opinion that plaintiff was awarded the only damages he was entitled
Affirmed.
