193 Wis. 531 | Wis. | 1927
Lead Opinion
The following opinions were filed June 20, 1927:
The principal contention of the plaintiff is that, the conditional sales contract having been procured by false and fraudulent representations, it is voidable both as to the defendant Lounsbury and his assignee, the defendant company.
The contention of the defendant company is that, the plaintiff having knowingly and intentionally signed the contract which contained a recital to the following effect:
“This agreement witnesseth: That Modern Equipment & Engineering Company [Lounsbury], hereinafter called ‘the seller,’ has sold, and Nick Malas, hereinafter called ‘the buyer,’ has bought one Model 2 ¿4-ton Arctic refrigerating machine, serial number-, as per proposal attached, hereinafter referred to as ‘the goods,’ delivery and acceptance of which is hereby acknowledged by the buyer, for which the. buyer agrees to pay the seller,” etc.,—
the plaintiff is now estopped to deny the truth of the recital as against an innocent purchaser who has relied upon it.
In support of its contention the defendant company cites Guaranty S. Co. v. Equitable T. Co. 136 Md. 417, 110 Atl. 860; Guaranty S. Co. v. Exchange State Bank, 148 Minn. 60, 180 N. W. 919; Bristol-Goodson E. L. & P. Co. v.
We do not find it necessary in our disposition of the case to discuss or decide the very interesting question raised by the contention made by the defendant company. Bearing upon the question, however, attention is called to the followr ing cases: American Nat. Bank v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc. 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376; Whiting v. Squeglia, 70 Cal. App. 108, 232 Pac. 986; Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Whalen (Idaho) 248 Pac. 444.
It clearly appears that the signature of the plaintiff to the conditional sales contract was procured by the false and fraudulent representations made by the defendant Louns-bury; that as between the plaintiff and the defendant Louns-bury the contract was voidable because its execution was induced by fraud there can be no reasonable question.
We are then confronted with the question, Does the as-signee, the defendant company, stand in any better position than its assignor, the defendant Lounsbury, so far as the right of the plaintiff .to avoid the contract is concerned? An express agreement made in a contract that it shall be incontestable for fraud is void as against public policy. Reagan v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217, 2 L. R. A. n. s. 821; Pearson v. Dublin, [1907] App. Cas. 351; Industrial & G. Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 180 N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 7.
Since Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 El. & Bl. 232, in which Lord Campbell held that a provision in a contract that it should be indefensible was “subject to an implied exception of personal fraud which shall vitiate every contract,” it has been the rule that all contracts procured by fraud were voidable with the single exception of negotiable instruments.
Fraud in the inducement of a contract may be set up by the obligor as a defense when sued upon it. Harriman Nat. Bank v. Seldomridge, 249 U. S. 1, 39 Sup. Ct. 244; 1
Sec. 260.14, Stats., provides:
■ "In case of an assignment of a thing in action the action of the assignee shall be without prejudice to any setoff or other defense existing at the time or before notice of the assignment; but this section shall not apply to a negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange transferred in good faith and upon good consideration before due.” . .
The assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action, though he buys it for value and in good faith, takes it subject to all defenses which the obligor may have had against the assignor. Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. L. Cas. 702, 731; 1 Williston, Contracts, p. 813, § 432, and cases cited.
It is argued, however, that this rule'is subject to the exception that the debtor has not intrusted to the assignor an instrument which by its form estops himself from setting up the defense. It being, as we have already seen, void as against public policy to make a contract indefensible on the ground of fraud, it must be equally true that the defense of fraud cannot be cut off by mere recitals contained in the instrument assigned.
The plaintiff’s signature to the contract having been induced by fraud, the contract itself is vitiated and at the election of the plaintiff was voidable, and the plaintiff’s rights in that respect are not altered by. the assignment to the defendant company by the defendant Lounsbury. To hold otherwise is to hold that in practical effect it becomes by assignment a negotiable instrument. If the contract were valid, it might well be that as against- the defendant Lounsbury there was a total failure of consideration and that such failure of consideration could be set up as a defense to an action brought by the defendant Lounsbury’s assignee. It is not necessary,to decide that question here, and it is only mentioned to negative any possible implication that the matter was overlooked or decided in this case.
By the,Court. — The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff as indicated herein.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). It seems plain to me that the plaintiff is estopped, so far as the Southern Wisconsin Acceptance Company is concerned, to allege the non-delivery of the Arctic refrigerator machine. After his order for this machine had been given, and after certain parts thereof had been installed, Lounsbury asked Malas for a conditional sale contract for the express purpose of enabling him to borrow money thereon. At this time the machine had not been installed. Lounsbury, however, represented to Malas that it was at the depot. Knowing that it had not been installed, Malas executed the conditional sale contract,
There is no doubt that as between plaintiff and Louns-bury plaintiff has a good cause of action for the cancellation of the contract. Neither is there any doubt that he would have the same cause of action, or the same defenses to a cause of action brought to recover thereon, as against an assignee of Lounsbury, unless, as to' such assignee, he has estopped himself.
There is nothing sacred in the rule of law which permits all of the defenses to a non-negotiable instrument while in the hands of an assignee that are available against the original party. It has been held by this court that a widow may be estopped from claiming her right of dower (H. W. Wright L. Co. v. McCord, 145 Wis. 93, 128 N. W. 873), and that a wife may be estopped from claiming her homestead (Krueger v. Groth; 190 Wis. 387, 209 N. W. 772). I know of no reason why a party situated as Malas may not estop himself from claiming non-delivery of the machine as against the assignee of Lounsbury. It seems to me that this was effectually done when by his own declarations he led the Southern Wisconsin Acceptance Company to believe that the machine had been delivered, installed, and accepted. This is particularly true when he did it for the special purpose of enabling Lounsbury to raise money upon the contract. I am unable to appreciate the morality of the doctrine which enables Malas under such circumstances, after he has induced the Southern Wisconsin Ac
It is said that he was induced to make this declaration by reason of the false representations of Lounsbury that the machine was at the depot. Even though the machine was at the depot Malas knew that it was not installed, and such representations afford him no excuse for making the declaration he did. Even though the misrepresentation had been merely that the machine was at the depot, if material and relied upon it would have been none the less fraudulent, even though Malas actually believed it was at the depot. It is well established that one who makes a representation must know that it is true. A misrepresentation made innocently is none the less fraud because he who makes it believes it to be true. The decision in this case establishes the doctrine that one who is the victim of fraud may by further fraud pass his loss on to another, as the cost of production is passed on to the consumer. I regard this as grossly immoral, unjust, and contrary to well established legal principles. I must therefore dissent.
A motion for a rehearing was denied, with $25 costs, on October 11, 1927.