This appeal is before the court a second time, after our previous decision,
Rule 10b-5 forbids a company or an individual “to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). But liability requires proof of the defendant’s “scienter,” which is to say proof that he either knew the statement was false or was reckless in disregarding a substantial risk that it was false.
Higginbotham v. Baxter International, Inc.,
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A complication introduced by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act is that “actual knowledge” of falsity, not merely indifference to the danger that a statement is false, is required for liability for “forward-looking” statements — predictions or speculations about the future. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(ii); see
Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.,
Section 21D(b)(2) of the Reform Act requires that the plaintiffs complaint “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind,” 15 U.S.C. § 78u — 4(b)(2), that is, with scienter. But except with regard to “forward-looking” statements, the Act does not specify “the required state of mind,” so it remains the concept of scienter developed before the Act.
Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc.,
To judges raised on notice pleading, the idea of drawing a “strong inference” from factual allegations is mysterious. Even when a plaintiff is required by Rule 9(b) to plead facts (such as the when and where of an alleged fraudulent statement), the court must treat the pleaded facts as true and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,
The complaint alleges the following: The corporate defendant, Tellabs, manufactures equipment used in fiber optic cable networks; its principal customers are telephone companies. In December 2000, the beginning of the period of alleged violations of Rule 10b-5, Tellabs’s principal product, accounting for more than half its sales, was a switching system called TITAN 5500. The product was almost 10 years old when on December 11 Tellabs announced that the 5500’s successor product, TITAN 6500, was “available now” and that Sprint had signed a multiyear, $100 million contract to buy the 6500, though in fact no sales pursuant to the contract closed until after the period covered by the complaint. The same announcement added that despite the advent of the 6500, sales of the 5500 would continue to grow. (Most of these and other announcements quoted in the complaint were made by Richard Notebaert, who was Tellabs’s chief executive officer and, along with Tel-labs, is the principal defendant.)
The following month, Tellabs announced that “customers are buying more and more Tellabs equipment” and that Tellabs had “set the stage for sustained growth” with the successful launch of several products. In February, the company told its stockholders that its growth was “robust” and that “customers are embracing” the 6500. In response to a question frequently asked by investors — whether sales of the 5500 had peaked — the company declared that “although we introduced this product nearly 10 years ago, it’s still going strong.” In March the company reduced its sales estimates slightly but said it was doing so because of lower than expected growth in a part of its business unrelated to the 5500 and 6500 systems, and that “interest in and demand for the 6500 continues to grow” and “we are satisfying very strong demand and growing customer demand [for the 6500, and] we are as confident as ever — that may be an understatement— about the 6500.” And in response to a securities analyst’s question whether Tel-labs was experiencing “any weakness at all” in demand for the 5500, Notebaert responded: “No, we’re not.... We’re still seeing that product continue to maintain its growth rate; it’s still experiencing strong acceptance.” Yet from the outset of the period covered by the complaint Tellabs had been flooding its customers with tens of millions of dollars worth of 5500s that the customers had not requested, in order to create an illusion of demand. The company had to lease extra storage space in January and February to accommodate the large number of returns.
Just weeks after these statements Tel-labs reduced its sales projections significantly because its customers were “exercising a high degree of prudence over every dollar spent.” But it reiterated that the demand for the 6500 was “very strong.” In April it said “we should hit our full manufacturing capacity [for the 6500] in May or June to accommodate the demand we are seeing. Everything *707 we can build, we are building and shipping. The demand is very strong.”
In June, however, at the end of the period covered by the complaint, Tellabs announced a major drop in revenues, and its share price, which at its peak during the period had been $67 and in the middle of the period had varied between $30 and $38, fell to just under $16. (It currently is below $7.00.) But the deterioration had been well under way by December as a result of the bursting of the fiber-optics bubble in the middle of the year. The market for the 5500 was evaporating; the next month (January 2001), Tellabs’s largest customer, Verizon, reduced its orders for the 5500 by 50 percent — having already, the previous June, reduced them by 25 percent. And not a single 6500 system was shipped during the complaint period.
Tellabs’s revenues in 2001 were 35 percent lower than the year before and its profits 125 percent lower. The drop in the second quarter (most of which was within the period covered by the complaint) over the year before was even steeper; revenues dropped 43 percent and profits 211 percent.
The company’s statements that we have quoted or paraphrased were, we ruled in our previous opinion — and, to repeat, the ruling binds us as law of the case — adequately pleaded as materially false. But is an inference of scienter from these allegations cogent and at least as compelling as the contrary inference — that there was no scienter? It is easier to consider the second, the comparative, question first, and also to separate the issue of the company’s scienter from that of Notebaert’s. The emphasis throughout the litigation has been on the latter, but the former is also alleged and (though briefly) argued; and we begin with it.
There are two competing inferences (always assuming of course that the plaintiffs are able to prove the allegations of the complaint). One is that the company knew (or was reckless in failing to realize, but we shall not have to discuss that possibility separately) that the statements were false, and material to investors. The other is that although the statements were false and material, their falsity was the result of innocent, or at worst careless, mistakes at the executive level. Suppose a clerical worker in the company’s finance department accidentally overstated the company’s earnings and the erroneous figure got reported in good faith up the line to No-tebaert or other senior management, who then included the figure in their public announcements. Even if senior management had been careless in failing to detect the error, there would be no corporate scienter. Intent to deceive is not a corporate attribute — -though not because “collective intent” or “shared purpose” is an oxymoron. It is not. A panel of judges does not have a single mind, but if all the judges agree on the decision of a case, the decision can properly be said to represent the collective intent of the panel, though the judges who join an opinion to make it unanimous may not agree with everything said in it.
The problem with inferring a collective intent to deceive behind the act of a corporation is that the hierarchical and differentiated corporate structure makes it quite plausible that a fraud, though ordinarily a deliberate act, could be the result of a series of acts none of which was both done with scienter and imputable to the company by the doctrine of respondeat superior. Someone low in the corporate hierarchy might make a mistake that formed the premise of a statement made at the executive level by someone who was at worst careless in having failed to catch the mistake. A routine invocation of re-spondeat superior, which would impute the mistake to the corporation provided only
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that it was committed in the course of the employee’s job rather than being “a frolic of his own,”
Joel v. Morrison,
6 C. & P. 501, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834), would, if applied to a securities fraud that requires scienter, attribute to a corporation a state of mind that none of its employees had. To establish corporate liability for a violation of Rule 10b-5 requires “look[ing] to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion therein, or the like) rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s officers and employees acquired in the course of their employment.”
Southland Securities Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc.,
Suppose the false communication by the low-level employee to his superiors had been deliberate. Suppose he was embezzling tens of millions of dollars, and by concealing the embezzlement greatly exaggerated his corporation’s assets. Suppose he even knew that as a result the corporation would misrepresent its assets to investors. Nevertheless, even if his superiors were careless in failing to detect the embezzlement, the corporation would not be guilty of fraud, since the malefactor’s acts of embezzling and concealing the embezzlement would not be acts on behalf of the corporation; deliberate wrongs by an employee are not imputed to his employer unless they are not only within the scope of his employment but in attempted furtherance of the employer’s goals.
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
The Supreme Court has declined to incorporate common law principles root and branch into section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (and hence into Rule 10b — 5), and specifically has rejected aider and abettor liability.
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
The court in the
Southland Securities
case said that corporate scienter could be based on the state of mind of someone who furnished false information that became the basis of a fraudulent public announcement. Suppose he had knowingly supplied the false information intending to help the company. His superiors would not be liable for failing to catch the mistake, but
Southland
implies that the corporation would be liable, just as it would be in a common law tort suit.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
§ 70, pp. 505-06 (5th ed.1984). That theory of liability is not argued in this case, however, and so we need not explore it. Nor do the plaintiffs seek to use section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), to impose “control person” liability on the corporation, which would require the plaintiffs to overcome defenses of good faith and noninducement. Tellabs does not make the argument, which has been rejected by most courts,
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that section 20(a) supersedes liability-based on apparent authority or respondeat superior.
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.,
The critical question, therefore, is how likely it is that the allegedly false statements that we quoted earlier in this opinion were the result of merely careless mistakes at the management level based on false information fed it from below, rather than of an intent to deceive or a reckless indifference to whether the statements were misleading. It is exceedingly unlikely. The 5500 and the 6500 were Tellabs’s most important products. The 5500 was described by the company as its “flagship” product and the 6500 was the 5500’s heralded successor. They were to Tellabs as Windows XP and Vista are to Microsoft. That no member of the company’s senior management who was involved in authorizing or making public statements about the demand for the 5500 and 6500 knew that they were false is very hard to credit, and no plausible story has yet been told by the defendants that might dispel our incredulity. The closest is the suggestion that while “available” no doubt meant to most investors that the 6500 was ready to be shipped to customers rather than that the new product was having teething troubles that would keep it off the market for many months, this may have been a bit of corporate jargon innocently intended to indicate that the company was ready to take orders. If so, then while it was false as reasonably understood by investors the false impression was a result of mutual misunderstanding rather than of fraud. See
Banque Arabe et Internationale D'Investissement v. Maryland National Bank,
Another possible, though again very unlikely, example of innocent misunderstanding is the charge of “channel stuffing.” The term refers to shipping to one’s distributors more of one’s product than one thinks one can sell. A certain amount of channel stuffing could be innocent and might not even mislead — a seller might have a realistic hope that stuffing the channel of distribution would incite his distributors to more vigorous efforts to sell the stuff lest it pile up in inventory. Channel stuffing becomes a form of fraud only when it is used, as the complaint alleges, to book revenues on the basis of goods shipped but not really sold because the buyer can return them. They are in effect sales on consignment, and such sales “cannot be booked as revenue. Neither condition of revenue recognition has been fulfilled — ownership and its attendant risks have not been transferred, and since the goods might not even be sold, there can be no certainty of getting paid. But those strictures haven’t stopped some managers from using consigned goods to fatten the top line — that is, the revenue line — of the corporate income statement.” H. David Sherman et al., Profits You Can Trust, Spotting & Surviving Accounting Landmines 30 (Financial Times Prentice Hall 2003); SEC v. McAfee, Inc., Civ. Ac *710 tion No. 06-009(PJH) (N.D.Cal. Jan. 4, 2006), http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr 19520.htm (visited Nov. 19, 2007). (Similarly, Tellabs could not properly record revenue on its contract with Sprint before actually transferring title to 6500 systems to Sprint.) The huge number of returns of 5500 systems is evidence that the purpose of the stuffing was to conceal the disappointing demand for the product rather than to prod distributors to work harder to attract new customers, and the purpose would have been formed or ratified at the highest level of management.
All this is not to say that the plaintiffs could name “management” as a defendant or, less absurdly, name each corporate officer. That would be an example of “the group pleading doetrine[, which] is a judicial presumption that statements in group-published documents including annual reports and press releases are attributable to officers and directors who have day-today control or involvement in regular company operations.”
Winer Family Trust v. Queen,
Against all this the defendants argue that they could have had no motive to paint the prospects for the 5500 and 6500 systems in rosy hues because within months they acknowledged their mistakes and disclosed the true situation of the two products, and because there is no indication that Notebaert or anyone else who may have been in on the fraud profited from it financially. The argument confuses expected with realized benefits. Noteb-aert may have thought that there was a chance that the situation regarding the two key products would right itself. If so, the benefits of concealment might exceed the costs. Investors do not like to think they’re riding a roller coaster. Prompt disclosure of the truth would have caused Tellabs’s stock price to plummet, as it did when the truth came out a couple of months later. Suppose the situation had corrected itself. Still, investors would have discovered that the stock was more volatile than they thought, and risk-averse investors (who predominate) do not like volatility and so, unless it can be diversified away, demand compensation in the form of a lower price; consequently the stock might not recover to its previous level. The fact that a gamble — concealing bad news in the hope that it will be overtaken by good news — fails is not inconsistent with its having been a considered, though because of the risk a reckless, gamble. See
First Commodity Corp. of Boston v. CFTC,
So the inference of corporate scienter is not only as likely as its opposite, but more likely. And is it cogent? Well, if there are only two possible inferences, and one is
much
more likely than the other, it must be cogent. Suppose a person woke up one morning with a sharp pain in his abdomen. He thought it was due to a recent operation to remove his gall bladder, but realized it could equally well have been due to any number of other things. The infer
*711
ence that it was due to the operation could not be thought cogent. But suppose he went to a doctor who performed tests that ruled out any cause other than the operation or a duodenal ulcer and told the patient that he was 99 percent certain that it was the operation. The plausibility of an explanation depends on the plausibility of the alternative explanations.
United States v. Beard,
And at the top of the corporate pyramid sat Notebaert, the CEO. The 5500 and the 6500 were his company’s key products. Almost all the false statements that we quoted emanated directly from him. Is it conceivable that he was unaware of the problems of his company’s two major products and merely repeating lies fed to him by other executives of the company? It is conceivable, yes, but it is exceedingly unlikely.
The defendants complain, finally, about the complaint’s dependence on “confidential sources.” The 26 “confidential sources” referred to in the complaint are important sources for the allegations not only of falsity but also of scienter. Because the Reform Act requires detailed fact pleading of falsity, materiality, and scienter, the plaintiffs lawyers in securities-fraud litigation have to conduct elaborate pre-complaint investigations — and without the aid of discovery, which cannot be conducted until the complaint is filed. Unable to compel testimony from employees of the prospective defendant, the lawyers worry that they won’t be able to get to first base without assuring confidentiality to the employees whom they interview, even though it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who blows the whistle on a securities fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, and even though, since informants have no evidentiary privilege, their identity will be revealed in pretrial discovery, though of course a suit might never be brought or if brought might be settled before any discovery was conducted.
The problem with this argument — besides the seeming flimsiness of the asserted need for anonymity — is that allegations based on anonymous informants are very difficult to assess. This concern led us to suggest in
Higginbotham v. Baxter International, Inc., supra,
The confidential sources listed in the complaint in this case, in contrast, are numerous and consist of persons who from the description of their jobs were in a position to know at first hand the facts to which they are prepared to testify, such as the returns of the 5500s, that sales of the 5500 were dropping off a cliff while the company pretended that demand was strong, that the 6500 was not approved by Regional Bell Operating Companies, that it was still in the beta stage and failing performance tests conducted by prospective customers, and that it was too bulky for customers’ premises. The information that the confidential informants are reported to have obtained is set forth in convincing detail, with some of the information, moreover, corroborated by multiple sources. It would be better were the informants named in the complaint, because it would be easier to determine whether they had been in a good position to know the facts that the complaint says they learned. But the absence of proper names does not invalidate the drawing of a strong inference from informants’ assertions. See
In re Daou Systems, Inc.,
We conclude that the plaintiffs have succeeded, with regard to the statements identified in our previous opinion as having been adequately alleged to be false and material, in pleading scienter in conformity with the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. We therefore adhere to our decision to reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing the suit.
Reversed and Remanded.
