Opinion by
This is a suit in trespass for damages for the wrongful death of Helen D. Maize, aged 33 years, the wife of Earl R. Maize, the administrator named as plaintiff. Mrs. Maize, the mother of two children, died as a result of inhaling the fumes of a poisonous chemical, carbon tetrachloride, which comprises 45% of a cleaning fluid designated as Atlantic Safetv-Kleen which is manufactured and sold to the genеral public by the defendant. The cans which contain it, and from one of which Mrs. Maize procured the fluid, display on one side the words “A Highly Efficient Dry Cleaner” in letters 5/16" in height followed by these words in letters 3/16" in height: *53 “For every dry cleaning purpose. Will not injure the finest fabrics.” On the can there twice appears the word “Caution” in letters *4" in height followed by the following words in y8" type: “Do not inhale fumes. Usе only in well ventilated place.” The compound word “Safety-Kleen” appears on the two broad sides of the can in letters ranging from %" in height to %" in height, “S” and “K” being the largest letters, and on the two narrow sides of the can in letters a trifle smaller. Thus the compound word “Safety-Kleen” stands out on the four sides of the can.
The 2-gallon can of Safety-Kleen which contained the fluid Mrs. Mаize used was delivered to her by her brother on May 13, 1942, and on the following day she used the fluid in cleaning rugs in her home. One of these rooms was 18' x 12' in dimensions. The other was a smaller room. She worked at the job “a good part of one morning” and also in the afternoon and in the evening. At noon she had a headache from inhaling the fumes and in the evening she became ill. Her illness continued until Mаy 27th when she died. It was established that the cause of her death was the inhaling of the fumes from Safety-Kleen. These fumes entered the blood stream and destroyed the liver and kidneys. Judge Marshall of the court below made the following statement in his opinion:
“Carbon tetrachloride fumes are so dangerous to human life that 1-7/10 cubic inches in a room containing 1000 cubic feet (1728 cubic inchеs equal 1 cubic foot) is the maximum amount to which a human can safely be exposed. The two-gallon can of “Safety-Kleen” placed on the market by defendant, when vaporized, contained 51,149 cubic inches of carbon tetrachloride fumes.”
The issue submitted to the jury was whether or not the defendant had been negligent in giving an inadequate warning to the public of the dangers naturally resulting from the use of this cleaning fluid in places where the fumes would be confined as they were in the *54 rooms in which Mrs. Maize worked when she used this fluid. The jury returned a verdict of $2500 to Mrs. Maize’s estate and $7500 to her husband and children. The defendant made a motion for judgment n. o. v. The defendant in support of its motion contended that the fluid used by Mrs. Maize was sold by it to Portable Lamp & Equipment Company fоr the latter’s own use and not for resale, and that on May 13 or 14, 1943, Elmer Davis, a brother of Mrs. Maize (this brother being employed by Portable as a serviceman) took “out of stock” at Portable a can containing Safety-Kleen and delivered it to his sister. The defendant argues from this that Mrs. Maize stood in no legal relationship either to the defendant or to Portable. ■ She simply used the fluid tаken by her brother from the stock of Portable. As the court below pointed out, Elmer Davis testified that the can he took was a full can and he denied that he filled it from the drum on the original purchaser’s premises. This presented an issue of fact for the jury on this phase of the case.
We do not deem this fact of vital importance, for this can of Safety-Kleen appаrently came into Mrs. Maize’s possession lawfully and she used it for the purpose it was manufactured and put on the market. We said in
Ebbert et al. v. Phila. Electric Co.,
“One duty imposed by law is to use due diligence to avoid causing harm which an individual has no legal *55 right to inflict upon another. This duty is breached by аny legally harmful act or omission which might have been foreseen and avoided, . . . Holmes in ‘The Com mon Law/ page 145, says: ‘Most liabilities in tort . . . are founded on the infliction of harm which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to avoid at the time of the acts or omissions which were its proximate cause.’
“. . . In
Bisson v. Kelly,
We do not agree with the decision cited by defendant’s counsel, in the case of
McClaren, Administratrix, v. G. S. Robins,
In the instant case it is clear that the court below could not declare as a matter of law that the defendant in displaying as it did the “cautionary” admonition on its can of Safety-Kleen discharged its full duty under the circumstances and was not guilty of negligence. It is equally clear that the court could not declare as a matter of law that Mrs. Maize’s failure to heed the cautionary admonition displayed on the can, as above described, amounted to contributory negligence. The case was for the jury.
The court below while refusing to enter judgment for the defendant n. o. v. felt constrained to grant a new trial because of a mistake in receiving and recording the jury’s verdict. Before the jury retired to deliberate, the judge wrote the words “Estate” and “Family” upon the verdict slip and instructed the jury to write thereon the amounts they found for respectively the estate and the family, if their verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff. The jury wrote after the word “Estate” $2500 and after the word “Family” $7500. These words were written above the word “Verdict” on the jury slip. Upon the trial judge receiving the verdict he wrote under the *58 word “Verdict” the following: “We find for plaintiff and award Earl R. Maize, Administrator of the Estate of Helen Davis Maize, deceased, the snm of $2500.” And under that he wrote “We find a verdict for Earl R. Maize, Administrator of Helen Davis Maize, in her own right, for pain and suffering, the sum of $7500.”
That the verdict as thus received and recorded was not what the jury intended is conceded by all parties in interest, and all the jurors have certified as follows: “We returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and that we awarded damages to the husband, Earl R. Maize, and his two children in the sum of $7500, as written in our verdict slip after the word ‘Family,’ and that we returned a verdict in favor of the Estate of Helen Maize, deceased, in the sum of $2500. It was our intention to make these awards as above indicated, and it was our understanding that our verdict was recorded as thus written by us into the verdict sheet.” The court en banc in its opinion says: “We are convinced that the trial judge made a mistake in writing out the verdict which was received and recorded in court . . .” The court then adds: “. . . we believe we have no authority to grant the plaintiff’s petition to correct the verdict. ... We, therefore, reluctantly grant a new trial; we say ‘reluctantly’ because of the mistake of the trial judge.”
The change of a jury’s verdict after it has been received and recorded is rarely asked for and even more rarely permitted. This court has said that the jury’s “findings in court is what decides the rights of the parties”:
Scott v. Scott,
The cases just quoted from are the cases which the court below apparently believed precluded the granting of the petition for the correction of the admitted error in receiving and recording the jury’s verdict. But in those cases the verdicts recorded were in fact the verdicts the juries
intended
to have returned and recorded. In the instant case the verdict received and recorded was not the verdict the jury had agreed upon. Through a clerical error on the part of the trial judge the verdict
recorded
was not the jury’s real verdict. What the verdict in the jury’s mind was and what it thought the verdict it was rendering was is not questioned by anyone. If under such circumstances a palpable mistake in the receiving and recording of a jury’s verdict cannot be corrected by the court and the true verdict substituted therefor, justice must be sacrificed so that the recording of a jury’s verdict may be invested with sacrosanct rigidity. Fortunately, the law does not require courts to. apply any such unreasonable rule. In
East Broad Top Transit Co. v. Flood,
“Moreover, even after the reception of the verdict, appellant could have moved the court to mould or amend it so as to make it conform with the jury’s apparent but unexpressed intention; this wоuld have been a matter within the sound discretion of the court:
Shively v. McDonnell,
In
Cohn et al. v. Scheuer et al.,
“The power of the court to mould or amend verdicts of juries is established by repeated decisions: Iven's Appeal, 33 Pa. St., 237; Haycock v. Greup, 57 Id. 438; Byrne v. Grossman, 65 Id. 310; Smith v. Meldien, 107 Id. 348. It was contended, however, that this power is confined to corrections made at the time the verdict is rendered. This is not the law. In Iven's Appeal, supra, the entry was ‘May 27, 1857, verdict for рlaintiff,’ and on the 26th of October of the same year the record was amended so as to read ‘verdict for the plaintiff on both issues.’ And there seems no good reason why this should not be done. It would be intolerable if a verdict may be entered erroneously by the clerk, and the court be powerless on the next day to correct it. And, if it may do so on the next day, why not the next week, or the next month? What magic is there in the lapse of a few days or a few weeks to prevent the court from amending its own record to conform to the truth? Must the court be forever chained to an error merely because the sun has gone down upon it?”
In
Brown v. Commonwealth,
*61
In
Zarko v. Kramer,
In
Smullin v. Harenski,
In
Minot et al. v. City of Boston,
To permit the verdict of a jury to be amended after the jury is discharged, except in a clear case of error in announcing and reсording the verdict, might lead to great abuses, and such amendments are permissible only in very exceptional cases where the facts are not disputed and where justice requires it. This is such a case. This jury actually agreed on a verdict for the “Family” in the sum of $7500 and for the “Estate” in the sum of $2500, and so declared in its written return. The trial judge in amplifying the jury’s finding confused in his composition the conсeptions of “Estate” and “Family,” and when his amplification was read to the jurors the latter not realizing that a transposition had been made in their respective findings gave formal assent to a verdict which they believed was the one they had agreed to and returned, but which was not. Since the facts are undisputed and no objection made by or in behalf of any party in interest, and since it is the just thing to do, the proposed amendment correcting what is so plainly an error will be ordered.
The judgment of the court below in refusing to enter judgment for the defendant n. o. v. is affirmed. The judgment of the court below in granting a new trial is reversed. The record is remitted to the court below with instructions to that court to enter judgment in favor of Earl K. Maize, Administrator of the Estate of Helеn Davis Maize, deceased, for himself as surviving husband of Helen Davis Maize, and for the children of the deceased, in the sum of $7500, and to enter judgment in favor of Earl K. Maize, as Administrator of the Estate of Helen Davis Maize, in the sum of $2500.
Notes
In
Prussel v. Knowles, 4
How. (Miss.) 90, an amendment to tbe verdict was made after some but not all of tbe jurors bad left tbe court room. Tbe amendment limited tbe jury’s finding against
all
of tbe defendants to some of tbe defendants. In
Sigal v. Miller
(Tex. Civ. App.),