A jury awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in damages for the defendant’s negligence and for the defendant’s violation of an implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of a printing machine to the plaintiff’s employer. A judge awarded the plaintiff attorney fees of $20,700 and costs of $8,641.52 pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9. On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in the exclusion of evidence and in the award of costs. We allowed the defendant’s motion for direct appellate review. We affirm. 1
We summarize the undisputed facts. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was employed by Carlsberg Printers, Inc., and was operating a printing press manufactured by the defendant. The press had been manufactured with a safety device designed to prevent accidental injuries, but the device was removed shortly after the press was installed at Carlsberg. The plaintiff never saw any warning stickers on the machine, nor was he aware that the safety mechanism had been removed.
On April 19, 1980, the plaintiff was working with the press. He determined that the plate then in the press had to be changed. He stopped the press so that he could change the plate. When he was finished, he turned the press back on before removing his hand from the inside of the press. When the machine started up, his hand was crushed.
1. Exclusion of evidence. On the first day of trial, the plaintiff made a motion in limine to exclude evidence that beer was available on the premises of Carlsberg Printers, on the ground that there was no evidence that the plaintiff consumed any alcohol on the day of the accident. The judge allowed the motion, stating: “I have made inquiry as to whether or not during the course of the discovery there has been any person who was deposed, including the plaintiff, who had indicated that the plaintiff did in fact have a beer. My understanding is that there is no one who would say yes to any question.” The defendant made a general objection.
*187 On the third day of trial, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the judge’s ruling. As grounds therefor, counsel for the defendant stated that he had telephoned a witness, Robert Harless, to inform him of the trial schedule and asked Harless whether “there were any substantial changes in the sworn testimony of his deposition.” Harless, a former supervisor at Carlsberg, said that there were changes. The defendant’s counsel informed the judge that Harless and another witness, Andrew Traylor, were now prepared to testify that the plaintiff “[h]ad at least two beers before his accident.” The judge was inclined to exclude the testimony and declared that the eleventh-hour recantation was “the very thing the rules [of civil procedure] are designed to foreclose.” Nonetheless, he allowed the motion to reconsider to the extent that he permitted the defendant’s counsel to cross-examine the plaintiff on the subject of alcohol consumption. The plaintiff denied that he had been drinking on the job on the day of the accident. 2 The judge deferred a further ruling until the two witnesses were present.
On the fourth day of trial, the judge held a voir dire of the two witnesses. Robert Harless stated that he did not see the plaintiff drink any alcoholic beverage on the day of the accident. Harless said that he saw the plaintiff handle a beer can at some time during the day, but he did not know whether it was empty. He also did not know if the beer can could have been an empty one left near the plaintiff’s work area by himself (Harless) or another employee. Andrew Traylor testified that he did not observe the plaintiff drinking on the day of the accident. Traylor did state, however, that other employ *188 ees drank beer during working hours and that once he had seen the plaintiff drinking a beer at work.
On the basis of this voir dire testimony, the judge ruled that further evidence about the plaintiff’s drinking beer at Carlsberg was excluded. The judge stated, “I have heard all I am going to hear on this matter. It is not coming in.” The defendant objected and now argues that this ruling was improper. We disagree.
Traylor’s testimony on this issue was inadmissible. The drinking habits of other employees, and the fact that the plaintiff himself had once before at an unspecified time and date had a drink at work, were irrelevant. They did not “render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Green
v.
Richmond,
Harless’s testimony also properly was excluded because it did not furnish a link in the chain of proof. See Green v. Richmond, supra at 59. Testimony about the beer can, without more, was insufficient to establish that the plaintiff had been drinking prior to the accident and therefore was impaired. This is particularly true because Harless admitted that he did not see the plaintiff drink any beer that day, that he did not know if he or another employee could have left the *189 beer can there, and that he did not know whether the beer can was empty. The defendant was unable to link Harless’s testimony at the voir dire hearing with any other evidence that could have permitted the jury to infer that the plaintiff had been drinking prior to the accident and was impaired. There was no error in the judge’s ruling.
2.
Claim under G. L. c. 93A.
After the trial, the judge held a separate hearing on the plaintiffs claim under the consumer protection statute, G. L. c. 93A. See
Nei
v.
Burley,
The judge found that “the defendant breached its warranty of merchantability in that it failed to warn of dangerous conditions. The machine in its condition was not of merchantable quality. As a result, [the] plaintiffs hand became caught and crushed by the machine . . . .” The judge noted the jury’s answers to special questions, which indicated that the plaintiff was unaware “that the product was defective and dangerous . . . .” The judge also took notice of the jury’s conclusion that the defendant was negligent. These findings yield ample factual support for the judge’s holding that the defendant had violated G. L. c. 93A, § 2. 5
The defendant contends that, in this case, we should abandon the general rule that a breach of warranty constitutes a violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (see section (3), infra), because (1) in a products liability case, a nonnegligent breach of war *190 ranty should not fall under the general rule; (2) G. L. c. 93A does not provide a cause of action for a personal injury plaintiff who is not a consumer and not in privity with the defendant; and (3) the defendant’s conduct was neither unfair nor deceptive.
(1) The defendant argues that, in a products liability case, liability should not be imposed automatically under G. L. c. 93A whenever a defendant has violated the warranty of merchantability. The defendant argues, essentially, that in some circumstances, liability might be imposed under G. L. c. 93A for breach of warranty even if the defendant was not negligent. That issue is not before us. The jurors concluded that the defendant was negligent, and the judge agreed with that conclusion. There was sufficient evidence for the jury and the judge to conclude as they did. 6 Thus, the only issues before us are whether the plaintiff has a cause of action under c. 93A and whether the defendant’s negligence and breach of warranty constitute a violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2. 7
(2) The defendant argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1988 ed.). This argument is premised on the contention that the plaintiff, an employee of the purchaser of the product, is neither a consumer nor in privity with the defendant. Section 9, however, no longer limits relief to consumers. It provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person, other than a person entitled to bring action under section eleven of this chapter [i.e., a business plaintiff], who has been injured by another person’s use or employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by section two or any rule or regulation issued thereunder . . . .”
8
*191
See
Van Dyke
v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
Nor has a lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant previously barred recovery under c. 93A, § 9.* *******
9
In
Van Dyke, supra,
for example, the plaintiffs, who had brought suit against a physician for malpractice, also brought suit against the physician’s malpractice insurer for unfair claim settlement practices. We held that these claimants against the defendant insurer’s insured were proper plaintiffs under § 9, even though the plaintiffs had no contractual relation whatsoever with the defendant insurer. In
Burnham
v.
Mark IV Homes, Inc.,
The defendant further objects to the application of G. L. c. 93A to products liability cases involving personal injury. Unlike the former version of the statute, however, the present version no longer includes a requirement that the plaintiffs show a loss of “money or property.” See note 8,
supra.
Section 9 provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person . . . who has been injured by another person’s use” of an unfair or deceptive trade practice. We see no reason to exclude injury to the person from the category of injuries cognizable under G. L. c. 93A. See
Leardi
v.
Brown,
*193
(3) The defendant’s argument that it has done nothing unfair or deceptive in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2, also fails. The judge concluded that the defendant violated G. L. c. 93A, § 2, because of the defendant’s negligence and the breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Generally, a breach of warranty constitutes a violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2.
Canal Elec. Co.
v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
Moreover, “it is not a defense to a c. 93A claim that the defendant’s conduct was negligent rather than intentional . . . .”
Linthicum
v.
Archambault, supra
at 388. “[N]either intent to engage in an unlawful act nor knowledge of its unlawfulness is required in order to establish liability.”
Id.
at 388 n.12, quoting Rice, New Private Remedies for Consumers: The Amendment of Chapter 93A, 54 Mass. L.Q. 307,
*194
314 (1969). See
Purity Supreme, Inc.
v.
Attorney Gen.,
3.
The reasonableness of attorney’s fees and costs.
The trial judge concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4).
13
The judge stated that, “[hjaving had the opportunity to view, first hand, the ability of plaintiff’s counsel, the nature and complexity of the issues and the length of the trial, plaintiff’s requests cannot be said to be unreasonable.” The judge then awarded fees of $20,700 and costs of $8,641.52. The defendant objects to this award because “[n]o breakdown as to how the legal fees or costs were arrived at was given to the court below.” In its brief, however, the defendant confines its argument to the issue of costs; thus, it has waived any objection to the reasonableness of fees awarded. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended,
As far as costs are concerned, “reasonable expert witness fees should normally be recoverable in a c. 93A case in order to vindicate the policies of the act.”
Linthicum
v.
Archambault,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
We acknowledge the assistance of amici Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers of the United States, Inc.
The plaintiff pointed out during oral argument that hospital records, introduced at trial, contained no indication that the plaintiff had been drinking. These records indicate that the hospital staff administered Demerol to the plaintiff only fifteen minutes after the accident occurred. The plaintiffs point was that the hospital would not have administered Demerol to a patient who had been drinking. The plaintiff is correct in asserting that there was no mention of alcohol in the hospital records. There was, however, no testimony concerning the meaning of the records. Without such testimony, we do not consider the records.
The defendant also contends that this evidence should have been admitted to impeach the plaintiff’s credibility, because the plaintiff stated that neither he nor any other employee drank at work prior to the accident. These were collateral matters. It was properly within the discretion of the trial judge to exclude extrinsic evidence of collateral matters.
Commonwealth
v. Sherry,
The jury also concluded that the plaintiff was forty per cent comparatively negligent.
The judge awarded costs and fees under c. 93A. A further award of damages for the plaintiffs injuries on the c. 93A claim, combined with the jury’s $100,000 award on the breach of warranty claim, would have amounted to cumulative damages for the same injury. See
Canal Elec. Co.
v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
On appeal, the defendant rightly did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
The defendant argues that, to the extent that the Attorney General’s regulation imposes G. L. c. 93A, § 2, liability automatically, the Attorney General has “arrogat[ed] excessive power to himself . . . .” Because we conclude that application of the regulation was proper in this case, we do not reach or decide this issue.
The former version of § 9, as appearing in St. 1979, c. 72, § 1, would have supported the defendant’s argument here. It provided that: “Any per
*191
son who purchases or leases goods, services or property, real or personal, primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by section two or by any rule or regulation issued under paragraph (c) of said section two may, as hereinafter provided, bring an action in the superior court . . . .” Compare
Dodd
v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
Lack of privity, the problem here, is to be distinguished from a situation in which no warranty arises because no sale, lease, or contract exists. Compare
Colter
v.
Barber-Greene Co.,
The difference between
Burnham
v.
Mark IV Homes, Inc.,
and this case is that the consumer plaintiffs in
Burnham
were not in vertical privity with the defendant, while in this case, the plaintiff is not in horizontal privity with the defendant but is someone who uses or is affected by the warranted product. See
Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc.
v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
We are unmoved by the defendant’s observation that, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq. (1982), liability for breach of warranty does not extend to personal injury. The MMWA was intended to supplement State regulation of warranties, not to limit State regulation.
Gorman
v.
Saf-T-Mate, Inc.,
Calimlim, supra, and Burnham, supra, both involve breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
General Laws c. 93A, § 9 (4) (1988 ed.), provides that, “[i]f the court finds in any action commenced hereunder that there has been a violation of section two, the petitioner shall, in addition to other relief provided for by this section and irrespective of the amount in controversy, be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with said action. . . .”
In addition to the expert witness and depositions, there were twenty-four exhibits, including ten photographs and a hospital record.
The judge made the award of costs on the basis of an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff’s attorney. The record does not disclose any request by the defendant for a breakdown of cost figures. It would have been better practice, however, to have submitted a breakdown of the figures.