Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc.Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc.
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- Before:
- Murphy
Plaintiff William J. Maher appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal securities claims against Defendants Colina Oro Molino, Inc. (“COM”) and Gwen Fraser. Maher argues that COM and Fraser are hable as “control persons” under § 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and
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20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) for various violations of the securities laws allegedly committed by Defendant Durango Metals, Inc. (“Durango”), the issuer of the relevant stock. The district court dismissed Maher’s claims against COM and Fraser, concluding as a matter of law that Maher failed to establish that COM and Fraser were control persons of Durango. The district court also concluded that neither COM nor Fraser could be held primarily liable for alleged violations of § 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act. This court exercises jurisdiction under
I. BACKGROUND
Maher’s securities claims originate from a failed $200,000 investment in Durango. In July 1995, Maher brought suit against the following parties, alleging various violations of federal and state securities laws: Duran-go; Tahmef (“Thames”) Hartley, allegedly an officer and director of Durango; COM, allegedly a control person of Durango; Fraser, allegedly the sole or principal owner of COM and consequently a control person of Duran-go; and J. Wayne Tatman, allegedly Fraser’s brother and an officer or employee of Duran-go and/or COM. Specifically, Maher alleged that Defendants violated § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and §§ 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(2) 1 of the 1933 Act. In addition, Maher brought a fraudulent misrepresentation claim and a claim alleging violations of the Colorado Securities Act.
Maher alleged in his Complaint that between October 1994 and March 1995, Hart
In response, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss under
II. DISCUSSION
This court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal under
A. “Control Person” Liability
Maher first challenges the district court’s dismissal of his § 10(b),
In
Richardson v. MacArthur,
451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir.1971), this court addressed “control” under § 20(a) and concluded: “‘The statute is remedial and is to be construed liberally. It has been interpreted as requiring only some indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual direction to hold a “controlling person” liable.’”
Id.
at 41-42 (quoting
Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir.1967)). The SEC’s definition of “control” reflects this remedial purpose: “control” is defined as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”
In his Complaint, Maher alleged primary violations of § 10(b),
Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Maher, this court concludes that he has failed to plead sufficient facts establishing COM’s control of Durango.. Maher has not alleged that COM possessed even the power to control Duran-go,
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but rather that COM, by virtue of its
The allegations in Maher’s Complaint are likewise insufficient to establish Fraser’s control of Durango. Maher primarily relies on Fraser’s ownership interest in COM to establish Fraser’s alleged control of Duran-go. As discussed, the allegations are insufficient to support a reasonable inference that COM was a control person of Durango. Consequently, Fraser cannot be considéred a control person of Durango solely by virtue of her ownership interest in COM. Maher also alleged that Fraser was the sister of Tatman, who was “an officer or employee of Defendant Durango Metals and/or Defendant Com, Inc.” Alleging that a defendant is the sibling of an individual who may or may not be an officer or employee of the primary violator is not sufficient to confer control person status on that defendant.
Because Maher failed to allege facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that COM and Fraser were control persons of Durango, the district court properly dismissed Maher’s § 10(b),
Maher next appears to argue the district court erred in dismissing his claims against COM and Fraser for primary liability under
The district court concluded that because Maher failed to allege COM and Fraser were “sellers” of Durango stock and failed to identify any “financial interests of [the] defendants related to the sale,” neither defendant could be held primarily hable under
Maher does not contend that either COM or Fraser directly sold him the Duran-go stock. Thus, to state a claim of primary liability against COM and Fraser, Maher must at a minimum allege facts indicating that COM and Fraser solicited his purchase of Durango stock.
See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig.,
90 F.3d 696, 717 n. 19 (3d Cir. 1996) (“An allegation of direct and active participation in the solicitation of the immediate sale is necessary for solicitation liability, i.e., where the
In his Complaint, Maher alleged no facts indicating that either COM or Fraser solicited his purchase of the Durango stock. Rather, Maher alleged that. Tatman and Hartley induced his purchase of the stock. As a result, Maher failed as a matter of law to state a claim of primary liability against COM and Fraser under
III. CONCLUSION
This court upholds the district court’s dismissal under
Notes
. Section 12 claims are commonly referred to as either
. All references to Maher‘s “Complaint” refer to his Amended Complaint.
. Maher has not appealed the dismissal of his claim alleging violations of the Colorado Securities Act.
. The district court also set forth an alternative ground for dismissing Maher‘s
. Section 15 of the 1933 Act provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title [sections 11 or 12], shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
.Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause, of action.
. Although worded differently, the control person provisions of § 15 and § 20(a) are interpreted the same. See First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 897 (10th Cir.1992), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994).
. This court recognizes there is a potential circuit split regarding whether, as part of a prima facie case of control person liability, a plaintiff must show that the alleged control person actually exercised control over the primary violator’s general affairs or whether it is sufficient to show that the control person had the power to exercise such control. Compare Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630-31 (8th Cir.1985) (holding that to establish a prima facie case of control person liability, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged control person “actually participated in (i.e., exercised control over) the operations of the [primary violator] in general” (internal quotations omitted)) and Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir.1992) (applying Eighth Circuit’s test) with Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 & n. 6 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant “had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws” but declining to decide whether “power to control” means “simply abstract power to control, or actual exercise of the power to control” (internal quotations omitted)), cert, de nied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 950, 136 L.Ed.2d 838 (1997), and Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir.1993) (noting plaintiffs’ argument that they need only show the alleged control persons possessed the “power to control [the primary violator], not the actual exercise of that power” but declining to analyze the distinction because plaintiffs could not even show power to control). Although perhaps disagreeing about whether a plaintiff must show actual control over the primary violator‘s general affairs, courts generally agree that the plaintiff need only show the power to control the transaction underlying the alleged securities violation and not the exercise of that power. See Metge, 762 F.2d at 631; Harrison, 974 F.2d at 881; Brown, 84 F.3d at 396 & n. 5; Abbott, 2 F.3d at 619-20. But see SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that to establish a prima facie case of control person liabilhy, a plaintiff must show that the alleged control person was “in some meaningful sense [a] culpable participant[] in the fraud perpetrated by [the] controlled person[]” (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 57, 139 L.Ed.2d 21 (1997).
In this case, Maher alleged that COM and Fraser possessed only the ability to acquire the power to control Durango. The ability to acquire the power to control is necessarily one step removed from the power to control and two steps removed from the actual exercise of control. Because Maher’s allegations are not sufficient to show that COM or Fraser possessed even the power to control Durango, this court need not address whether a plaintiff must allege actual control of or simply the power to control the primary violator‘s general affairs in order to establish a prima facie case of control person liability.
. It is unclear from Maher’s brief whether he is arguing that COM and Fraser are liable under
. -The
Pinter
definition of a statutory seller under