Mary J. MAGWOOD, Appellant v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
No. 07-3787
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Sept. 9, 2008
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) Sept. 9, 2008. Filed: Sept. 9, 2008.
Taryn Jasner, Social Security Administration OGC/Region III, Philadelphia, PA, for Commissioner of Social Security.
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, McKEE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Mary J. Magwood appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the denial by the Commissioner of Social Security of Magwood‘s application for benefits under Title XIV of the Social Security Act. The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to
Magwood applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits in 2004, alleging disability on the basis of depression and a history of alcohol abuse, which was in remission. Her depression was attributable in part to the fact that her son had been declared dependent in 2003 when her significant other broke her son‘s arm. Thereafter, Magwood stopped drinking and began to provide a tox screen on a weekly or biweekly basis to verify her abstinence from alcohol. She was treated with an antidepressant, attended on a weekly basis either individual or group therapy, participated in weekly sessions with a counselor for victims of abuse, and was evaluated by her psychiatrist on a monthly or bimonthly basis. Magwood testified that she suffered from crying spells, and that her ability to concentrate and to sleep were affected by her depression. As support for her claim of disability, one of Magwood‘s treating psychiatrists at an outpatient psychiatric center, Dr. Duckett, opined that it was unlikely that she could perform sustained work because she had marked limitations in her ability to maintain social functioning, to concentrate and persist in a task, to interact appropriately with the public and coworkers, and to respond appropriately to work pressures. Magwood‘s score on the Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF) ranged from 55-60, a score which is indicative of moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social or occupational functioning.1 The progress notes of her treating psychiatrists consistently documented Magwood‘s mood as depressed.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Magwood‘s mental impairment of major depression and alcohol abuse disorder, in remission, were not severe impairments at step two in the sequential analysis set out in
Magwood appealed. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge‘s report, which recommended that the Commissioner‘s decision be affirmed. This timely appeal followed, challenging again the ALJ‘s finding that she did not have a severe
In Newell v. Commissioner, 347 F.3d 541 (3d Cir.2003), we instructed that step two of the sequential analysis “is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims ... An impairment or combination of impairments can be found ‘not severe’ only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which have ‘no more than a minimal effect on an individual‘s ability to work.‘” Id. at 546 (internal citations omitted). We declared that “reasonable doubts on severity are to be resolved in favor of the claimant.” Id. at 547.
In McCrea v. Commissioner, 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir.2004), we reiterated Newell‘s teaching that the “burden placed on an applicant at step two is not an exacting one.” There, we determined that the ALJ erred by concluding that the applicant did not have a severe impairment at step two in the sequential analysis. We pointed out that there was objective medical evidence supporting the claimant‘s complaint of back pain, that her treatment history showed that her ailment had more than a minimal impact on her ability to do basic work activities, and that she had an opinion from her treating physician in support of her claim. The ALJ‘s refusal to attach any significant weight to the treating physician‘s opinion, we reasoned, “may or may not be relevant in later steps of the sequential analysis ... but they certainly do not carry the day at step two.” 370 F.3d at 362 (citing
Newell and McCrea instruct that the determination of whether an applicant has met her burden at step two in the sequential analysis should focus upon the evidence adduced by the applicant. If such evidence demonstrates that the applicant has “more than a ‘slight abnormality,’ the step-two requirement of ‘severe’ is met, and the sequential evaluation process should continue.” Newell, 347 F.3d at 546; McCrea, 370 F.3d at 362;
In this case, the ALJ ignored McCrea‘s instruction by weighing the medical evidence adduced by Magwood, including the opinion from her treating psychiatrist, against the consultative examination of a psychologist and a consultative review of a psychiatrist. This was error. The medical evidence adduced by Magwood demonstrated that she was receiving psychiatric services on a regular basis, was engaged in therapeutic counseling on a weekly basis, was taking antidepressants, was assessed as functioning with a GAF of 55-60, and had an opinion from a treating psychiatrist that she was unable to work on a sustained basis. This was more than sufficient to satisfy step two‘s de minimis threshold. Newell, 347 F.3d at 546; McCrea, 370 F.3d at 361. Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ‘s determination that Magwood did not have a severe impairment at step two in the sequential analysis is not supported [by] substantial evidence. For that reason, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings, which will allow the medical evidence to be weighed and evaluated at the latter steps