241 Mass. 355 | Mass. | 1922
This is a bill in equity, brought by the trustees under the will of John R. Magullion against his surviving partner, to establish a trust in certain real estate numbered 6 Dover Street, in Boston, the record title to which stands in the name of the defendant. The case was referred to a master, together with a suit between the plaintiffs, as executors of the will of John R. Magullion, and the defendant, for an accounting. The master found that the real estate was not partnership property and a
The first exception is based upon the objection that the master made no findings on the issues raised in the fifth paragraph of the bill and the answer thereto. He found that "Magee was a good business man and for the most part attended to the general management of the business.” This finding, together with the other findings, would seem to cover the issues in question, to enable the master to report the facts. "A master is not required to state every subsidiary circumstance which brings his mind to its ultimate determination as to the facts.” Smith v. Lloyd, 224 Mass. 173, 176.
The second exception is to the finding that the trustees "never asserted any claim to have any right, title or interest in the Dover Street property until this action was brought in 1917,” because it is inconsistent with the facts reported in the action of Magullion v. Magee, post, 360, tried with this action. The report in the present case and that in the suit by the executors deal at length with the relations of the partners. If there is any inconsistency in the findings, as claimed, it is immaterial in view of the conclusion which we have reached. The exceptions must be overruled.
The motion to recommit the report rested in the sound discretion of the court, and is final unless the denial of the motion was an abuse of judicial discretion, which does not appear.
The question remains whether, upon the findings made, the plaintiffs were entitled to a final decree that the real estate was partnership property. It adjoined the property on Tremont Street where the firm’s principal place of business was located, and the first floor and basement were used in connection with that business under a lease before the time it was purchased by the defendant, who paid therefor $7,500 and $200 taxes. The master states that the defendant told Magullion a day or two after he had acquired title that he had purchased the property and that “This purchase by Magee greatly disturbed Magullion when he learned of it, and he expressed his disappointment to
The master also found that after the alterations above referred to had been made, Magullion’s attorney presented to Magee for his signature an agreement relating to the party wall between the two properties, in which the Dover Street property was treated as belonging to the defendant; that in April, 1916, when the plaintiffs as trustees leased the Tremont Street property to the defendant, they inserted a provision in the lease by which the defendant agreed that if he sold, mortgaged or leased No. 6 Dover Street he would do so subject to the restriction and condition that for a period of fifteen years “the person holding title
Upon these and other findings it cannot be said as matter of law that Magullion or the defendant ever intended that the Dover Street property should belong to the firm. It follows that the final decree dismissing the bill with costs must be affirmed.
So ordered.