65 A.2d 299 | Md. | 1949
This is an appeal from a judgment for defendants on demurrer to the declaration in a suit for a declaratory judgment. The question is whether plaintiff, licensed as a plumber under sections 318-324 of Article 43 of the *618 Code of 1939, and section 290 of Article 56, is also required to obtain a license as a "construction firm or company" under section 291 (1947 Supplement). From a decision that he is required to do so he appeals.
Licenses are required for the purpose of regulation under Article 43 and for revenue under sections 290 and 291 of Article 56. For present purposes, therefore, sections 318-324 of Article 43 are not relevant. The question is whether a plumber is required to pay one license fee for revenue under section 290 of Article 56 or two under sections 290 and 291.
Chapter 704 of the Acts of 1916 is entitled "An Act * * * to add twenty-five additional sections to * * * Article 56 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, to follow Section 163, and to be known as Sections 164 [to and including] 188, said new sections providing for the licensing of Detective Agencies and Agents, Moving Picture Shows and Carnivals, Garages, Cash Registers and Adding Machines, Typewriting Machines, Commercial, Mercantile and Mutual Protective Agencies, Intelligence Offices and Employment Agencies, Laundries, Junk Dealers, Trading Stamp Companies, Wholesale Dealers in Farm Machinery, Soda Water Fountains, Livery Stables, Bowling Saloons, Storage Warehouses, Check Rooms, Cleaning, Dyeing and Pressing Companies, Shoe-Shining Parlors and Hat-Cleaning Establishments, Restaurants or Eating Places,Plumbers and Gas Fitters, Construction Firms or Companies,
Non-resident Wholesale Tobacco Dealers and Non-resident Wholesale Liquor Dealers." [Italics supplied]. Sections 183 and 184 became sections 290 and 291 in the Code of 1939. The Maryland Tax Revision Commission of 1939 recommended that sections 290 and 291 and most of the other license requirements of the Act of 1916 be repealed, and remarked that section 291 was probably an unconstitutional discrimination between residents and non-residents. Report of Commission, pp. 92-98-99-107. Cf. Statev. Case,
Sections 290 and 291 provide:
"In cities or towns of less than 5,000 inhabitants, for each place of business ........................ $ 5.00
"In cities or towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants, and less than 10,000 inhabitants, for each place of business ....................................... $10.00
"In cities or towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants, for each place of business ........................ $15.00
"Each person, firm or corporation, who shall carry on the business of construction as mentioned in this section, shall before doing so, first take out a license therefor and pay an annual license fee of $15.00; provided, however, *620 this section shall not apply to persons, firms or corporations doing a construction business the gross amount of whose orders accepted and executed does not exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) per annum." [The captions are part of the original Act of 1916.]
In the opinion of the lower court the case is stated thus: "Are plumbers and gas fitters required to take out three separate annual licenses to conduct their business? That is the question posed by this suit for a declaratory judgment.
"The plaintiff, a master plumber in Baltimore City since 1930, holds a master plumber's certificate under sections 318 to 325 [324] of Article 43 of the Code. These provisions are in exercise of the police power of the State to regulate trades and occupations in the public welfare. He pays one license fee under this law.
"He pays a second annual license fee under section 290 of Article 56, subtitle `Plumbers and Gas Fitters,' which is a revenue measure requiring plumbers and gas fitters to take out either a trader's or plumber's license. The fee is regulated according to the size of town in which the business is conducted. The plaintiff pays $15.00 annually to do business in Baltimore City.
"There is a third license fee prescribed by section 291 of Article 56, and it is this provision of the law that is the subject of this litigation. The pertinent provisions are: `Any person * * * accepting orders or contracts for doing any work on or in any building or structure requiring the use of galvanized iron, metallic piping * * * or any other building material * * * shall be deemed to be carrying on the business of construction.'
"The annual fee under this section is $15.00, without regard to the size of the city or town in which the licensee does business, unless the gross annual business is less than $5,000.00. The sub-title of this section is `Construction Firms or Companies', and it was first enacted in 1916 as section 184 of Chapter 704. It followed immediately after the section sub-titled `Plumbers and Gas Fitters' when originally enacted. *621
"From the time this law went on the statute books in 1916 until recently no effort was ever made by any State Comptroller or other official to apply its provisions to plumbers and gas fitters and require them to take out this third license. The present State Comptroller has been engaged in a campaign to enforce the various license statutes and other revenue producing laws. He was advised by the Attorney-General that this section of the law was applicable to the plaintiff and others similarly situated. Demand was made for the license fees under section 291 for the years 1944 to 1947, inclusive. The plaintiff refused to pay and filed this suit.
"The Comptroller contends that the language of the law is plain, clear and free from any ambiguity; that plumbers came within its plain provisions, as they are naturally large users of metallic piping and galvanized iron. While the plaintiff admits he may be literally covered by the words used in the law, he maintains it never was the intention of the Legislature to tax him under two separate consecutive sections of the law, and that the provisions of section 291 apply to a business distinct in character from that described in section 290; further, that since the license fee has never been collected from plumbers over all the years since its enactment, it should not now be applied to this business under the doctrine of continuous administrative construction.
"The rules of construction and interpretation of statutes have often been stated by our Court of Appeals. The meaning and intent must be sought in the language of the law itself. Courts cannot surmise legislative intent contrary to the letter of the statute. The interpretation must be according to the ordinary and natural import of the words used without resort to subtle or forced meanings to extend, limit or alter the operation of the enactment. Words should not be inserted or omitted to ascertain legislative intent where the language used is clear."
After thus stating the case and the rules of construction, the opinion construes sections 290 and 291: *622
"Applying these principles to sections 290 and 291, it is apparent that the words used are plain and free from ambiguity. The words employed are in every-day use and their meaning is obvious. If the Legislature meant the two sections to be mutually exclusive it did not say so. It could have done so easily. If the intention was to exclude plumbers and gas fitters from Section 291 this could have been done by simply inserting the words `excluding plumbers and gas fitters.' These words are not in the law and the courts may not add language to give a new meaning. `We cannot assume authority to read into the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out. Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an ambiguity exists.' Howard Contracting Co. v. Yeager,
We agree with the lower court's statement, but not with its application, of the rules of statutory construction. This court has endeavored to adhere to the meaning of words and not to follow different trends by treating words as mere counters in an exercise in semantics or hurdles to be jumped in a quest for "legislative intent" in a wordless limbo of speculation about "the meaning of meaning," the Zeitgeist and other pretexts for judicial legislation. Bosley v. Dorsey,
Adherence to the meaning of words does not require or permit isolation of words from their context. "* * * the meaning of the plainest words in a statute may be controlled by the context. A statute should be so construed that all its parts harmonize with each other and render them consistent with its general object and scope." Pittman v. Housing Authority,
In the light of the context we reach a construction opposite to the lower court's. The Act of 1916 in 23 sections (164-186) provided for licensing 23 businesses. Each license was provided for in a separate section, and each business was briefly mentioned in the title and in a caption identical (or in two instances substantially identical) with the title. As construed by the lower court the business licensed under section 290 [originally 183], "Plumbers and Gas Fitters," is a duplication of part of the business licensed under section 291 [originally 184], "Construction Firms or Companies." It is not contended that there is any other such duplication in any of the 23 sections. This alleged duplication is claimed to have been effected by the statutory definition of "construction" in section 291. The title of the act and the captions do not disclose duplication in "Plumbers and Gas Fitters" and "Construction Firms or Companies" or suggest that any one of the 23 license taxes is a duplication of another. The definition in section 291 can be given effect without including plumbers or gas fitters. It must be so limited by its context (including the captions) and by the title of the act. Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy,
This construction, thus arrived at, makes it unnecessary to decide whether, in case of doubt, the same result might have been reached on the basis of uniform administrative construction for over thirty years. It may be noted, however, that the administrative construction of another section of the Act of 1916 has been followed by this court, Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v.State, supra, and that administrative construction of sections 290 and 291 gains weight from the fact that the same officials issue licenses under both sections and, if those sections could be otherwise construed, should have required every applicant for a license under section 290 to take out two licenses, one under section 290 and one under section 291.
Judgment reversed, with costs, and new trial awarded. *626
