Magraw v. DonovanMagraw v. Donovan
This mаtter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiffs, pursuant to
Plaintiffs, who are residents of the more populous areas of the state of Minnesota, in this action seek a determination that their representation, and the representation of other residents similarly situated, in the Minnesota Legislature under the 1913 Minnesota Legislative Redistricting Act, is so inadequatе and unequal as to deprive them of their rights under the United States Consti *805 tution, particularly under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendmеnt, and plaintiffs have asked for a determination that the 1913 Redistricting Act is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs have also asked that the defendants he enjoined from carrying out the election laws of the State under the 1913 Act.
At a hearing before this Court on January 27, 1958, the Counties of Grant, Houston and Otter Tail and their County Auditors were permitted to intervene as additional defendants. The defendants at that time moved for an order dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs oppоsed the motion to dismiss, and requested a three-judge court to determine the issues on the merits. In a memorandum and order dated March 21, 1958, the defendants’ motiоn to dismiss was denied. Magraw v. Donovan, D.C.,
Thereafter, a three-judge court was convened under the authority of
“Here it is the unmistakable duty of the State Legislature to reapportion itself periodically in accordance with rеcent population changes. Minnesota Constitution, Article 4, Sections 2 and 23; Smith v. Holm, supra, at page 490 of220 Minn., 19 N.W.2d 914; State ex rel. Meighen v. Weatherill, supra, page 341 of125 Minn., 147 N.W. 105. Early in January 1959 the 61st Session of the Minnesota Legislature will convene, all of the members of which will be newly elected on November 4th of this year. The facts which have been presented to us will be available to them. It is not to be presumed that the Legislature will refuse to take such action аs is necessary to comply with its duty under the State Constitution. We defer decision on all issues presented (including that of the power of this Court to grant relief), in order to afford the Legislature full opportunity to ‘heed the constitutional mandate to redistriet.’ Smith v. Holm, supra, at page 490 of220 Minn., at page 916 of 19 N.W. 2d.
“It seems to us that if there is tо be a judicial disruption of the present legislative apportionment or of the method or machinery for electing members of the State Legislаture, it should not take place unless and until it can be shown that the Legislature meeting in January 1959 has advisedly and deliberately failed and refused to perfоrm its constitutional duty to redistrict the State.
“The Court retains jurisdiction of this case. Following adjournment of the 61st Session of the Minnesota Legislature, the partiеs may, within 60 days thereafter, petition the Court for such action as they, or any of them, may deem appropriate.” Magraw v. Donovan, D.C.,163 F. Supp. 184 , 187.
On April 24, 1959, an extrа session of the 61st Session of the Minnesota Legislature convened at St. Paul, Minnesota. During said extra session, in response to the mandate of the Minnesota Constitution, the Legislature duly enacted Laws 1959, Extra Session, c. 45, which repealed the 1913 Minnesota Legislative Redistricting Act, c. 91, Minn.Laws 1913; Minn.Stats.1953, § 2.02 et seq., M.S.A. § 2.02 et seq., and provided for a reapportionment of the legislative districts in the state, said act to be effective on January 1, 1962, and to apply to all members of the Legislature elected for any regular session thereof occurring thereafter. The said act was approved on June 15, 1959. On July 1, 1959, said extra session adjourned.
Plaintiffs, in their motion for an order permitting them to dismiss, state that because of the passage of Laws 1959, Extra Session, c. 45, the purposes of plaintiffs herein have been achieved, and that plaintiffs no longer desire to maintain or prosecute this suit. In their memorandum in support of their motiоn, *806 plaintiffs also urge that because of the 1959 legislation, a decision by this Court would now have no practical effect.
“Except as provided in parаgraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motiоn to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudicatiоn by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.”
The question of the right of the plaintiff to dismiss after answer has been filed is discussed in 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 912, and there is an annotation on the subject following the report of Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 7 Cir.,
“Most of the lower federal courts ■ take the view that the unqualified right to dismiss without prejudice . does not exist after the filing of an answer, but that an application to dismiss without prejudice after an answer has been filed is addressed to the sound discretiоn of the court. * * * »>
• In New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Vardaman, 8 Cir.,
“The basic principal [sic] of law involved here is stated inFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(a) (2) , 28 U.S.C.A., that an action shall not be dismissed by the plaintiff save upon order of the сourt and ‘upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.’ The judicial discretion thus authorized has been construed to allow dismissal, upоn payment of costs, “unless the defendant would suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second law suit.’ Cоne v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.,330 U.S. 212 , 217,67 S.Ct. 752 ,91 L.Ed. 849 ; Home Owners’ Loan Corporation v. Huffman, 8 Cir.,134 F.2d 314 , 317. * * * ”
Here none of the defendants and interveners will suffer any “plain legal prejudice.” Because of the substantial change in circumstаnces brought about by the 1959 Redistricting Act, defendants and interveners do not even face the “prospect of a second law suit.” It therefore seеms quite clear that this Court, in the exercise of sound discretion, should permit plaintiffs to dismiss this action without prejudice.
There is a grave question whether, because of the change in circumstances, this case has not become moot, in which event it would be the duty of the Court to dismiss this action of its own motion. In Myеrs v. Polk Miller Products Corp., 1953, 40 CCPA 739,
“In the cases where issues have become moot as a result of judicial decisions, or otherwise, the courts unquestionably hаve the authority, and it often becomes their duty, to dismiss cases sua sponte and without any motion to dismiss being made.”
Here it seems that the issues presented by the pleadings and the evidence have beеn rendered moot by the 1959 Redistricting Act and that the Court therefore should not undertake to *807 decide the serious and difficult questions presented herein. See 1 Am.Jur., pp. 416-417 (Actions, § 19); 14 Am.Jur., pp. 277-278 and 372-373 (Courts, §§ 49 and 173). In 14 Am.Jur., p. 372, it is stated:
“Another firmly-established principle of jurisdiction is that the courts will not undertake to decide questions which are unrelated to an actual controversy or which by a change in the condition of affairs during the pendency of the action, have become purely abstract.”
For the reasons hereinabove given, plaintiff’s motion to dismiss is granted without the imposition of terms or conditions.