Joseph C. MAGNOTTI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY FOR the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 06-15397
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
April 12, 2007.
222 Fed. Appx. 934
Non-Argument Calendar.
AFFIRMED.
Heidi L. Bettendorf, Office of the Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before DUBINA, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph C. Magnotti, a Florida prisoner serving a 25-year sentence for robbery, appeals pro se the district court‘s denial of his
Magnotti filed a
At Magnotti‘s trial, Sally Wood testified as the state‘s first witness. Wood testified that, on July 13, 2001, she had been working as a bank teller for approximately one and one half months. As part of her training for her bank teller job, she was instructed that, if the bank was robbed, she should do exactly what the robber asked and, after the robbery was over, she should write down all the details and not talk to anyone. At approximately 3:30 on a busy Friday afternoon at the bank, Wood called the next customer in line to her window. Magnotti walked up to Wood‘s window and said, “[t]his is a hold-up, I want your hundreds, fifties and twenties, now.” Magnotti did not display a weapon. Wood began to put money up on her counter and she felt “[e]xtremely upset, nervous, afraid.” Wood stated that, because there was a very thick wall between her-
On cross-examination, Wood testified that she did not think any person could get to her through the glass that separated her from the customers and that Magnotti did not yell or make any threats. She further stated that she “was not in fear of death, but [she] was deathly scared, the mere fact of somebody coming up and demanding money.” Wood stated that she knew she could not be hurt because of the wall between her and Magnotti. On redirect, Wood testified that she did not see a weapon, but that she had no idea whether Magnotti had a weapon or not. She further stated that she was scared to death and she was in fear.
Magnotti elected not to testify in his own defense, nor did he provide any defense witnesses. Magnotti moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not support the charge of robbery. The district court denied the motion. Magnotti‘s counsel then requested that the court instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery by sudden snatching, but declined to request instructions on any other lesser included offenses. The trial court next gave the jury charge, instructing the jury that, if it found that the state had not proved the elements of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, that it would have to decide if the state proved the elements of the lesser included offense of robbery by sudden snatching. The jury found Magnotti guilty of robbery as charged in the information. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Magnotti to 25 years’ imprisonment.
Magnotti appealed his conviction and sentence to the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida, arguing that the trial court had erred in denying his motions for acquittal and a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented at trial did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Wood would have been in fear of great bodily injury or death, as was required by the robbery statute. The state appellate court affirmed Magnotti‘s conviction and sentence. In so doing, the state court cited Florida‘s robbery statute,
Magnotti then petitioned for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Based upon the above-detailed record, the district court denied Magnotti‘s
We review a district court‘s grant or denial of a
As amended by the AEDPA,
Moreover, a state court‘s factual findings are presumed correct, and the petitioner can rebut them only by clear and convincing evidence. See
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Magnotti argues on appeal that, pursuant to the Florida robbery statute and case law cited by the state appellate court, the state had to prove that Wood had fear of death or great bodily harm from his actions. Magnotti maintains that a finding that a reasonable person would have been objectively afraid is unsupported by the evidence because: (1) Wood
In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the “critical inquiry” is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court noted that it is the duty of the trier of fact “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts,” and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment as to whether it believes the evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id.
In Florida, the offense of robbery is defined as:
the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.
Here, to the extent that Magnotti argues that the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard used by the state appellate court was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, his argument is without merit. It is noteworthy that the state court did not cite Jackson in reviewing Magnotti‘s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. Nonetheless, Magnotti does not point out any part of the state court‘s decision that was contrary to Jackson, and the record establishes that the state court considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, cited the relevant state law, and did not re-weigh the evidence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89; see also Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (holding that a state court does not have to cite to Supreme Court “cases—indeed, [
As to the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the “putting in fear” element of Magnotti‘s robbery conviction, the state court determined that its precedent required a showing that the robbery would have “ordinarily induced fear in the mind of a reasonable person.” See State v. Baldwin, 709 So.2d 636, 637 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998). According to Baldwin, the state does not have to prove that the defendant‘s conduct was itself threatening or forceful, but only that “the conduct would induce fear in the mind of a reasonable person notwithstanding that the conduct is not expressly threatening.” Baldwin, 709 So.2d at 637-38. Magnotti does not contend that the Baldwin standard is not the proper standard for determining whether he put Wood in fear during the incident. Rather, he argues that the evidence established that Wood had no fear. The evidence presented at trial dem-
B. Assistance of Counsel
Magnotti argues that his counsel was deficient in requesting a jury instruction on the offense of robbery by sudden snatching because that offense was not actually a lesser included offense to robbery and, further, was not supported by the evidence from his trial. He further argues that, in light of the facts of his case, his counsel should have requested jury instructions on simple theft, grand theft, and attempted robbery. Magnotti contends that his counsel‘s decision to not request instructions on other offenses was not entitled to deference because, as the district court noted, it was an inexplicable decision. He also asserts that he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel‘s decisions because the evidence left the jury with nothing to debate as to his guilt on the robbery charge and, because his counsel did not request instructions on lesser included offenses, the jury had no alternative offense for which to convict him. Magnotti lastly argues that the state court and district court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his counsel‘s ineffective assistance.
The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall have the right to “the assistance of counsel for his defense.”
In Magnotti‘s case, the state court decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. First, while the state court decision denying Magnotti‘s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim did not directly cite Strickland, the court nonetheless denied the claim for the reasons indicated in the state‘s response to Magnotti‘s Rule 3.850 motion, which explicitly relied upon
Moreover, the state court did not unreasonably apply the law from Strickland to the facts of Magnotti‘s case. Here, the state court and the district court determined that Magnotti failed to establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel‘s decisions. As discussed in issue one above, the evidence presented at Magnotti‘s trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery. As such, even assuming without deciding that Magnotti‘s counsel was deficient in failing to request jury instructions on other lesser included offenses, that deficiency does not suggest that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different because the jury had sufficient evidence to find Magnotti guilty of the greater offense of robbery. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (explaining that a reviewing court should presume that the jury acted according to law). Therefore, Magnotti‘s argument, that the jury would have convicted him of a lesser offense had it been given the instructions on such an offense, is not conclusive where the jury properly convicted him of robbery based upon the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, the jury would have performed its duties in violation of the law had it convicted Magnotti of a lesser offense in the face of sufficient evidence for the greater offense. See id. (holding that “[a] defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision. It should not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness or leniency“). Similarly, Magnotti‘s counsel‘s request for instructions on the lesser offense of robbery by sudden snatching did not prejudice Magnotti because the jury found Magnotti guilty of robbery based upon sufficient evidence in the record. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Magnotti‘s
Magnotti has not met his burden under
AFFIRMED.