Moises Rincon Magana, Petitioner and Appellant v. State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee
No. 20260046
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2026 ND 141
20260046 - Filed 07-09-2026 NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Justice.
Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant.
Nicholas S. Samuelson, Assistant State‘s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for respondent and appellee; submitted on brief.
[¶1] Moises Rincon Magana appeals from a judgment denying his application for postconviction relief. We affirm, holding the district court did not err when it decided Magana failed to establish prejudice caused by defense counsel‘s allegedly deficient performance.
I
[¶2] Magana pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess over 50 grams of cocaine with intent to manufacture or deliver and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. See Case No. 09-2023-CR-00716. The charges arose from a traffic stop during which Magana was a passenger in the vehicle. At the plea hearing, Magana admitted he transported approximately 1.7 pounds of cocaine. He initially claimed the cocaine was for personal use but later admitted he intended to “share” it with others. The State recommended a 20-year prison sentence with all but seven years suspended and two years of supervised probation. Defense counsel informed the district court Magana faced deportation to his native country of Mexico “as soon as his matters here are concluded” but did not offer an independent sentencing recommendation. The court sentenced Magana to ten years in prison with no probation. He did not appeal.
[¶3] Magana filed an application for postconviction relief. He claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advise him the State had not tested the substance to confirm it was cocaine and incorrectly told him he would receive a shorter sentence. The district court held an evidentiary hearing where Magana and defense counsel testified. Magana testified counsel told him a laboratory test confirmed the drugs were cocaine when in fact none had been performed. Magana also testified counsel told him he “didn‘t have a chance to win the case” and that if he pleaded guilty he would only serve five years in prison. Defense counsel testified he told Magana federal authorities had the cocaine in their possession and “it would take a long time”
[¶4] The district court denied Magana‘s application. The court found that defense counsel credibly testified he never told Magana testing confirmed the drugs were cocaine. The court also rejected Magana‘s claim that he received deficient sentencing advice. The court made no findings concerning what sentencing advice defense counsel actually gave Magana. The court instead determined Magana‘s guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary based on admonishments the court provided. The court specifically noted Magana was shown a video informing him the court did not have to accept the prosecutor‘s recommendation. The court also noted it advised Magana he could face a maximum of 20 years in prison. The court determined Magana had not established prejudice and entered judgment denying his application. Magana appeals.
II
[¶5] Magana argues he received ineffective assistance because counsel gave incorrect advice about the sentence he would receive; counsel failed to notify him the State had not conducted testing to confirm the substance was cocaine; counsel did not inform him about the potential Miranda defense; and counsel neglected to advise him he might obtain a lesser-included-offense instruction by claiming the drugs were for personal use. Magana claims the cumulative effect of these errors resulted in an unintelligent guilty plea and, had they not been made, he would have insisted on going to trial.
[¶6] Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature. Everett v. State, 2023 ND 243, ¶ 6, 1 N.W.3d 590. They are governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent those rules are consistent with the statutory
A trial court‘s findings of fact in post-conviction relief proceedings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if it is not supported by any evidence, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal of a post-conviction proceeding.
Brown v. State, 2024 ND 95, ¶ 6, 8 N.W.3d 265 (quoting Kisi v. State, 2023 ND 226, ¶ 5, 998 N.W.2d 797).
[¶7] Postconviction relief applicants seeking to withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel bear a “heavy burden.” Brown, 2024 ND 95, ¶ 8. Their applications are treated as being made under
[¶8] An applicant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). An applicant must show: “(1) counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Urrabazo v. State, 2024 ND 67, ¶ 13, 5 N.W.3d 521 (quoting Koon v. State, 2023 ND 247, ¶ 21, 1 N.W.3d 593). “Courts
[¶9] The second prong of the Strickland test requires a showing of prejudice. Stein v. State, 2018 ND 264, ¶ 6, 920 N.W.2d 477. In the context of a guilty plea, an applicant must “establish there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Brown, 2024 ND 95, ¶ 9 (quoting Abdi, 2021 ND 110, ¶ 9).
This standard requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result. The petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. This requires an examination and prediction of the likely outcome of a possible trial. The movant must allege facts that, if proven, would support a conclusion that the decision to reject the plea bargain and go to trial would have been rational, e.g., valid defenses, a pending suppression motion that could undermine the prosecution‘s case, or the realistic potential for a lower sentence.
Id. (quoting Bahtiraj v. State, 2013 ND 240, ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605). An applicant‘s subjective self-serving statement that he would have insisted on going to trial absent deficient representation is not sufficient to establish prejudice. Booth, 2017 ND 97, ¶ 9.
[¶10] Magana argues the district court erred by addressing each of his counsel‘s alleged deficiencies in isolation. He asserts all of his counsel‘s errors, when taken together, resulted in an unknowing plea. He claims he would have proceeded to trial had he been given correct advice about sentencing, laboratory testing, a suppression motion, and a personal-use defense. However, even assuming Magana received inadequate advice, he provided nothing to show a decision to proceed to trial would have been rational. Magana does not claim the State would have failed to confirm the drugs were cocaine before trial. His personal-use defense is undercut by the sizable quantity of drugs law enforcement seized. He has provided no details about the factual basis for a potential suppression motion, and he has not identified any inculpatory statements that might have
III
[¶11] The judgment denying Magana‘s application for postconviction relief is affirmed.
[¶12] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J.
Jerod E. Tufte
Jon J. Jensen
Douglas A. Bahr
Mark A. Friese