Madsen v. Whitman

71 P. 152 | Idaho | 1902

Lead Opinion

QUARLES, C. J.

— This action was commenced by appellants to obtain judgment foreclosing two trust deeeds executed by the respondents Martha J. Whitman and Marcus E. Whitman to secure two certain loans made by the Western Loan and Savings Company in the first instance. By novation the appellant became the owner, and new trust deeds were executed. The record is voluminous, and the findings of fact are quite lengthy. The trial court found the contracts usurious, and the findings favor the respondents in the main. The original, transaction shows an utter disregard of the usury statutes of this state. Compound interest was provided for by way of coupon notes for monthly interest, each of which coupon notes for interest drew interest after its maturity. Large premiums were demanded and extorted by the lender in order that the debtors, the Whitmans, might obtain the loans. The transactions were unquestionably usurious. The assignments of error-are many, but a careful consideration of the record shows us that they are without merit in the main. It is not necessary to review each action of the trial court excepted to in ordeT to reach a determination of this ease upon its real merits. The-court found that the principal of the debts had been fully paid, except the sum of twenty-two dollars and sixty-five cents upon one loan, and the sum of forty dollars and sixty cents upon the other, and that respondents had broken their obligation in said trust deeds contained, by failing to pay taxes for the year of 1901, and that same were paid by appellants in the sum of thirty-one dollars and thirty-five cents, and entered a judgment of foreclosure for the amount due to appellants, ninety-four dollars and fifty cents. The respondent Gray made a loan to the respondents Whitman, and took a mortgage upon said premises as security, subsequent to the execution of said trust deeds to> appellant. After the execution of the mortgage to respondent Gray upon the same premises, the appellants and the respondents Whitman met together and made an arrangement between themselves for the purpose of purging the original transactions, of usury, and made what is called in the record a “compromise agreement." After this so-called compromise agreement was made, the respondent Gray sued on his mortgage debt, and obtained a foreclosure decree against the respondents Whitman, foreclosing his mortgage; and at decretal sale thereunder he purchased the premises described in said trust deeds, in his mortgage, and in the complaint herein, for the sum of $915.95. Appellants were not parties to the last-named action. The decree herein adjudges the rights of respondent Gray, subject to-the said lien of appellants for ninety-four dollars -and fifty cents.

The real question here is whether by the so-called comp promise agreement the transactions between appellants and the Whitmans were purged of usury, so as to leave the amount agreed upon to be due to appellants from the Whitmans a lien secured by said trust deeds as against respondent Gray? But we will take the argument of the appellant in their written brief, where it is first asked: “Was this suit brought upon a contract which was usurious at the commencement of this action?” Then, after showing that the original indebtedness was, $1,800, appellant says: “The total payments were twenty-seven dollars per month on the entire loan of $1,800. This would be just eighteen per cent per annum on the $1,800 — a rate which was at that time legal and authorized by the interest laws-of Idaho. When the Whitmans paid this, they were simply paying the interest on the loan. They had the $1,800 all the time, loss commissions which had a consideration of their own.”' By the term “commissions” we presume appellants’ able counsel means the premiums exacted in order to secure the two loans, which were in one ease eighty dollars cash retained, and a mortgage for $400, and in the other $100 cash retained, and a mortgage for $500, making $1,080 in all, or more than one-half of the amount of the loans. Can there be any question about the usurious character of the transactions in the first in-stance? We think not, and say there is no doubt that they were usurious. Being usurious, the trust deeds secured the principal of the loans, but secured no interest or costs. See the following eases decided by this court: Stevens v. Association, 5 Idaho, 741, 51 Pac. 779; Fidelity Sav. Assn. v. Shea, 6 Idaho, 405, 55 Pac. 1022. Under the statute, every payment, made, whether as a premium for obtaining the loan, upon the; interest, or upon the principal, is to be credited upon the principal of the debt. Now, securing only the principal of the debt, the contracts being usurious, the law applying all payments to the extinguishment of the debt, can the parties, by agreement between themselves, remove the usurious character of the transactions, and make the trust deeds liens for something that they were not liens for prior to such agreement, as against a third party whose rights will be affected thereby? We think not. Respondent Gray was not a party to the so-called compromise agreement. That agreement could not, in law, and did not, extend the obligations of the trust deeds so as to make the same a lien for a single dollar that they did not secure prior to such agreement. Section 3351 of the’ Revised Statutes provides that “a mortgage can be created, renewed, or extended only by writing, executed with the formalities required in the case of a grant or conveyance of real property.” These trust deeds executed to secure the payment of loans are mortgages. Hence the lien of same could not be extended by the so-called compromise agreement, especially as against the respondent Gray.

(January 20, 1903.)

We find no error in the record, wherefore the judgment is affirmed. Costs awarded to respondents.

Sullivan and Stoekslager, JJ., concur.

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Rehearing

ON REHEARING.

STOCKSLAGER, J.

— Appellants, in their petition for a rehearing, say: “We are fully convinced that the voluminous record, and the confusing, conflicting, and in many instances unsatisfactory evidence presented by such record, has misled the court, and that the opinion .... is based on a state of facts which the record does not support, and that such opinion does neither directly nor indirectly refer to or consider other questions presented by the record, which we believe are of controlling importance. Further, the decision in this cause practically overrules the decision of this court in Anderson v. Mortgage Co., ante, p. 418, 69 Pac. 130.” As suggested, the record is a voluminous.one, containing two hundred and nineteen pages; but when it is stripped of the pleadings, which contain as exhibits the two mortgages, two trust deeds, with the other exhibits, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment, but little remains of the record. Counsel for appellants in the hearing assigned thirty errors, but in the argument they say: “The general question is, Was this suit brought upon a contract which was usurious at the commencement of this suit?” and argue the two questions (that is, Was the old contract usurious as to the $1,000 note?), practically admitting that the $800 note was usurious. They then urge upon the court that even if the old contracts were usurious, the parties purged them of any taint of usury by the new contract entered into at Montpelier, Idaho, on the 25th day of November, 1899. It is true, in the brief of appellants it is said: “It will be seen herefrom that appellants rely chiefly upon the insufficiency of the evi-< dence in this case, other enumerated errors being incidental; but, not waiving these, the appellants rely upon and reserve the right to argue orally all the other errors assigned in this brief as such, the same as though they had been folly discussed herein.” The statement of counsel for respondent in their brief is practically the same as that of counsel for appellants. They say: “The general question is, Was this suit brought upon a contract which was usurious at the commencement of this action?” No other question was urged upon the court, both' parties seemingly being content to have the single question of usury passed upon. We fully agree with counsel in their briefs that it was the controlling question in the case, and the opinion prepared by Chief ’Justice Quarles was in harmony with the views of his associates.

Counsel who now represent appellants urge that other important questions were involved and should have been passed upon by the court. We cannot agree with this contention, under the circumstances as they then existed and now exist in this¡ ease. Section 3818 of the Revised Statutes says: “The court, may reverse, affirm or modify any order or judgment appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or order to be entered, or direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had. Its judgment must he remitted to the court from which the a.ppeal was taken. The decisions of the court shall be given in writing; and in giving a decision, if a new trial be granted, the court shall pass upon and determine all the questions of law involved in the ease presented upon such appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case.” The case was tried in the lower court on the theory of usury in all the contracts by respondents, and by the appellants on the theory that if there, was usury in the original contracts, or either of them, it was> purged by the contracts of November 25, 1895. It was argued and submitted in this court on the same theory. The opinion was written on that theory, and dealt with that question, as we view it, fully and fairly. We do not modify the opinion in the least, in the case of Anderson v. Mortgage Co., supra. Very different conditions exist, as may be observed by reading the two opinions. The record in the Anderson ease disclosed that Anderson bought the land covered by the mortgage, subject to the usurious contract, and agreed to pay the same to the mortgagee, and, in settling with the mortgagor, deducted all that could be claimed, including the usury, upon the usurious contracts, and then, in a suit in equity, asked the court to remove the cloud from his title by declaring the mortgage void by reason of the usurious clause. This the court refused to do.

Counsel for appellants submit numerous figures in an effort to convince us that no usury was contained in the contracts— especially the $1,000 note. We have carefully considered their figures, and the findings of the trial court, and also a table of figures submitted by respondents in their brief, purporting to show the amount of payments, and the interest on each of said notes at the time of such payments. The correctness of this computation has not been questioned by the appellants, either in the hearing in this court, or in the application for a rehearing; hence we conclude that they concede the computation to be correct. Our examination leads us to believe the figures, lo be correct, or practically so; and, if so, there was usury in both contracts, and it was not purged by the contract of November 25, 1899.

Inasmuch as the judgment will not be reversed and remanded for a new trial, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon each assignment of error separately. Nevertheless, we have considered them, and find no reversible error. A rehearing is therefore denied.

Sullivan, C. J., concurs. Ailshie, J., not being a member of the court at the time the cause was heard, took no part in this opinion on petition for rehearing.