Madrin v. . R. R.Madrin v. . R. R.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Clarkson
The Sinclair Refining Company, further answering, says: “That in the event the jury should find that the plaintiff‘s injuries were in any wise caused by the negligence of the defendants, which this answering defendant denies, then this answering defendant alleges and says: That the negligence of its codefendant, the Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff‘s said injuries. And if any judgment be had against this answering defendant on account thereof, then this answering defendant is entitled to have judgment over against its codefendant, the Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, for such amount.”
The evidence was to the effect that the defendant, Norfolk Southern Railroad Company crosses the State Highway No. 11 on the outskirts of the corporate limits of the town of Greenville, and in a thickly settled mill village. The defendant Sinclair Refining Company owns and operates, or leases and operates, oil and gasoline tanks, a distributing station and buildings in the northeast corner or intersection of said railroad and Highway No. 11, and has been owning and operating the said station for two or three years. “There is a switch or spur track of the Norfolk Southern Railroad running out in the Sinclair Refining Company‘s yard. . . . The said station or building is about sixty feet from the railroad. The switch or spur track which runs out in the Sinclair yard at its nearest point to State Highway No. 11 is thirty-eight feet. . . . In approaching the crossing from the west there is a filling station in about one hundred feet of the crossing, on the north side of the highway. There are some stores next to said filling station and another filling station. It is a well traveled road. . . . The Norfolk Southern Railroad did not have gates there at that time to stop the traffic when trains were passing; they did not have or keep a guard there with a flag, to guard the traffic and travel. They did not have any gongs there to ring at that time.”
The plaintiff testified, in part, that he was driving a Ford, model T, on 11 March, 1928, with his nephews in a car behind him, along Highway No. 11. “Just before I got to the Norfolk Southern crossing, I wanted to see if the boys were behind me, as I was showing them the proper way out of the highway. They were never here before. I stopped my car to see if they were behind me. They were. And I could not see to my right, for the first obstruction was this station. I drove by that, and the next obstruction was this lumber and signs and the oil tanks. I didn‘t see any train or could see no signs of any train. I could see to my left down to the factory; I could see everything clear, but when I put my car in gear and when I was on the track I could see the train flying. I couldn‘t do anything. I was practically right under it before I knew there was a train around. I looked westward, or tried to look westward down the railroad. When I drove to the crossing I couldn‘t see, and I had occasion to stop to see if those boys were behind me as they didn‘t know exactly the highway. I looked westward; I could not see down the railroad until I was in five feet of it, five or six feet before I could see to my right at all down the railroad, but when I started my car and got on the track the first thing I seen about the railroad engine was the drive-wheel flying very fast. It was on me; I realized that, and before I knew it I was on the track under the engine. The whistle did not blow for the crossing, the bell of the engine did not ring for the crossing. I did not hear the train at all; didn‘t know there was a train
The plaintiff was corroborated by numerous witnesses. At the close of plaintiff‘s evidence, the court below sustained motions of defendants for judgment as in case of nonsuit.
As often repeated, it is the well settled rule of practice and the accepted position in this jurisdiction that, on a motion to nonsuit, the evidence which makes for the plaintiff‘s claim and which tends to support his cause of action, whether offered by the plaintiff or elicited from the defendant‘s witnesses, will be taken and considered in its most favorable light for the plaintiff, and he is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment upon the evidence, and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.
On this appeal we do not think it necessary to pass upon the exceptions and assignments of error in regard to certain evidence introduced by plaintiff and excluded by the court below. On the present record we do not think there is sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury as to actionable negligence on the part of Sinclair Refining Company. We think the evidence sufficient to be submitted to the jury as to the Norfolk Southern Railroad Company. We will not discuss the evidence, as the case goes back to be heard again. The principles of law governing this action have been thoroughly and fully considered in many recent decisions. Moseley v. R. R., 197 N.C. 628; Collett v. R. R., 198 N.C. 760; Scoggins v. R. R., 199 N.C. 631; Butner v. R. R., 199 N.C. 695; Harris v. R. R., 199 N.C. 798; see Eller v. R. R., ante, 527.
The judgment of the court below as to the Sinclair Refining Company is affirmed, and as to the Norfolk Southern Railroad Company reversed.