delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question desired to be raised in this case for decision is presented in a very irregular manner, that is, by a demurrer to the answer instead of exceptions, or sitting the case down for hearing on bill and answer. According to the general chancery rule of pleading and practice, if an answer is insufficient in its responses to the allegations of the bill, objections must be taken to it by exceptions filed. And if it be bad in substance as a defence, and further proofs be not required by the plaintiff, the case should be set down for hearing upon the bill and answer, and the matter thus placed upon record will be adjudged accordingly. Sto. Eq. Pl., secs. 456, 864 and 865. Since the transcript has come into this Court an agreement has been filed to the effect that the demurrer shall be treated as an exception to the answer; and, giving a liberal construction to this agreement, we suppose it to be intended that the case shall be so presented as to enable this Court to decide the case as upon bill and answer; and we shall so consider it.
The question thus presented is, whether the curative Act of 1890, ch. 187, applies to and is effective to make
The mortgage in this case was in all respects perfectly valid and formally executed; and the estate in the mortgaged premises was thereby transmitted to and vested in the mortgagee; and the only defect consisted in the delegation of the power of sale, as a summary remedy for default, under the statute. We cannot entertain a doubt of the power of the Legislature, by retrospective curative legislation, to provide for such a case as this, and that the Act of 1890, ch. 187, fully embraces the case. A Court of chancery could have exercised jurisdiction in decreeing a sale for default, or in reforming
It is insisted, however, that the Act of 1890, ch. 181, cannot have application to this case, because the case was pending when the Act was passed. But it is clear that that fact does not withdraw the case from the operation of the Act. It is truly said that the bringing of suit vests in a party no right to a particular decision; and his case must he determined on the law as it stands, not when the suit was brought, hut when the judgment is rendered. Cooley, Const. Lim., 468. As an apt illustration of this principle, the case in our own Reports
Upon the case as presented we find nothing to support the claim of the appellants, and the decree of the Court below must he affirmed, with costs to the appellees.
Decree affirmed.