34 App. D.C. 119 | D.C. Cir. | 1909
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This is an appeal from a decree and judgment of the supreme court of the District entitling appellee, John B. Bottineau, to the sum of $18,815, with interest from March 10th, 1905, on account of services and expenses incurred in behalf of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, as evidenced by an agreement in writing between appellee and appellant J. M. E.' O’Grady.
This band of Indians formerly occupied a tract of several million acres of land in what is now the State of North Dakota. The land was opened to settlement without a recognition of the rights of the Indians. Appellee, a member of the bar of the state of Minnesota, claims to be a member of the tribe, and, at all events, has many relatives and friends among them. Eor many years prior to the incidents culminating in this litigation, he had devoted his entire time and expended quite a large sum of money in endeavoring to secure from Congress recognition of the rights of these Indians, and adequate compensation for their lands. The autonomy of the tribe was not recog
Bottineau removed from Minnesota to Washington, and from 1892 to 1901 devoted his entire time in^an, endeavor to obtain additional compensation for the lands of the tribe, which he had all along contended had been taken by the government without compensation. At no time during this period did he consent to the acceptance of the $1,000,000 stipulated in the McCumber treaty. On the contrary, he uniformly and consistently contended that that amount was grossly inadequate. Such was the situation when, in 1901, O’Grady, who was then a member of Congress and whose term was to expire on the 4th of March of that year, learned of the claim of this band of Indians through one Finn, an assistant attorney in the office of the Assistant Attorney General of the United States, in charge of Indian depredation claims. Finn and O’Grady were from the same state and friends. Through Finn’s instrumentality Bottineau and O’Grady were brought together, and, upon Finn’s representation that O’Grady was a man of influence and an attorney of ability, Bottineau assigned to O’Grady his contract with the tribe, and a contract between them was concurrently executed on the 25th of February, 1901. Since O’Grady’s term of office had not then expired, it was subsequently deemed
In the contract between Bottineau and O’Grady, it is agreed (inter alia) that the sum of $23,000, which the contract recites had been expended by Bottineau in the prosecution of the claim, should first be deducted from any fees which might be recovered, and that, after such deduction, one fourth of the balance should be paid to Bottineau and the remaining three fourths to O’Grady. O’Grady agreed to “give in good faith his personal services and assistance in the preparation and prosecution of the said claim to its final adjudication and settlement,” and to pay all necessary expenses of such prosecution, including the expenses of Bottineau during the time his services, in the judgment of O’Grady, might be necessary. O’Grady was to have “full charge and management of the preparation and prosecution of said claim,” and Bottineau was to render such services as O’Grady might require and deem necessary. The contract further provided as follows: “In. event of judgment being obtained in the sum not exceeding one million (1,000,000) dollars, then and in that case the sum of twelve thousand five hundred (12,500) dollars shall be deducted and paid to said Bottineau, in lieu of the twentyrthree .thousand (23,000) dollars aforesaid, before the division of any fees or commissions as herein stated.”
O’Grady, in his answer (to the bill of complaint) under oath, stated that Bottineau “represented to him that he had a valid contract with the Turtle Mountain Indians that had been properly executed in accordance with the statutes of the United States.” In his testimony, however, O’Grady stated that Bottineau, at the time of assigning said contract, represented “that all it lacked in order to have full force and effect was the approval of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior.” From the testimony of Bottineau and his daughter, we find the fact to be that O’Grady was fully advised before executing the contract with Bottineau as to the exact state of Bottineau’s contract with the Indians. O’Grady’s subsequent conduct was quite in harmony with this
Failing in their efforts to have the Bottineau contract approved, the consent of the Department was sought and obtained to negotiate a new contract with the Indians. A council of the Indians was arranged on their reservation in North Dakota, to take place in October, 1901. There is some dispute as to whether Bottineau suggested attending this council with O’Grady, or whether O’Grady first requested him to do so. At all events, he did attend with the knowledge and consent of O’Grady, and in supposed compliance with the terms of their contract. Bottineau contends that he labored earnestly and conscientiously with his friends and acquaintances on the reservation, to induce them to enter into a new contract with O’Grady. O’Grady and Finn, who attended the council, testified that Bottineau was intoxicated when he reached the reservation, and for several days thereafter; that he was without influence in the tribe, and a much greater hindrance than help. They also testified that the farmer in charge was so incensed because Bottineau had brought whisky upon the reservation that he would have ejected Bottineau therefrom but for them. It-is a very significant fact, however, that the testimony of said farmer in charge and other witnesses who were also supposed to know of Bottineau’s condition while on the reservation contains no reference to this subject. This is all the more significant because the testimony of these witnesses was taken by appellants, without a representative of Bottineau being present.
O’Grady further testified that he was so disgusted with Bottineau, and so incensed because of his misrepresentations, that he then notified Bottineau that their relations were at an end. Again, the circumstances tend to sustain Bottineau and dis
Maddux, in his testimony, disclaimed all knowledge, .at tho time he became a party to said contract, of Bottineau and his previous relations with O’Grady. His testimony, however, is so full of inconsistencies, so evasive, so contradicted by his own
In reply to this letter Maddux wrote in part as follows: “On my return from Washington I found your letter on my desk, and was very much surprised at the contents, for we had every reason to believe that you were friendly to us, and especially so with your understanding with O’Grady. * * * I hope you will reconsider the matters and things stated in your communication, and follow a different course, and I think you will have no cause to regret such determination. * * * Expected to see you while I was in Washington, but was there only a short time. * * * Matters seemed to be in good condition. * * * Expect to see you when I come down again, which will be at no distant date. With kindest personal regards, I am,” etc.
Upon the modification by the Interior Department of the contract between the Indians and appellants, no further effort appears to have been made by appellants to recover for the Indians more than the $1,000,000 stipulated for in the said Mc-Oumber treaty, and which the Indians for twelve years had been unwilling to accept.
On April 21st, 1901, an appropriation of $1,000,000 was made by Congress in favor of said Indians, and, by the terms of the act, there was made payable to O’Grady and Maddux the sum of $12,000, and to William D. Anderson, whose identity is a mystery, and who appears never to have done anything in the case, the sum of $8,000, which sums were to be “accepted by them respectively in full payment for all services rendered the Indians by them, or by those claiming under them.” No money was to be paid under said act until the Indians had executed and delivered to the United States a general release of the claims and demands against the United States. This release was finally obtained. Thereupon O’Grady and Maddux repudiated Bottineau, and refused to recognize any liability to him.
This testimony, considered in the light of the other evidence in the case, we think establishes beyond question that both O’Grady and Bottineau understood, and acted upon the understanding, that the terms of the contract between them were still in force, and would furnish a measure for the division of the •fees appropriated by Congress. The fact that the contract as-signéd O’Grady by Bottineau had not heen approved by the Department is immaterial. O’Grady knew it had not been ap
The situation, therefore, amounts to this: Bottineau had labored for many years in behalf of these Indians, and his legitimate expenses had amounted to thousands of dollars; O’Grady appeared upon the scene; Bottineau was evidently discouraged and ready, for the first time, to admit the necessity for assistance. O’Grady stepped into Bottineau’s shoes, and, for the privilege and Bottineau’s continued co-operation, agreed that, in the event the amount recovered for the Indians should not exceed $1,000,000, $12,500 should first be deducted from the fees allowed, to reimburse Bottineau for his expenses, which were fixed in the contract as amounting to $23,000, and that one fourth of the balance should be paid Bottineau as his fee. To evade the plain and unambiguous terms of this contract, O’Grady now says that Bottineau did not have the influence ■with the tribe that he represented himself to have, and that he in no way contributed to the employment of O’Grady-by the tribe. The contract says nothing about the extent of Bottineau’s influence, and we have found that he exerted whatever influence he had in O’Grady’s favor. While there is some testimony to the effect that the Indians were desirous of securing other or additional counsel, the testimony on the whole, we think, shows not only that Bottineau did all he could to induce the Indians to enter into the contract with O’Grady and Maddux and to secure the ratification of that contract, but that this was done upon the representation of O’Grady, through Finn, that O’Grady was continuing to recognize the contract between them.
That the council of October, 1901, did not result in a new contract is by no means decisive of Bottineau’s rights. The Bottineau and O’Grady contract contains no such restriction. Whether one or a dozen councils were necessary is not material, so long as it appears that Bottineau fulfilled the conditions of his agreement with O’Grady. The fact remains that a contract
As amended the decree is affirmed, with costs. Affirmed.
On December 15, 1909, a motion by the appellants to stay the mandate was overruled. ,