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Maddox v. River & Sea Marine, Inc.
925 P.2d 1033
Alaska
1996
Check Treatment

*1 principles City and the by these Guided mem- explicit ban on a conflicted

Homer’s respectfully, I participation, dissent

ber’s remedy. Rather than re-

from the court’s issue, I 92- would hold Ordinance

mand this of council member Swed-

18 invalid because participation.6

en’s

Jerry MADDOX, Appellant, MARINE, INC., Appellee.

RIVER & SEA

No. S-6582.

Supreme of Alaska. Court

Nov. particular posi- unnecessary persuading numerically toward tainted vote was intent any particular evenly split actual Courts tion. The contribution the decision. issue, have on preci- favoring measured with slight majority cannot be invalida- decisionmaker sion, significantly frequently be- refusing extends deci- tion. Courts to invalidate such reason, a yond cast. For this primarily the actual vote sions that even with- reasoned accuracy significant exist even threat to can out vote decision the tainted would numerically particular unnec- anyway and when a vote therefore invalidation occurred accuracy essary for the decision. improper. In this sense the threat legitimacy also arguably similar reasons concerns legitimacy de minim- For concerns is numerically unneces- particular apparently even when a vote is exist is when the vote is sary. Although legitimacy are less concerns particular, legitimacy to a decision. In crucial circumstances, percep- such less threatened when decision substantial concerns are result, сollegial decisionmaking poten- appears the adminis- tion inevitable. As invalidating remanding of a tainted decisionmaker tial influence trative burden of "appearance fairness" outweighs would others violate threat substantive decision Thus, legiti- accuracy for both perceptions standards. results and of fairness. distinctions, macy view is that even when strong reasons the better Despite these several numerically unnecessary deci- for a invalidating vote is decisions even reasons exist courts should still invalidate it. vote was nu- sion when a tainted decisionmaker's omitted). First, (footnotes unnecessary merically Id. at 214-216 for the decision. invalidating decisions have noted courts agreement other decisionmaking ideally my with the court's collegial note involves I views, holdings. exchange of ideas and often with *2 Flanigan, Flanigan, Michael W. Walther & Anchorage, Appellant. Corey, Smith, Sandberg,

Michael D. Wues- Corey, Anchorage, Appedee. tenfeld & COMPTON, C.J., RABINOWITZ, Before EASTAUGH, JJ., and MATTHEWS CARPENETI, J. Pro Tem* OPINION CARPENETI, Justice Pro Tern.

I. INTRODUCTION appeal superior This is an from a granting summary judgment decision to de- Marine, (River fendant River and Sea Inc. Sea), dismissing (Maddox). claim plaintiff Jerry Maddox scope case involves the aof seller’s of, purchaser safe, to warn the or make chattel dangerous for its intended ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‍use. The dispute injured whеn arose Maddox his back while attempting detach truck a purchased boat and trailer from River and Sea. Because we find that material issues of fact are in dispute concerning the defendant’s duty, grant we reverse the court’s summary judgment and remand for farther proceedings.

II. AND FACTS PROCEEDINGS purchased power Maddox a used boat and August from River and Sea on 1990, in Kenai. River and is a retail boats, motors, trailers, seller of snowma- chines, and all-terrain vehicles. Maddox had owned power three boats and trailers before purchasing Sea, boat from River and had worked a boat salesman. The boat years tráiler been two had leased for trailer, another customer. The boat made companies, paired by different were purchased River and When Sea. Maddox boat, possession still in prior lessee. been left at empty and Sea. Maddox attached the Sea, trailer to his truck River and then * IV, Sitting by assignment pursuant made to article section 16 of Alaska Constitution. light rendering liable tion the boat from location

retrieved him of it.4 its failure to warn river.1 summary judg- moved for River and Sea later, to de- days Maddox decided Several ment, duty to arguing provide that it had no from his truck. and trailer tach the boat with a boat-trailer combination' that so, attempted to do he found When he *3 hand, if by such a raised with the trailer was tongue-jack supplied the breached, and if the was owed it was the attempted to remove He then broken.2 duty was both owed and breached Maddox’s by pro- In the his from truck trailer not caused the breach. Af- were back, to the injured allegedly due cess argument, briefing ter the court boat-trailer combina- of the excessive summary for granted River and Sea’s motion tion. judgment, stating: “while the is not deposition that hе at his Maddox testified saying any duty the defendant free trailer attempted first to lift the boat at the respect plaintiff, plaintiff the to the off, got so I hitch wouldn’t come “[i]t the has described the for which defen- reverse, truck, put back in the the truck liable, held the court find dant should be can gas sharply” in to break hit the order [and] appeals. none.” Maddox the clamp. He returned to the trailer loose boat attempted then lift the trailer and III. DISCUSSION bow, feet the five to six with his back under summary judgment, of we must review tongue. of trailer’s Mad- from the end the any genuine whether there are determine Kint- of Robert dox the affidavit submitted fact, of mov issues material whether the (Kintzele), investigator hired zele judgment ing party entitled to as a the who stated that he examined Maddox matter of law. “The court must draw all tongue- and that the boat-trailer combination of non- reasonable inferences in favor the configured at the weight as combination moving against the party and movant.” pounds.3 the of the was 394 time Trucking Excavating, & Inc. v. Swenson Co., Equip. Truckweld injury, After the Maddox took (Alaska 1980). requested River back to so, they They tongue-weight. the did reduce rule, general negligence As issues of аpparently by relocating the of the trail- axle presented by this ease as those affidavit, According ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‍to Kintzele after er. summary susceptible judgment due to the adjustment tongue-weight was 285 this required in judgments highly circumstantial determination, be resolved their but should ordinary manner. by trial in the Webb Sea, against filed suit Maddox Sitka, Borough City & claiming that his of of result (Alaska 1977). case, we in that noted As him an im- selling Sea’s for rule is reason matched and a bro- properly boat the elusive nature the con- tongue-jack. alleged ken because of Maddox negligence, incorrectly paired, cеpt re- the determination trailer were boat and requires of which the form- tongue-weight. in an the existence sulting excessive contended, Therefore, ing judgment as to the reasonableness Maddox light in the parties the broken conduct boat-trailer combination and ease. If rea- condi- all the circumstances of the tongue-jack constituted a water, "tongue-weight” to the amount 3. The term refers 1. Because the boat was in required required to lift the boat to raise trailer at the end of was not of force this time. tongue. “tongue” portion the trailer is that Sea is Maddоx does not claim that River and towing forward to attach to vehicle. extends liability, product or breach liable strict tongue-jack is a A device that raises warranty. express implied or or order to attach detach trailer. product. According minds could draw infer- sonable different seller’s to the Restate- ences and reach different conclusions from ment Torts must for the facts issue be reserved supplies directly through who [o]ne trial. person third a chattel for another to use is subject sup- to those whom Id., (quoting Ry. Gross v. Southern plier expect should to use the chattel with (5th Cir.1969) (citations 292, 297 F.2d omit- consent of the other or to endan- ted)).5 use, gered by physical probable for harm caused the use of chattel in Duty A. Scope Seller’s to Warn Pur- person of, the manner for which and Safe, chaser or Make Products supplied, supplier whose use it is if the Dangerous Their Intended Use (a) has knows or reason to know that *4 The court concluded that River likely dangerous the chattel is or is to be duty and a Sea did owe Maddox supplied, for the use for which it is regard configuration to the of the boat-trailer (b) has no to that reason believe those Specifically, combination. the trial court supplied whose for use the chattel is will duty found that River and did not have a condition, dangerous realize its configure to the boat-trailer combination in (c) fails to exercise to reasonable care way that it such a could be detached manual- dangerous them inform of its condition or court, ly. respect With due to the trial we likely of facts which make it to be being see as the issue different: It is wheth- dangerous. duty er River and Sea Maddox a owed to (Second) (1965).6 § Restatement Torts 388 configure prop- the boat-trailer cоmbination of explicitly we adopted While have not Section erly or to warn him that not so 388, to we referred it. Saddler v. Alas- configured. Inc., Lines, 784, ka Marine 856 788 P.2d “duty” concept negligence of (Alaska 1993). recognized Prior cases have a range a encompasses policy broad consid warn, duty breach of which result when, underlying erations the determination Prince, liability. 87; strict 685 P.2d at Pa- extent, and to what an individual should bear Sullivan, (Alas- 91, R. v. 631 tricia P.2d 102 given activity. Bushy the costs of See 1981). ka 230, Municipality Anchorage, 741 P.2d suggests duty River and Sea that it had no (Alaska 1987) (listing 233 factors relevant to otherwise, under Section 388 or analysis). long Courts recognized protect him of the boat- responsibility seller must shoulder some for (1). trailer combination because: it was not imposed by dangerous costs defective or attempt foreseeable he would to detach Parachutes, Inc., products. Prince v. 685 (2) hand; by danger posed (Alaska 83, 1984); 87 see also MacPher by was obvious. Co., 382, son v. Buick Motor N.Y. (1916) (duty N.E. of manufactur Foreseeability Detaching B. Trailer er). Hand Restatement, outcome this case turns Under the and under scope duty protect general negligence seller’s the custom- princiрles, ambit of potentially posed er from hazards beyond one’s does not extend foresee- argues opening § River and Sea that issues are 6. Maddox cites Restatement 392 in his negligence,” "issues therefore that the brief. Section 392 "states the rule under which preference apply peculiar liability imposed upon supply- for trial determination does not one previously applied gen- ing here. This has chattels for another’s use because fact against summary judgment eral rule supplier in cases that the use is one in which the has a See, determining (Second) e.g., whether a exists. business interest.” Restatement Torts Lines, Inc., § Saddler v. Alaska Marine 392 cmt. As the chattel in this case (Alaska 1993). supplied The same circumstan- was not use in which River and interest, judgments required tial in such as in general cases Sea had a business rule applies. other cases. stated in Section 388 Long during Palsgraf v. such use of consequences. Island able product. N.Y. 162 N.E. R.R. (“If (1928) [one harm not willful who However, the record also contained evi- show that the act law]

seeks redress at must suggesting dence that it was foreseeable danger many possibilities of so as to him had the boat-trailer сombination would be lifted protect- him be apparent as to entitle offered it.”). (e) doing of against the Comment ed (Paulk), Robert Paulk a former River and states: Section 388 employee who stated “it is well frequently another lends chattel to to be known that boat users are in a [0]ne who which, they though position tongue by lift the put particular to a use for have to failure, safe, defective, tongue jack required give hand due to which is it is is not defect, although tongue weights warning of the knows common with excessive during that it Thomson admitted his de- of its existence knows makes these.” uses, prеvious position other un- that both he and the owner the chattel expect less reason to such other the boat lifted this boat-trailer combi- he has that a nation hand. He further testified uses. permissible tongue-weight maximum § Torts 388 cmt. e Restatement “[bjetween pounds,” hundred and added). (1965) (emphasis Page See also W. that any more was “more awkward than is *5 al., Prosser Keeton Keeton et on addition, necessary.” tongue-jack 96, (5th 1984); § ed. Law Torts at 687 of provided with the trailer was defective. Neakok, 721 Division v. Corrections of this, and Sea was not aware of While River (Alaska 1986) (“The 1121, impor- mоst been, jury may find that it should have well imposing single tant criterion for of possession trailer was in its when foreseeability.”). is re- care This doctrine purchased it. it understanding that is both flects basic inequitable person Drawing and inefficient to hold all reasonable inferences in favor of which or she is unaware. of this evidence creates a material risks dispute foreseeability of over Maddox’s summary judgment Propriety 1. on of attempt to lift the boat-trailer foreseeability by summary hold that hand. Therefore we conclude that Maddox satisfied We judgment granted not could be this basis. by prеsenting evidence sufficient burden by Danger Posed Ex- C. Obviousness genuine dispute regarding the to create a of Weight cessive by foreseeability detaching of summary judgment hand. Therefore should danger that argues and Sea also River granted not on this basis. have been weight posed by the of the boat-trailer com- danger, it an obvious for which bination was supported River with motion responsible. not be held should (Thomson), Peter Thomson president majority shareholder and to warn obvious Absence of River and Sea. Thomson testified that dangers safety primary balancing concern in boat- аppear universally agree with creating enough Courts combinations is firmly is not liable for weight the Restatement that seller at the attach obviously dangerous towing an He further caused to the vehicle. See, Turner, e.g., v. product. Mele given stated the wide variations in the that (no 787, (1986) 73, boats, design weight Wash.2d 720 P.2d boat-trailer com- liability arising from failure to warn of obvi- often binations similar size Maddox’s Indus., danger); ous Nichols v. could lifted hand. Based on this not be Westfield 1985) (Iowa Ltd., (sup- evidence, ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‍N.W.2d argued before the dangers which are plier’s duty is warn of suppliers could not rea- to use of the chattel sоnably manually respect expect individuals to de- obvious supplied). it is As condition which tach and therefore could be held trailers 388(b) necessary suggests, lar at ease. “[i]t Section is not issue Given the range strengths, supplier to inform for whose wide individual sizes those person weighty is the supplied is best use the chattel of a condition judge ability safely.7 of his or her to lift it looking which a mere casual over will dis- only injury particularly is the Not risk of close, which unless the circumstances under person lifting object, to the “obvious” it is supplied the chattel are such make it is as to extremely pеrceive. difficult for the seller to likely so inspection that even casual an will seller, however, This fact does not relieve not be made.” Restatement prior duty purchaser to inform the § k Torts 388 cmt. combination; of the boat-trailer (now Justice) Judge applying Breyer in only purchaser if relieved liability impose Maine law refused to reasonably expected to become obviously an con- placing aware of the before himself or required suppliers dition. the law “[I]f in danger. herself dangers warn of all in a obvious inherent product, practices of foоlish warned ‘[t]he list Propriety summary judgment based against long, so fill a would be it would on obviousness of ” Corp., volume.’ Plante Hobart F.2d Summary judgment appropriate, (1st Cir.1985) (citation omitted). 617, 620 We therefore, dispute if there was no impose strict based refused to reasonably River and dangers failure to warn “hazards or expected Maddox to aware of the readily recognized would be the ordi- tongue-weight posed with Prince, nary product.” user of the 685 P.2d warning out Sea. See al., Page at 88. W. et See also Keeton States, Andrulonis v. United 924 F.2d Prosser and Keeton on the Law Torts (2d Cir.1991), vacated, 801, 112 502 U.S. 1984). (5th § ed. 686-87 (1991), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 18 result rein *6 These cases and the Restatement (2d stated, Cir.1991), 952 F.2d 652 cert. de based on the rationale that once aware the nied, 505 U.S. 112 S.Ct. item, posed by pur- the hazardous (1992) (inquiry L.Ed.2d into obviousness position chaser is in the best to evaluate the danger depends upon actual knowl operation risks of and to make decision the edge upon user but whether the whether to assume avoid risks. those sufficiently obvious that would be un Richard Epstein, A. Modem Lia- Products impose reasonable to upon warn bility provider Law 94-95 so, supplier). posed If the the risk the good generally superior has information re- boat-trailer combination was obvious and garding potential posed the hazards the properly responsibility Maddox bears good; however, presumes, the law that once assuming he suffered it. A review possession of this information the user of the evidence leads us conclude that good position is in a better evaluate summary judgment properly could not the risks and avoid accidents in connection granted on this basis. with use. Maddox testified at his that he place

The decision risk of tongue- did not feel the full force products fully-informed gains weight user until he removed the from the support partieu- point further in thе context of the hitch. At that no he had choice wheth- this, holding employer appears In his when it that information concern- by bellboy attempt- back suffered while ing assigned by employer a task an to an suitcase, ing heavy Washington to lift a Su- employee, information, opportunity acquire or the preme Court observed: equally by persons is shared Any person intelligence concerned, can estimate his general ... rule is that strength.... physical emergency own [N]o employer is not liable for an suffered alleged. By [is] a reasonable exercise of his employеe. faculties, [plaintiff] could have his estimated v. Cotton Morck Hotel Wash.2d strength ability own to move the box in 711, 718(1949). any particular manner.... a case as [such] injuries were not ate because Maddox’s already he bore tongue, as to lift the er tongue. no We presented weight of the weight. River full grant would have that Maddox decision to suggesting court’s evidence affirm tongue- of the magnitude grounds. summary judgment been aware on alternative tongue from (Alaska he removed State, before Wright v. during his de- Thomson testified hitch.8 1992) (“This by the rea- court is not bound vary substan- tongue-weights position in the trial court and can soning articulated length, boats of similar tially between even summary judgment on al- grant affirm predict how quite difficult that it is con- River and Sea grounds.”). ternative will be. combination heavy a boat-trailer placed himself tends that because prop- suggested that the affidavit Paulk tongue, end of the to six feet from the five boat-trailer combina- tongue-weight of the er greater than if he subjected himself to force 80 and would be between to Maddox tion sold According- at the end. had lifted the trailer in favor Drawing inferences all improper argues that his ly, River and Sea differ minds could rеasonable tongue- rather than the excessive positioning, Mad- as to whether upon this evidence based injury. We decline weight, caused Maddox’s inju- appreciated the risk dox should ground. on this to affirm tongue. ry before person to a generally obvious Weight is Enters., Inc., Farley Morris directly ground, lifting an (Alaska 1983), two-part enunciates P.2d 167 object. actually Howev- one lifts before eases. causation test er, the boat-trailer tongue-weight of First, that the accident plaintiff must show by the largely determined the defen happened “but for” not have would trailer. of the boat placement of the axle Second, negligent act negligence. dant’s object was weight of this Accordingly, the bringing important so must have been Moreover, in advance. not obvious person injury that a reasonable about the by the partially borne tongue-weight was respon attach regard it as a cause and would it. Maddox removed hitch as the standard sibility it. Id. at 169. Given dispute the in material leaves The evidence summary judg involving in cases of review reasonably Maddox could question whether ment, summary judgment conclude we associated the hazards expected to realize pre granted on the could not be these circum- lifting the trailer. Under sented. stances, summary judgment should have *7 concerning tongue- only injury The evidence danger of inherent been denied. in the Kintzele manually not contained weight was was that detaching affidavit, trailer was that as the sufficiently to relieve River which states obvious weight injury any duty configured to warn Maddox at the time Maddox’s tongue was 394 combination.9 end of the at the heavy enough presumably10 It was D. Causation Maddox, even if he injury to cause some point. A himself at the safest positioned had argues, in the alterna River reasоnably that but for conclude jury could tive, judgment appropri- was summary injury, *8 388,1 which to affirm the trial court.12 ment section that is not the case here. (5th alleges 1984) § 11. (noting similarity that and Sea violated its at 274 ed. duty by providing proximate duty analysis). to him a trailer with a defec- cause and jack. negligent tive We infer that the conduct to which he refers is River Sea's and failure to Thus, objects might theoretically some mislead faulty jack. detect the assuming they weighty, users into are might exposed all. A reasonable user to be dan- opinion ger by lifting 12. The issues discussed in this are also the in a manner ill-suited to likely inspect theory. hefting heavy weight. to to arise under a failure One who sells a leaden therefore, determining jack proxi- pillow might, subject whether the broken to for mately injury, failing purchaser weight ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‍caused Maddox's the trial court to warn a attempt dangerously greater will have to determine appears whether to than to be. it Per- manually haps object’s weight might pose detach the trailer was foreseeable in an also non- light PageW. of the circumstances. See Keeton obvious if a hazard consumer could set it into al., lifting et and Prosser Keeton on the Law Tоrts downward motion without first its full motors, inevitably ators. tongue weight apply disclosed It should to outboard might of the consumers in- any person sought who to because to and obvious jure lifting themselves the motors from person unhitching A unhitch the trailer. ground removing level or them boat hitch, from to lift the and thus the trailer had transoms. towing inches clear the tongue, several the hitch Maddox tes-

ball which rested. Likewise, any tongue duty to disclose the seven-eighths it was an and tified that inch weight eighteen-foot of an boat and trailer To unhitch the or a two-inch standard ball. combination would to all apply boаt-trailer trailer, tongue he had to raise the some apply It combinations. would to smaller vertically top of inches to clear the the ball boat-trailer because own- combinations some consequently attached to his truck. The user foreseeably ers able than are less Maddox. weight full tongue could before the apply larger assess It would much boat-trailer ball; top combinations, hitch before the cleared some users inevi- because will ball, always tably appreciate weight hitch the user could fail to that the ex- cleared ability weight, drop safely hitch ceeds allowing release the their to lift and because tongue weights inevitably will safely weight exceed the ca- the ball. The full thus over pabilities consumer. It is irrelevant during poten- lift. The became obvious that Maddox’s and boat trailer (any discrepancy tial between the tongue weight been mismatched that the and ability user’s and the undisclosed tongue weight “excessive.” inevitably tongue weight) was disclosed to adjusted properly matched boat the user. lifting capa- trailer could still the safe exceed discerning tongue This method bilities of some consumers. weight is more valuable to a consumer than a purchaser reasonably No could have ex- perhaps Except written disclosure. pected appearance the boat lifters, weight skilled written disclosure of a tongue weight would be trivi- weight help non-trivial few consumers would consumers, safely al all and could be lifted they safely lift decide whether could an ob- regardless age, strength, infirmity, of their ject. what Most would to do reasonable experience, intelligence. Maddox submit- expected persons to do: must assess weight ted should have weight against their own abilities while tak- been between and 200 Some ing up tongue weight raising incapable safely lifting consumers hitch. The ineffectiveness of disclosure con- weights, not mean the failure to does infirmity imposing firms the here. disclose them creates a under section Apart resulting from fluctuations from what carrying the boat con- Knowledge gravity imputed must be located to the trailer’s tents were relative duty given I no all find consumers. would axle, disclosing tongue weight would reveal lift of facts of this casé: vertical salient they safely few consumers whether weight opportunities to a non-trivial unhitch the trailer сompare weight ability to with the user’s Nothing about the boat and combi- safely if it lift release moderately apart nation from other sets I would affirm the sum- seemed excessive. heavy products If provided to consumers. mary judgment. justification imposing there were case, in this it would disclose products, logically to other consumer extend televisions, stoves,

including reftiger- *9 car, wagon weight. Elec. to unload an from a or a Forsman Seattle 58 Wash. appearance no notice other than the has object, P. until the him and the party heavy to raise a Where undertakes brief, danger period at in the one body ground, he has notice of the he can when the becomes case apparent, desist danger period before the arrives. It is the other cannot. different, however, very Id. one undertakes 109 P. at 122. notes may slight of such likelihood experience a boat salesman 8. Maddox's the individual reasonable and risks are "[s]ome reasonable for River have made it more responsibility encountering risks bears the posed aware of the hazard that he was assume avoiding However, Here the dealing them. with lifting. Maddox testified and/or manual plaintiff's as he lifted back previously was sold risk had not that he heavy patient. was an obvi- pushed This trailers. defendant had risk which the and reasonable ous against.”). protect lifting was no case in which 9. For a result, compare contrary led to a obvious and 488, (La. point adduced before evidence on this 10.No Corp., 531 So.2d 490 Pratt v. Lifemark is denied, (La.1989) that there no It cannot be said the trial court. App.1988), 536 So.2d 1214 writ magnitude tongue-weight of this physi (in doubt that holding hospital no owed injury. cause lifting heavy patient due to cannot injured while cian 1040 River and Sea’s failure to warn ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‍IV. or CONCLUSION heavy, make the less supеrior grant We REVERSE court’s injury. would not have suffered Great Cf. summary judgment and REMAND the 366, Lang, Atl. Tea Co. v. 291 & Pac. S.W.2d ease proceedings. for further (Tex.Civ.App.1956)(finding no employee employer for back suf EASTAUGH, Justice, dissenting. crate, lifting heavy fered while where agree I with the court’s discussion of the way by [plaintiff] a safe which “[t]here was controlling principles, disagree performed could task if he view, my the result it reaches. the al- it.”). Similarly, chosen to use reasonable leged danger was obvious. Under Restate- jury regard alleged River and Sea’s (1965), ment Torts section 388 negligence as injury. a cause of Maddox’s expected River & Sea could not be to believe compara been While Maddox that users of the boat and trailer combination tively negligent positioning himself im would fail to “realize its condi- properly while the boat and hence consequently tion.” & Sea owed Mad- partially responsible injuries, for his see protect dox “danger- no him State, 1087, (Alaska Kaatz v. 540 P.2d presented by ous condition” the excessive 1975) (plaintiff’s damages propor reduced tongue weight. tion to amount attributable to correctly The court “a notes that seller is plaintiff), presеnted River and Sea has no an obviously suggesting evidence that Maddox’s action dangerous product.” Op. (citing at 1037 injury. cause the sole of his See Dura Turner, 73, Mele v. 106 Wash.2d 720 P.2d Harned, (Alaska 396, Corp. v. (1986); Indus., Nichols v. Westfield 1985) (“The proximate issue of cause is nor Ltd., (Iowa 1985)). 380 N.W.2d It mally question jury fact for the to decide concludes, however, that “[t]he evidence only and becomes a matter lawof dispute question leaves in material differ.”). reasonable minds could not reasonably expect- whether Maddox could ed to realize the hazards associated with trailer,” lifting the and thereforе reverses E. Sea’s Failure to Discover summary judgment. Op. Faulty at 1039. Tongue-Jack recognizes, As posed the court presents negli- Maddox also an alternative by attempting to lift an obvious gence theory, upon faulty tongue- based usually Op. obvious. at 1038. See Cotton v. jack.11 findings court made no Morck Hotel Wash.2d as to whether River and Sea’s failure to faulty jack negligent, discover the supporting the record contains little Assuming for sake of discussion refuting such a theory weight objects present conclusion. This might of some dan- present does gerous sufficient basis conditions under actionable Restate-

Case Details

Case Name: Maddox v. River & Sea Marine, Inc.
Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court
Date Published: Nov 8, 1996
Citation: 925 P.2d 1033
Docket Number: S-6582
Court Abbreviation: Alaska
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.