260 Pa. 492 | Pa. | 1918
Opinion by
Catherine E. Macpherson, a resident of the City of Philadelphia, died 8th January, 1897. By her last will, executed some sixteen years before her death, she gave her entire estate to her husband. Her husband predeceased her. She left no issue, or brother or sister, and her estate descended to a maternal uncle, Charles T. Begley, and certain cousins standing in first degree. Letters of administration on the estate were granted to Charles T. Begley, above named, and H. B. Yerger, the latter of whom was a lawyer, the Merchants’ Union Trust Company becoming surety on the bond of the administrators. The first account of the administrators was filed 1st June, 1898, and the adjudicated balance thereon was $35,609.05. On March 8, 1898, Charles T. Begley, one of the accountants, presented his petition for distribution of the funds', setting out in his petition the names of the persons entitled as heirs at law to participate, their relationship to the decedent, and the pro
While two later accounts were filed, the final one on 9th June, 1899, and the balance on each was distributed to the same distributees in like proportion, it is not necessary for the purpose of the argument to introduce them in this connection. They may be reserved for a later comment, if comment be necessary. On the 23d August, 1911, fourteen years after the death of Mrs. Macpherson, twelve years after the adjudication of the administrator’s final account, and about five years after he claims he first heard of the distribution of the estate, one Albert Massey, with five other persons who have since dropped out of the proceedings, they having learned that they were without interest being second cousins of the decedent, filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia in which it was represented that the said Albert Massey was a son of William Begley, then deceased, who was an uncle and heir at law of the said Catherine Macpherson. The petition distinctly and expressly charged that Charles T. Begley, as administrator of the estate of Mrs. Macpherson, and the parties to whom the estate had been distributed, “had fraudulently concealed the existence of the said William Begley and his descendants” and prayed for a citation upon Charles T. Begley to show cause why he should not be surcharged with $8,597.37, claimed to be the amount of the petitioner’s share, and upon the distributees to show cause why they should not be required to pay into court proportionate amounts of this sum respectively. Upon answers filed denying the fraud, charging laches on part of the petitioner, and averring that the petition improperly included several and distinct adjudications, the court referred the case to Maurice Bower Saul, Esq., as examiner and master: The mhster found that the petitioner,
The first question to be considered is that raised by assignments one and two-. These complain of the reversal of the master’s original findings, and his refusal to affirm the petitioner’s thirteenth request for finding which was “That Charles T. Begley, concealed from- the court the fact that Catherine E. Macpherson had another maternal uncle, to wit, William Begley, and that the said William Begley had children,” and his refusal to affirm petitioner’s third request which was “That
Turning now to such of the evidence as reflects light on the real question, whether the name of William Begley was omitted from the list of those entitled to share in the distribution by Charles T. Begley, with fraudulent intent to deprive the heirs of William of any share in the inheritance, what have we? Admittedly no direct evidence, but facts and circumstances which it is contended on the part of the appellee warrant a safe, if not conclusive, inference that the omission was with fraudulent design. The true significance of these facts and circumstances can be properly understood only as we consider in connection therewith what the evidence discloses as to the personality of William Begley, and as well the personality of his brother, Charles T., the respondent, and the relations of each to the other. In the petition for review, Albert Massey, the son of William .Begley, thus describes his father. “He was a man of most intemperate and brutal habits, and in the course of some years after their marriage it became necessary for his wife, the said Jane Massey (petitioner’s mother),
' Associated with Charles T. Begley as coadministrator was H. B. Yerger, Esq., a reputable lawyer, since deceased, a member of the law firm of Peace & Yerger. So long as he lived Mr." Yerger took an active part in the settlement of the estate. It appears by the testimony of Mr. Peace that the legal side of the settlement of the estate was committed to the firm of Peace & Yerger, through Walter B. Morris, a son-in-law of the respondent, now a confirmed invalid who was unable to testify, and - who, - with Mr. Yerger, took active charge in trying to' find out where the heirs of decedent were. Mr. Peace in his testimony says, “At or about the time that Charles T. Begley and Harry B. Yerger were appointed administrators they caused advertisements to be inserted in the public newspapers stating in substance that it would be to the interest of anyone connected with William Begley to apply to Peace & Yerger, attorneys; that they also advertised in newspapers for the relatives and heirs of another Begley, which advertisement brought response from a lady in New York State, who turned out to be the daughter of John Begley, deceased, a brother of respondent; that respondent, at or about the time that letters of administration were granted (and this must have been at least a year before any statement was filed by the respondent)
The master further found that the petitioner had been guilty of laches. Laches presupposes a knowledge of existing conditions on which a right depends. When such knowledge exists, no matter how acquired, equity demands vigilance on the part of him who would seek to
We have confined the discussion to the case on its merits. Questions of no little importance are raised involving the pleadings, which but for the conclusion we have reached on the merits would require careful consideration. In view of these conclusions further reference to them is unnecessary. The decree is reversed; the first report of the master is confirmed, and the bill is dismissed; the costs to be paid by the appellee.