186 Ga. 792 | Ga. | 1938
On February 11, 1937, Robert S. Steele filed a suit for the writ of mandamus against Mrs. Mabel Abbott MacNeill as treasurer of Fulton County. The defendant’s demurrer to the petition was overruled, and the plaintiff’s demurrer to the answer was sustained. There being then no issue of fact, the judge entered an order granting a mandamus absolute, and the defendant excepted. The petition alleged substantially the following-facts: On August 18, 1923, the plaintiff was appointed as a bailiff by Judge G-. H. Howard, who was then one of the judges of the superior court of Fulton County. The plaintiff served as such bailiff until December 31, 1936, at which time his appointment was terminated. Under an act of the General Assembly approved
The demurrers were general in nature, and need not be stated in detail; nor is it necessary to set forth the specific allegations contained in the answer. It is sufficient to state the legal contentions as urged by the plaintiff in error upon the record, as follows: (1) The act of the legislature on which the plaintiff based his claim (Ga. L. 1927, p. 194) was repealed by a later act passed at the same session (Ga. L. 1927, p. 135). (2) In accepting the lower salary for the period of fifteen months the plaintiff waived, and is estopped to claim, the difference. (3) The county treasurer can not in any event be compelled to pay the sum claimed, without an order for its payment duly passed by the county commissioners. (4) The plaintiff is barred by the twelve-months statute of limitations, as contained in the Code, § 23-1602, in reference to claims against counties; and by laches. (5) Any right of recovery had been assigned by the plaintiff to a named bank. (6) The allowance of the claim would be in violation of public policy.
Judge Clifford Pratt of the Piedmont Circuit, who presided in the case, delivered the following opinion pn the demurrers:
"Did plaintiff by accepting the $135 monthly salary waive his right to claim the amount asked for in his petition? It is urged by counsel for defendant that § 102-106 of the Code of 1933 applies, and that plaintiff by accepting the reduced amount each month without protest waived the right to claim more. With this position the court can not agree. It is expressly stated in Hall v. Stulb, 126 Ga. 521, 523 [55 S. E. 172], that 'An agreement by a public officer to accept less than the fees or salary allowed him by law is contrary to public policy and void.’ If then a public officer can not bind himself by express agreement to take less than the statute provides for his salary, it is difficult to see how silence on the matter would bind him by a waiver. It has been repeatedly held by the courts that 'an officer’s right to his compensation does not grow out of a contract between him and the State or the municipality by which it is payable. The compensation belongs to the office, and is an incident of his office, and he is entitled to it, not by force of any contract, but because the law attaches it to the office.’ Johnson v. Brooks, 139 Ga. 787, 791 [78 S. E. 37]. It is a matter in which the public has a vital interest. The functions of government must be carried on through public officers. To permit changes in the compensation of the officer except as provided by law, either by agreement or by the unauthorized action of any fiscal board, would tend to destroy the efficiency of officials in large measure, and thus is
“Counsel for defendant contend that the ruling in Barfield v. City of Atlanta, 53 Ga. App. 861 [187 S. E. 407], prevents plaintiff’s recovery, on the doctrine of estoppel. That case, however, is easily distinguishable from the case at bar on the facts. The city authorities who reduced the salary in the Barfield case had the authority to discontinue the services of Barfield. In the case at bar the county commissioners had no such authority over plaintiff. Only the judge who appointed him could discontinue the services of plaintiff. In the Barfield case it was pointed out by the court that there was a sufficient consideration moving Bar-field to sign a/n, agreement to accept a reduced amount in salary as an employee of the fire department, namely, that ‘he wished to avoid this possibility’ of losing his job, ‘and did avoid it by accepting a reduction of salary.’ There was neither a signed agreement by plaintiff in the case at bar nor was there the possibility, so far as pleadings show, that plaintiff would lose his official position. The same reasons on which is based the holding in the case at bar that plaintiff did not waive his right of action apply to estoppel, and it is my opinion that plaintiff is not estopped to assert his claim.
“Defendant also contends that under the equitable doctrine of laches plaintiff can not maintain his action. The court can not so hold. See Talmadge v. Cordell, 167 Ga. 594 (11) (146 S. E. 467). It is also contended by defendant that by virtue of a pleaded assignment plaintiff assigned all his rights to salary for certain months. The language of the assignment, construed together with the paper assigned, does not, in my opinion, admit of this construction. What was assigned by plaintiff was ‘the within warrant together with the claim on which it was issued,’ and the warrant expressly states that it was issued ‘on account salary.’ Not that it was in full of salary for the given month. It is therefore considered, ordered, and adjudged as follows: (l).On the coming in and allowance of the amendment to plaintiff’s petition, each of the grounds of defendant’s demurrer are overruled. (2) Each and all the grounds of plaintiff’s demurrer to defendant’s answer and response are sustained, and the paragraphs of defendant’s answer and response to which they refer are stricken.”
Judgment affirmed.