MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
In this action, Plaintiff Freddrick McMillan alleges that Defendant Millennium Broadway Hotel subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 et seq. Following a four-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in Plaintiffs favor, awarding him $125,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress and $1 million in punitive damages.
BACKGROUND
I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
McMillan has worked at the Millennium Broadway Hotel (the “Hotel”) for more than twenty years.
According to McMillan, his working conditions changed in 2004 when Tom Scudero became the Hotel’s Director of Property Operations. Scudero supervised the Engineering Department and relegated McMillan to undesirable tasks, such as dealing with complaints — “house calls” — from Hotel guests. McMillan considered this assignment undesirable because it required less skill than other jobs. (Tr. 184) McMillan’s requests for other assignments were denied. (Tr. 185) McMillan also testified that he was disciplined for minor mistakes, and felt that he had to “go back to calls four [or] five times to make sure that nothing was done wrong, because anything that [his supervisors] would find ... they would write me up for.” (Tr. 197) On one occasion, McMillan was disciplined for a white employee’s mistake. (Tr. 199) McMillan testified that Scudero did not treat white employees in the same demeaning manner. (Tr. 201-02)
McMillan testified that it was “horrible” working under Scudero, and complained that Scudero “allow[ed] an atmosphere where you’re called the ‘N’ word all the time” by coworkers. (Tr. 185-86) McMillan cited an April 18, 2007 incident, in which co-worker Cromwell Bodden
A. The January 2008 Voodoo Doll Incident
In January 2008, Scudero traveled to New Orleans on vacation. (Tr. 270) While there, he purchased six voodoo dolls as souvenirs for his management team. (Tr. 270-71) Scudero testified that he thought the dolls “would be a cute ... souvenir. Thought, you know, typical New Orleans. We had seen them all around as we were traveling and I figured I could kind of personalize them just so I could basically give them a gift.” (Tr. 271-72)
On January 23, 2008, Scudero brought the voodoo dolls to work and laid them out on his desk so that he could decorate them for each recipient.
Scudero subsequently distributed the dolls to his management team. Chief Engineer Joe Fariello was not in the office at that time, however, so Scudero pinned Fariello’s doll to a bulletin board above Fariello’s desk in the Engineering Department. (Tr. 278, 254-55)
Three days after McMillan saw the dolls in Scudero’s office, he noticed the doll hanging from the bulletin board above Fariello’s desk. (Tr. 193) McMillan regularly entered the Engineering Department office in which Fariello sat: he borrowed tools that were kept behind Fariello’s desk, he frequently asked Fariello — the Chief Engineer — whether he needed assistance; and he entered the office to pick up his paycheck. (Tr. 183) McMillan testified that “[t]he [voodoo] doll was hanging to the side [of the bulletin board] with a noose around its neck.” (Tr. 193; Def. Ex. LL) The doll had a black face and pink lips. (Tr. 51; Dx LL) McMillan was “very upset” about the display (Tr. 194) and complained to Vincent Foster, his union delegate. (Tr. 152-53)
Other Hotel employees were likewise offended by the display of the doll. (Tr. 160, 50) Foster testified that he was “disgusted” by the doll. (Tr. 160) Hotel employee Colin Taylor testified that the manner in which the doll was displayed evoked a lynching. (Tr. 172)
On January 30, 2008, Eddie Cedeno, another union official, complained to Kathleen Pyne, then the Hotel’s Director of Human Resources, about the voodoo doll display. (Tr. 49-50) The doll had been hanging on Fariello’s bulletin board since January 24, 2008. (Px 23) Pyne accompanied Cedeno to the Engineering Department. (Tr. 49) After Pyne saw the doll on the bulletin board, either she or Cedeno immediately took it down. (Tr. 134-35)
Pyne testified that the display of the doll on the bulletin board created “chaos” at the Hotel, and ultimately led the union to call a “work stoppage.” Many employees — mostly minority employees — congregated in the Hotel lobby. (Tr. 50-52) Concerned about Scudero and Fariello’s safety, Pyne asked them to leave the building. (Tr. 51-52) Pyne then addressed the assembled employees and promised them that she would conduct an investigation and take corrective action if appropriate. (Tr. 52-53)
Pyne commenced her investigation immediately, and she interviewed 33 employees over the next two weeks. (Tr. 87; Px 23) She began her investigation by speaking with Scudero and Fariello, and then interviewed recipients of the dolls as well as Hotel employees who had seen or might have seen the doll pinned to Fariello’s bulletin board. (Tr. 87) Pyne took notes at each interview, and then prepared a written memorandum for each interview. (Tr. 56; Px 23) Pyne concluded that some employees were offended by the voodoo doll display, while others were not. (Tr. 55, 133) All of the employees who were offended were minorities. (Tr. 55)
The Hotel took several steps as a result of this incident. The General Manager issued a letter of apology to all employees and stated that harassment of any sort would not be tolerated at the hotel. (Dx CC; Tr. 133) When Scudero — who was on paid leave while the investigation was pending — returned to work, he gave a public apology to the Hotel’s employees. The Hotel also offered “dignity-at-work” training after this incident. (Tr. 81-82, 133, 260)
No one was disciplined or terminated as a result of the voodoo doll incident, however. (Tr. 81-82, 132-33, 260) Scudero returned to his position as Director of Property Operations, and he testified that “no one from the hotel” ever told him that he had done anything wrong in displaying the voodoo doll. (Tr. 81, 260)
B. The June 2009 Luis Sierra Incident
On June 22, 2009, while sitting at a desk in the Engineering Department office, McMillan overheard Hotel co-worker Luis Sierra repeatedly use the word “nigger” in the hallway outside. (Tr. 196, 390; Dx Q) Sierra then entered the Engineering Department office, and he continued to say “N this and N that.” (Tr. 390) McMillan told Sierra, “give me a break,” and Sierra patted him on the shoulder and said, “Ok man, Ok.” (Tr. 196) McMillan was “very upset” about the incident and immediately reported it to the Human Resources Department. (Tr. 196, 386) Robert Lafferty, who was then Director of Human Resources, conducted an investigation. (Tr. 386; Dx Q)
Lafferty asked McMillan to prepare a written statement. (Tr. 389-91) Because McMillan had identified Izlau Chin, an Engineering Department employee, as a witness to Sierra’s conduct, Lafferty “immedi
The following day, Chin provided a written statement to Lafferty. (Dx Q; Tr. 393) Chin’s written statement did not include McMillan’s alleged remark to Sierra that he “would appreciate it if you didn’t use that word.” (Dx Q; Tr. 393) Lafferty noted the omission and asked Chin to explain. (Dx Q; Tr. 393) Chin responded that she was not certain that McMillan had made that statement and, accordingly, she had omitted it from her written account. (Dx Q; Tr. 394)
Because McMillan had told Lafferty that Sierra’s misconduct had taken place at about 3:45 during a shift change- — when employees were punching in and out— Lafferty obtained time cards in an attempt to identify possible witnesses. (Tr. 387-88) Lafferty then interviewed all employees who punched in or out around the time of the alleged incident. (Dx Q; Tr. 387, 395) Lafferty interviewed nine employees in total, and took contemporaneous notes during the interviews. (Tr. 387, 395; Dx Q) None of the employees corroborated McMillan’s allegations. (Tr. 396; Dx Q) Lafferty also interviewed Sierra, who denied using the word “nigger” on June 22, 2009, or on any other occasion at the Hotel. (Dx Q) At the end of his investigation, Lafferty prepared a report concluding that McMillan’s allegation was not corroborated. Lafferty shared a one-page summary of his report with McMillan and advised him that his allegation had not been corroborated. (Tr. 387, 396; Dx Q) Lafferty told McMillan that if he wished to submit any additional evidence, Lafferty would be happy to consider it. ' (Tr. 397)
C. McMillan’s Damages Evidence
Because McMillan remained employed in the Hotel’s Engineering Department throughout the pendency of this litigation, he asserted no claim for economic damages. Instead, he sought damages for alleged emotional distress and punitive damages.
McMillan’s evidence concerning emotional distress was quite limited. He testified that he found working in the Engineering Department “horrible,” but otherwise did not testify about any emotional distress he suffered. (Tr. 185) When asked by his counsel how Scudero’s conduct “made you feel,” McMillan merely said that “[i]t made me feel like Tom was being racist against me for no particular reason.” (Tr. 201)
McMillan’s daughter testified that her father “was always sad” when he was working under Scudero, and that he felt that no one believed his complaints of discrimination or listened to him. (Tr. 301) She explained that after Scudero became his supervisor, McMillan “changed his temperament,” “wasn’t as happy anymore,” and “wasn’t his same self.” (Tr. 301-02) McMillan told his daughter on several occasions that he would prefer to work in the Housekeeping Department. (Tr. 302) Foster testified that “it was hard” for McMillan to work in the Engineering Department and that he had “watched [McMillan] constantly going through all the stress.” (Tr. 154, 156) McMillan told Foster that the voodoo doll incident was “very detrimental to me.” (Tr. 156)
The jury found that McMillan proved all elements of his-racial harassment hostile
DISCUSSION
I. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
A. Standard of Review
The Hotel seeks judgment as a matter of law with respect to McMillan’s hostile work environment claim. (Def. Br. 3-16) The standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 is “well established”:
Judgment as a matter of law may not properly be granted under Rule 50 unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, is insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in her favor. In deciding such a motion, the court must give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury, and it may not itself weigh the credibility of witnesses or consider the weight of the evidence. Thus, judgment as a matter of law should not be granted unless
(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or
(2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].
Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp.,
B. Analysis
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII and Section 1981, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment, either through words or actions, based on his membership in that protected class; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment; and (4) there is a specific basis for imputing the conduct creating a hostile work environment to the employer. See Alfano v. Costello,
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment, either through words or actions, based on his membership in that protected class; (3) he was treated less well than other employees because of his membership in that protected class; and (4) there is a specific basis for imputing the conduct creating a hostile work environment to the employer. See Zhao v. Time, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 8872(PAC),
The Hotel argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) there is no evidence that McMillan experienced anything more than sporadic and isolated incidents of alleged harassment; (2) there is no evidence that McMillan was subjected to discrimination because of his race; (3) the Hotel proved its affirmative defense under federal law by demonstrating that it had an anti-harassment policy in place and that it took prompt action in response to discrimination allegations; and (4) the Hotel proved its affirmative defense under the NYCHRL by demonstrating that the alleged conduct constituted nothing more than isolated petty slights and trivial inconveniences. The Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings on each of these issues.
With respect to the Hotel’s first argument — that McMillan suffered no more than sporadic and isolated incidents of harassment — there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that McMillan was subjected to harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create an abusive work environment. The Court gave the following instruction to the jury concerning this element:
... Mr. McMillan must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the harassment unreasonably interfered with his work performance and created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation in this regard. Rather, Mr. McMillan must demonstrate either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of his working environment. Mr. McMillan must show that his workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create an abusive working environment.
In determining whether Mr. McMillan has satisfied this element, you should look to all the circumstances, including the frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether the discriminatory conduct unreasonably interfered with Mr. McMillan’s performance of his work. Generally, incidents must be more than episodic: they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive. However, a single incident of harassment may give rise to a hostile work environment claim if it is very serious — that is, if, by itself, it can and does work a transformation of the plaintiffs workplace.
Mr. McMillan need not show psychological injury, but he must show that he perceived the environment to be abusive and that a reasonable person would find the working environment to be hostile or abusive. In other words, Mr. McMillan must meet both an objective and subjective test. The conduct must be severeor pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and Mr. McMillan must also have subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive.
(Tr. 474-76)
“[I]n all cases, juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley,
The Hotel next argues that there was no evidence that McMillan was subjected to harassment because of his race. On this element, the jury was instructed that, to prevail on his Title VII and Section 1981 claims, “Mr. McMillan must prove that he was the subject of harassment and that this harassment was based on his race. ... The harassment must ... have been motivated by the plaintiffs race. This means that Mr. McMillan must prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct occurred because of his race.” (Tr. 474) (emphasis added) With respect to McMillan’s NYCHRL claim, the Court instructed the jury that McMillan had to prove that he “was subject to harassment, either through words or actions, based on his membership in [a] protected class.”
To a great extent, the outcome of the trial turned on the jury’s conclusions regarding Scudero’s intent in pinning the voodoo doll to the bulletin board. The issue of intent in a discrimination case presents a classic jury question. See Pern
In displaying a black-faced voodoo doll on an Engineering Department bulletin board — hanging by a string wrapped around the doll’s neck — Scudero chose to exhibit what McMillan and other minority employees regarded as an extremely inflammatory racial symbol. Although Scudero offered an explanation for the display that was not race-based (Tr. 271-72), the jury was free to reject that explanation. Zellner v. Summerlin,
In determining whether the Hotel had acted with discriminatory intent, the jury was also permitted to consider the repeated use of derogatory racial remarks by McMillan’s coworkers in the Engineering Department, as well as the adequacy of the Hotel’s response to those incidents. (Tr. 466-67) See Shub v. Westchester Cnty. Coll,
In sum, the Hotel has not demonstrated either that there is a “complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict” or that “there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in [its] favor ... that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50.
The Hotel also argues that the jury was required to accept its affirmative defenses. (Def. Br. 13) The Court instructed the jury that under Title VII and Section 1981 the Hotel made out an affirmative defense if it proved by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any racial harassment by its supervisors or employees; and (2) Mr. McMillan unreasonably failed to avail himself of any corrective or preventative opportunities provided by the hotel, or to avoid harm otherwise.” (Tr. 477; see Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic,
Although there was evidence that the Hotel’s Human Resources Department conducted lengthy investigations of the voodoo doll incident and the Sierra incident (Tr. 86-131; Dx W; Tr. 386-99; Dx Q, R), no employee was terminated or sanctioned in any fashion for either incident. (Tr. 81-82, 132) Indeed, Pyne testified — as to the voodoo doll incident — that the Hotel never concluded that “anyone had done something wrong.” (Tr. 132) The jury could have found that the Hotel’s response to McMillan’s complaints of racial harassment was not appropriate or adequate under the circumstances. Moreover, as to McMillan’s NYCHRL claim, the jury could have concluded that the display of the voodoo doll was not a “petty slight or trivial inconvenience.” In sum, this Court cannot find that the Hotel made out its affirmative defenses as a matter of law.
The Hotel’s motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied.
II. REMITTITUR OF THE COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
A. Standard of Review
“When a trial court finds a damage verdict to be excessive, it may order a new trial on all issues or only on the question of damages. Alternatively, the court may grant remittitur.... ” Iannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc.,
“ ‘Remittitur is the process by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between a reduction of an excessive verdict and a new trial.’ ” Chisholm v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center,
“Remittitur is appropriate to reduce verdicts only in cases ‘in which a properly instructed jury hearing properly admitted evidence nevertheless makes an excessive award.’” Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors’ Guild, Ltd.,
B. Compensatory Damage Award
Arguing that McMillan suffered no more than “garden-variety” emotional distress, the Hotel asserts that the jury’s award of $125,000 in emotional distress damages is excessive and should be remitted to no more than $10,000. (Def. Br. 16)
“‘While it is properly within the province of the jury to calculate damages, there is “an upper limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect to which reasonable [persons] may differ, but a question of law.” ’ ” Dotson v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:04-CV-1388(NAM)(GJD),
A compensatory award for emotional distress in a discrimination action may be based on testimonial evidence alone and “is not preconditioned on whether [the plaintiff] underwent treatment, psychiatric or otherwise.” Jowers v. DME Interactive Holdings, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4753(LTS)(KNF),
“Emotional distress awards within the Second Circuit can ‘generally be grouped into three categories of claims: “garden-variety,” “significant” and “egregious.” ’ In ‘garden variety’ emotional distress claims, ‘the evidence of mental suffering is generally limited to the testimony of the plaintiff, who describes his or her injury in vague or conclusory terms, without relating either the severity or consequences of the injury.’ Such claims typically ‘lack[] extraordinary circumstances’ and are not supported by any medical corroboration.” Olsen v. County of Nassau,
“ ‘Significant’ emotional distress claims ‘differ from the garden-variety claims in that they are based on more substantial harm or more offensive conduct, are sometimes supported by medical testimony and evidence, evidence of treatment by a healthcare professional and/or medication, and testimony from other, corroborating witnesses.’ ” Id. (quoting Khan,
“Of course, a court is not required to remit a large non-economic damage award, even where evidence of emotional damage consists solely of plaintiffs testimony.” Mendez v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.,
Here, Plaintiff offered very little evidence of emotional distress. Indeed, McMillan himself did not offer any testimony concerning his emotional distress, testifying only that working for Scudero in the Engineering Department had been “horrible.” (Tr. 185) There is no evidence that McMillan ever sought medical or psychological treatment, that he missed work, that he had any difficulty sleeping, that he lost his appetite, or that his alleged emotional distress had any physical manifestation or disrupted other aspects of his daily life. He remained at work throughout the period of alleged discriminatory acts.
McMillan’s daughter’s testimony was only marginally more descriptive: she testified that while working under Scudero, her father “was always sad” (Tr. 301), “wasn’t as happy anymore” (Tr. 301), and “wasn’t his same self.” (Tr. 302) She stated that McMillan’s temperament changed. (Tr. 301) Foster testified that “it was hard” for McMillan to work under Scudero (Tr. 154), and that he “watched [McMillan] constantly going through all the stress.” (Tr. 156)
Such evidence, at best, demonstrates “garden variety” emotional distress. To the very limited extent that McMillan described his injury, he did so in “vague or conclusory terms” without “relating] either the severity or consequences of the injury.” His claims were likewise “not supported by any medical corroboration.” Olsen,
In the Second Circuit, ‘“[gjarden variety’ emotional distress claims ‘generally merit $30,000 to $125,000 awards.’ ” Id.; see also Lore v. City of Syracuse,
Where a plaintiff offers only sparse evidence of emotional distress, however, courts have reduced such awards to as little as $10,000. See, e.g., Mendez,
Given the conclusory nature of McMillan’s and his daughter’s testimony and the lack of any supporting detail or specific examples of emotional injuries suffered by McMillan, the Court finds that the evidence warrants only a modest award of emotional distress damages. In surveying the case law in this Circuit, research has revealed no case in which an emotional distress award of $125,000 has been sustained in a discrimination action on such limited evidence.
The cases cited by McMillan in support of the jury’s award (Pltf. Opp. Br. 16-17) are distinguishable. For example, in Mugavero v. Arms Acres, Inc.,
Similarly, in Patterson — in which the Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a remittitur of a $100,000 emotional distress award — the plaintiff “offered testimony of his humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of self-confidence, as well as testimony relating to his sleeplessness, headaches, [and] stomach pains .... ”
The evidence in these cases is not comparable to what was offered here. McMillan “did not present either the quality or quantity of evidence” necessary to support a $125,000 award. Kim,
Accordingly, the Hotel’s motion for a new trial concerning compensatory damages will be granted unless McMillan agrees to a remittitur reducing the compensatory damage award from $125,000 to $30,000.
C. Punitive Damage Award
The Hotel argues that the Court must vacate or remit the jury’s $1 million punitive damage award because (1) the evidence was insufficient to justify punitive damages, and (2) the award is, in any event, constitutionally excessive. (Def. Br. 19-23)
1. Standard for Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are available under both federal law and the NYCHRL. Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc.,
Corp.,
The NYCHRL “ ‘does not provide a standard to use in assessing whether [punitive] damages are warranted.’ ” Farias,
The Court will not disturb the jury’s determination that punitive damages were warranted in this action. Given McMillan’s objection to the dolls, the inflammatory nature of the voodoo doll display, and the Hotel’s failure to impose any disciplinary sanction in connection with this incident, a rational jury could find that the Hotel acted with reckless indifference to McMillan’s protected rights. See Cruz v. Henry Modell & Co., Inc., No. CV 05-1450(AKT),
2. Excessiveness Inquiry
“Regarding the magnitude of punitive damage awards, due process requires that they be ‘ “reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition.” ’ ”
The Supreme Court has noted that “[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” Gore,
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
With respect to the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, the Supreme Court has “been. reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.” State Farm,
Even when the “punitive award is not beyond the outer constitutional limit marked out ... by the Gore guideposts,” a court must separately determine whether the award is “so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice.” Mathie,
With respect to the reprehensibility of its actions, the Hotel argues that “there was no evidence demonstrating racially motivated intent, let alone deceit,
Crediting the jury’s verdict, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Hotel’s managers were at least more than merely negligent, and that they acted with knowledge that their conduct would violate McMillan’s rights. Moreover, because the jury was permitted to consider two incidents — the voodoo doll incident and the 2009 Sierra incident — in determining damages, the Hotel’s misconduct could be viewed as “repeated.” Nevertheless, “[i]t is clear that [the Hotel’s] conduct did not result in physical injury to [McMillan], nor did it evince an indifference to or reckless disregard for the health or safety of others.” Thomas v. iStar Financial, Inc.,
There was likewise no evidence of retaliation against McMillan for complaining of discrimination, nor is there any evidence of trickery or deceit. Moreover, the Hotel conducted extremely thorough investigations of both the voodoo doll incident and the Sierra incident. As soon as Pyne was made aware of the voodoo doll hanging from the bulletin board, it was taken down. (Tr. 134) In addition, as discussed above, the evidence of McMillan’s emotional distress was sparse at best.
The Court finds that “[t]he defendant’s conduct, while meriting some award of punitive damages, was by no means as reprehensible as that in many other [employment] discrimination ... cases.” Iannone,
The cases cited by McMillan in support of the $1 million punitive damage award here (Pltf. Opp. Br. 18-19) involve more reprehensible conduct. See, e.g., Greenbaum,
“[T]aking all of the circumstances of the ease into account, [the Hotel’s] conduct ... was insufficiently reprehensible to justify a punitive damages award in significant excess of his compensatory damages award.” Thomas,
With respect to the ratio factor, the jury’s award of $1 million in punitive damages and $125,000 in emotional distress damages represents a ratio of 8 to 1. Taking into account this Court’s remittitur of the compensatory damage award, the ratio rises to approximately 33 to 1. See DiSorbo,
Finally, the Court must compare the punitive damage award to applicable civil penalties. Lee,
A survey of punitive damage awards in discrimination and retaliation eases reveals that the $1 million award here is excessive and should be reduced significantly. See, e.g., Chisholm,
The Court concludes that a punitive damage award of no more than $100,000 is proper in this case. Such an award is nearly four times the remitted compensatory damages amount, a ratio which “[t]he Supreme Court has ‘concluded ... might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety.’ ” Thomas,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied. Defendant’s motion for a new trial is granted on the issue of damages unless Plaintiff agrees in writing by June 18, 2012, to a remittitur reducing the compensatory damage award to $30,000 and the punitive damage award to $100,000. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion. (Dkt. No. 66)
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. McMillan has remained employed at the Hotel throughout this litigation. (Tr. 202-03)
. There was conflicting testimony concerning Bodden’s race. McMillan testified that Bod-den is Hispanic and is from Honduras. (Tr. 208) Chief Engineer Joe Fariello testified that Bodden is African-American. (Tr. 309) Bod-den appears to self-identify as black, as McMillan testified that he used the phrase "us Negroes.” (Tr. 191)
. Bodden received an oral warning as a result of this incident. (Dx K)
. Zgoda claimed that McMillan had referred to him as "sonny.” (Tr. 212-13)
. Bodden was placed on written warning as a result of this incident. (DxO)'
. As discussed below, the jury was instructed that these 2007 incidents could be considered only as background evidence, and could not be the basis for a liability finding. (Tr. 466-67) With respect to the Zgoda incident, McMillan and the Hotel had entered into a settlement agreement in 2007 in which McMillan granted the Hotel a full release.
. Scudero "customized” each doll, attaching something of significance to the recipient. For example, Scudero tied a disposable razor to a doll given to a manager who commonly came to work unshaven, and he attached images of dollar signs and coins to a doll given to a manager responsible for energy conservation and cost savings. (Tr. 275-78)
. Scudero denied that McMillan asked whether he should be offended by the dolls, claiming that McMillan simply asked what the dolls were “all about.” (Tr. 252-53, 273)
. The Hotel argues that the jury must have ignored the Court’s limiting instruction that the 2007 incidents could be considered only as background evidence. (Def. Br. 12-13) The Court instructed the jury as follows: “These incidents were admitted as background evidence and are to be considered by you only on the issue of whether the Hotel acted with discriminatory intent with respect to Mr. McMillan. These two incidents cannot serve as a basis for a liability finding against the Hotel under either Mr. McMillan’s federal or New York City Human Rights Law claims, however, or as the basis for an award of damages. The events surrounding the 2008 and 2009 incidents are the focus of Mr. McMillan’s claims.” (Tr. 466-67) ”[T]he law recognizes a strong presumption that juries follow limiting instructions,” United States v. Snype,
. In response to a jury note during deliberations, the Court reinforced its earlier instructions concerning McMillan’s burden to demonstrate this causal connection. The jury asked: "If the intent of an act is not racially motivated but the act itself is racially offensive, does that constitute racial harassment?” (Tr. 512) The Court reiterated that “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct at issue here including, for example, Mr. Scudero’s pinning of the doll onto the bulletin board, occurred because of Mr. McMillan’s race. There must be a causal connection. Mr. McMillan must demonstrate that he was subjected to a hostile work environment because of his race." (Tr. 513) (emphasis added) "[A] jury is presumed to understand a judge’s answer to its question.” Weeks v. Angelone,
. No evidence was offered at trial concerning Defendant’s net worth or assets.
. Although Title VII sets caps on compensatory and punitive damage awards, the NYCHRL contains no such restrictions. See Holness v. Nat’l Mobile Television, Inc., No. 09 CV 2601(KAM) (RML),