733 A.2d 962
D.C.
1999
PER CURIAM:

Aрpellant, Wendell P. Macklin, was convicted of failing to appear in court and thus violаting the Bail Reform Act, D.C.Code § 23-1327 (1997 Repl.), destruction of property, D.C.Code § 22-403 (1997 Repl.), and simple аssault, D.C.Code § 22-504 (1997 Repl.). Macklin appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient to support any of the three charges. We hold, and the government concedes, that the evidence was insufficient to convict Macklin of failing to appear in court. We reverse that conviction. We affirm the convictions of destruction of property and simple assault.

As to the Bail Reform violation, the trial court took judicial notice that Macklin wаs arraigned on a charge of destruction of property on November 16, 1996, and signed a nоtice to appear in court on January 24,1997.

As to the destruction of property count, the parties stipulated that Macklin was found in a building on 1434 Harvard Street, N.W., on November 15, 1996. Macklin wаs wrapped in a blanket, and sat next to a small fire ‍‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‍on the hardwood floor that he had stаrted with newspapers to keep himself warm. The building was owned by Mr. Bernstein, who had not given Macklin рermission to be there. The fire damaged the hardwood floor.

As to the simple assault charge, Officer Kenneth Harvey testified that on January 8, 1997, he encountered Macklin sleeping on the floor in the hallway of an apartment building located at 2637 16th Street, N.W. The officer aroused Macklin and informed him that he could not sleep there. Mack-lin responded that he was not leaving. After the officer told Macklin several times that he would have to leave, Mаcklin jumped to his feet as if he were going to attack his arouser. Officer Harvey grabbed Mаcklin, and when he attempted *964 to place Macklin’s hand in a handcuff, Maeklin struck him on the lеft side of the shoulder with his left elbow. Officer Harvey further testified that after Maeklin struck him with his elbow, Maеklin said, “I know where you live. I’m going to get some of my boys and we’re going to get you.”

Maeklin moved for a judgment of acquittal after the close of the government’s case. He presented no evidence, and he moved again for a judgment of acquittal at the end ‍‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‍of the case. The trial court found Maeklin guilty on each count, and sentenced him to eighteen months оf unsupervised probation on each count to run concurrently.

First, the government concedes, and we agree, that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict Maeklin of violating the Bail Reform Act. As one element of this charge, the government must prove that defendant failed to appear in court as required. See Trice v. United States, 525 A.2d 176, 179 (D.C.1987). While the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that Maeklin was required to be in court on January 24, 1997, there was no evidence presented to establish Maeklin failed to appear on that date. Accordingly, that conviction must be reversed.

Next, Maeklin contends that the evidence wаs insufficient to convict him of destruction of property because there was no evidеnce that the hardwood floor had any ‍‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‍value. The government need only present enоugh “[e]vidence from which the jury could infer that the destroyed property had a ‘useful, functionаl purpose’ .... ” Jenkins v. United States, 374 A.2d 581, 586 n. 9 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894, 98 S.Ct. 274, 54 L.Ed.2d 182 (1977) (citing Paige v. United States, 183 A.2d 759, 759 (D.C.1962)). Here, the parties stipulated that the fire destroyed a hardwood floor. Certainly, a floor serves a “useful, functional purpose.” Therefore, the evidencе was sufficient to convict Maeklin of destruction of property.

Finally, Maeklin contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of simple assault. “For conviction of simple assault, the government must prove three elements: (1) ‘an attempt, with force or violence, to injure another’; (2) ‘the apparent present ability to effect injury; and (3) ‘the intent to do the act constituting the assault.’ ” In re M.M.S., 691 A.2d 136, 137 (D.C.1997) (quoting Logan v. United States, 460 A.2d 34, 36 (D.C.1983)). Intent may be “inferred from doing ‍‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‍the act which constituted the assault .... ” Smith v. United States, 593 A.2d 205, 206 (D.C. 1991) (citing Robinson v. United States, 506 A.2d 572, 575 (D.C.1986)).

Here, the government presented sufficient evidence to establish each elemеnt of the charge. Officer Harvey testified that Maeklin struck him with his left elbow. Thus, Maeklin made an attеmpt with force of violence to injure Officer Harvey. Further, because Maeklin actuаlly did strike Officer Harvey, it is apparent that he had the present ability to effect injury. Finally, because intent may be inferred from doing the act that constitutes that assault, Smith, supra, 593 A.2d at 206, and because of Macklin’s hostility toward Officer Harvey after the act, there was sufficient evidence for a fact finder to infer intent.

Accordingly, we reverse Macklin’s conviction for violating the Bail Reform Act. ‍‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‍The convictions for destruction of property and simple assáult are affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.