205 Pa. Super. 489 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1965
Opinion by
In this unemployment compensation case the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review awarded benefits to the claimants, employees of the appellant, Maekintosh-Hemphill Division, E. W. Bliss Company, on the ground that their unemployment was the result of a work stoppage for which the employer was primarily responsible under §402(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 PS §802(d).
The case involves benefits for a number of employees who had become unemployed as a result of a dispute concerning a new labor contract between the appellant and the union representative of the claimants. The parties have stipulated that the rights of all claimants involved will be governed by the decision in the case of one of the claimant-employees, John J. Tnima.
At the outset we should dispose of the complaints of the employer regarding the procedural aspects of this case, keeping in mind that “its benefits and objectives shall not be frittered away by slavish adherence to technical and artificial rules.” Baigis Unemployment Compensation Case, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 379, 51 A. 2d 518 (1947).
The Bureau of Employment Security held the defendants ineligible for benefits in that their unemployment was due to a labor dispute. On appeal the case was assigned for hearing to Referee John F. Curran.
After hearing, Referee Lampl sustained the appeal from the Bureau and awarded benefits on the theory that their unemployment was the result of a lock-out by the employer. The employer appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and requested a further hearing for the purpose of submitting additional testimony. When such a request is made the Board appoints a referee to hear the additional testimony. The Board issued a remand order and appointed Referee Edward Solomon, Jr. to hear the additional testimony. The notice read: “Hearing on Board Appeal”, to distinguish it from the decisional hearing. Referee Solomon was sitting as a hearing officer for the Board: §502 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 PS §822. The Board and not the referee then makes the decision.
After the Board hearing in this case, the matter was argued before the Board and the Board affirmed the decision of Referee Lampl. The employer sought reconsideration. The decision was vacated and reargument scheduled. After reargument the Board reinstated its decision affirming the referee.
However, we are not deciding that it would have been error for another referee to have held additional hearings and then dispose of the ease by decision on the entire record, despite the fact that he did not see and hear the witnesses that testified before the deceased referee. We are deciding that under the circumstances of this case the de novo hearing was preferable for both sides and that the employer was not prejudiced by it. It is certainly much better if the decision writer had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses in disposing of matters of credibility but in the administration of workmen’s compensation and unemployment compensation the ultimate fact finder, the Board, in most cases never sees or hears the witnesses but must make the final decision, including the determination of credibility. In these cases the delegation of the hearing power has been given to referees. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 584, 163 A. 2d 80 (1960). In divorce cases the Superior Court of Pennsylvania hears appeals de novo and must dispose of the question of credibility, purely on the cold record of the testimony taken before a master.
At any rate the parties reached an impasse as negotiations reached the contract deadline and an industrial dispute closed the plant as of August 1,1962. The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review made the following pertinent findings of fact:
“7. One of the principal issues separating the Company and the Union was the problem of C.W.S. (Cooperative Wage Scale). Although the issue of C.W.S. was written into the labor-management agreement of January, 1960, it was not to become effective until the job descriptions had been agreed to between the Union and the Company.
“8. From January of 1960 until notice of renegotiation of contract was given prior to June 1, 1962, no agreement had been arrived at between the Union and the Company as to job descriptions under C.W.S.
“9. Meetings were held between June 1 and July 31, 1962, for the purpose of resolving the C.W.S. problem, job descriptions and many other issues, both economic and non-economic.
“10. When it became apparent that no agreement could be arrived at, the Company proposed to extend the existing contract for a period of nine (9) days.
“11. The Union proposed to extend the existing contract for either 30, 60 or 90 days, as might be required, and to negotiate all disputed provisions of the entire contract.
“12. When the Union made this proposal on July 31, 1962, the Company broke off negotiations although there were ten hours left before the midnight deadline.
“13. The Company was not willing to negotiate the entire contract, but was willing only to negotiate on C.W.S. provisions.
“14. An industrial dispute closed the plant as of August 1, 1962.
“15. Although an industrial dispute began on August 1, 1962, the employes were not immediately unemployed as a result of the industrial dispute because plant-wide vacations had been scheduled from August 1 to August 13, 1962.
“16. The Union was ready, willing and able to return to work after the vacation period by extending the contract, but was prevented from doing so by the employer.”
The above findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and are binding on this Court. Section 402(d) reads as follows: “An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week— ... (d) In which his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work, which exists because of a labor dispute (other than a lock-out) at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed: . . .”. The Board concluded that under the above facts the work stoppage was the responsibility of the employer and constituted a lock-out under the Unemployment Compensation Law.
The Unemployment Compensation Law recognizes the legality of a strike called by a union or a lock-out declared by an employer. Both of these devices are
If tbe employees offer to continue working for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment so as to avert a work stoppage, pending further negotiations looking toward a final settlement of tbe contractual negotiations, there is no disqualifying strike. Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, Erie Forge & Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 400 Pa. 440, 163 A. 2d 91 (1960); Leto Unemployment Compensation Case, 176 Pa. Superior Ct. 9, 106 A. 2d 652 (1954) ; Hogan Unemployment Compensation Case, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 554, 83 A. 2d 386 (1951); McGinnis Unemployment Compensation Case, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 95, 132 A. 2d 749 (1957). It has long been established that it is tbe duty of tbe compensation authorities to ascertain tbe final cause and responsibility for tbe work stoppage. McGinnis Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, at page 101.
In a much closer case on tbe facts than tbe instant one tbe Supreme Court in tbe Erie Forge case, supra, reversed the decision of this Court, as reported at 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 405, 146 A. 2d 751 (1958), that held tbe employees ineligible and found that tbe facts supported tbe legal conclusion of a lock-out. Tbe Supreme Court in that case clearly fixed the law to be that:
Under the facts as found in this case the application of the law is governed by the Erie Forge case.
Decision affirmed.