72 N.J.L. 29 | N.J. | 1905
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is a demurrer to a plea. The declaration averred that the defendant had insured the husband of the plaintiff against “disability or death resulting directly from bodily injuries sustained through accidental means” by a certain contract or policy of insurance made with him, a copy of which was annexed to the declaration and expressly referred to therein and made a part thereof. The policy so annexed included a schedule of warranties, consisting of a series of questions and answers, one of which is as follows:
“K. No application ever made by me for insurance has been declined and no accident or health policy issued to me has been canceled or renewal refused, except as herein stated. No.”
The plea to which a demurrer has been filed recites the precise language of this section and identifies it as section K, and then goes on to aver that such statement was false and untrue because the insured had made an application for a policy of life insurance, which was declined.
" The primary question is whether the word “insurance” in the first clause of this warranty means life insurance, the plaintiff contending that it refers only to insurance of the sort for which the insured was applying, viz., accident or health insurance. The word “insurance” in this clause evidently did not mean any insurance, for in that case it would cover not only life and accident insurance, but also fire insurance and insurance against tornadoes, burglars, liability to employes, as well as credit, live stock, plate glass and other
The question therefore arises whether courts resort to such intricate processes of construction for the purpose of sustaining forfeitures. The doctrine upon this subject arises from the relative positions of the parties. Here we are dealing with a question propounded by an insurer as the basis of a warranty on the part of the insured, a breach of which will avoid the insurer’s contract. Such questions arc formulated by the insurer under circumstances that admit of their being clear and direct. The purpose for which they
The present case is an apt illustration of the salutary nature of this doctrine. Our own original differences admonish us of the difficulties involved in the construction of the language employed by the insurer in framing this warranty. The process by which its falsity is made to appear is of the most intricate nature. There is a possible construction that is consistent with the truth of the statement made by the insured. The ambiguity that exists did not inhere in the nature of the inquiry and is chargeable solely to the insurer. To ask a man whether he has ever made an application for life insurance that has been declined is not an abstrp.se question or a difficult one to ask. It is only by couching the question in language that admittedly is not clear, and by intermingling such inquiry with others touching an entirely different subject-matter, that ambiguity is imported into a transaction that should be rendered as simple and direct as possible. It is not contended that the ambiguity was intentional. That is not required by the rule we are applying; it is enough that it exists and that it has
Judgment on the demurrer will be given for the plaintiff.