The offense is felony theft, with two prior convictions for felonies alleged for enhancement; the punishment, lifе.
The indictment charged the primary offense of automobile theft from Charles L. Darnell, a prior convictiоn of felony theft resulting in a conviction on January 4, 1955, and another conviction for felony theft resulting in a conviction on November 7, 1952.
A statement of the nature of this case will be greatly simplified by setting forth appellant’s defense which he developed through questioning Captain Brown of the automobile theft division of the Houston police whom he called as a witness. Brown testified that sometime after his arrest for the primary offense appellant admitted that he was a receiver of stolen property but denied that he was the thief. He stated that it was his modus operandi to drive around with another man (whose identity he refused to disclose) and pick out the cleanest automobile that could be found to match a certificate of title and “serial plate” whiсh had come into his possession by virtue of his employment in an automobile junk yard, then change the license plates and serial number from the junked automobile to the stolen automobile, which he then sold. He admitted reсeiving the Darnell 1953 Ford, switching the license plates and serial number and driving it to the Rio Grande Valley, where he sold it. Frоm this information, the officers were able to recover the Darnell Ford. The jury were instructed to acquit if they found that appellant was a receiver and was not present when the Darnell Ford was stolen.
The facts will be more fully developed as we discuss appellant’s contentions advanced by brief and in argument.
His first contention is that the State failed to prove that the offense which resulted in the 1955 conviction was committed subsequеnt to the 1952 conviction. Reliance is had upon Rogers v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
We are unablе to comprehend appellant’s contention that the indictment which result *699 ed in the 1955 conviction constituted no proof because the same did not conclude with the phrase “against the peace and dignity оf the State.” While it is true that the court did sustain appellant’s objection to the second page of the 1955 indictment, the instrument which appears in the record before us, approved by counsel, does contain thе phrase mentioned.
We overrule appellant’s complaint as to the sequence in which the prior convictions and the primary offense were plead. In addition to Clifton v. State,
We again uphold the constitutionality of Articlе 63, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., as we did in Ex parte Breen, Tex.Cr.App.,
We find no merit in appellant s complaint, if we considered thаt it was properly before us, as to the indictment which alleged in part “appropriate
to
to the use and benefit.” In Lewallen v. State,
We need not discuss the question as to the admissibility of the certificate of title because appellant introduced proof that he received the Darnell Ford аnd sold it after, altering it.
We overrule appellant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because the indictment alleged that the courts in which the prior convictions had oсcurred had jurisdiction •of said offenses. We take judicial knowledge of the jurisdiction of district courts, and presume that venue was proved.
Appellant contends that, since he elicited testimony from his own witness Officer Brown that when first questioned he had explained his possession of the recently stolen property, he may not be сonvicted of theft. Without further discussion, we observe that appellant developed this testimony and not the State, and the State is not bound thereby.
We have repeatedly approved the method of proof as to the prior convictions. Reyes v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
We find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.
The judgment and sentence are reformed to find aрpellant guilty of felony theft and that he had theretofore twice been convicted of felonies, and, as reformed, the judgment is affirmed.