137 U.S. 556 | SCOTUS | 1890
MACKALL
v.
CASILEAR.
Supreme Court of United States.
*562 Mr. Samuel Shellabarger, (with whom was Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson on the brief,) for appellant.
Mr. J.J. Darlington, for Casilear and wife, appellees.
Mr. S.S. Henkle for devisees of Brooke Mackall, Senior, appellees.
*563 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Apart from the prayers for process, an account, and for general relief, the specific relief sought is, that the two deeds of B. Mackall, Sr., trustee, and Louis Brand, trustee, to Joseph B. Hill be decreed to be null and void, together with all deeds, written instruments, and claims of title whatever derived through the same, and that complainant be adjudged to be the owner of the property free and clear from all claims and demands of the defendants or either of them.
The deed of complainant to Mackall, Senior, was dated May 5, 1866, and recorded June 5, 1867. The deed of Mackall to Hill was dated June 26, and recorded July 2, 1873. Brand's title was derived through a conveyance by complainant to Morsell, dated March 13, 1867, and the conveyance of Morsell, Mills and complainant to him, dated July 14, 1868. The deed from Brand to Hill was dated and acknowledged July 29, 1873, and presumably recorded the same day, though the record gives the date as July 28. The bill was filed June 1, 1885. The death of Mackall, Sr., was stated to have occurred February 28, 1880. This attack was delivered, then, more than nineteen years after the deed to Mackall; about seventeen after that to Brand; and nearly twelve years after the other two deeds were recorded.
It is charged that the deed of May 5, 1866, was given to secure complainant's two notes, amounting to nearly $600 in the aggregate, for the purpose of borrowing money for the use of father and son, but that no money was ever borrowed thereon; and that the deed to Brand was given to secure a note for $2000 payable to Mackall, Sr., for the same purpose, likewise not carried out.
Counsel for complainant insisted, upon the argument, that the deed from Mackall, Jr. to Mackall, Sr., was void, because Mackall, Sr., took the acknowledgment, and that the sales made by Brand and Mackall, Sr., to Hill were invalid by reason of the omission to advertise for the time prescribed, and the want of publicity in the conduct of the sales, and because *564 these transactions were merely covers for the purchase by Mackall himself in fraud of complainant's rights.
If the general rule that an acknowledgment is not essential to the validity of a deed as between the parties applies, the fact that a grantee cannot take the acknowledgment of a conveyance to himself would be immaterial in this case. The execution of this deed to Mackall was expressly averred by complainant and its delivery conceded, but he alleged that it was given to secure notes for the purpose of borrowing money for himself and his father, and that this was not done.
There is no prayer for specific relief in relation to it, nor do we think the averments such as would entitle complainant to resort to the prayer for general relief, to set it aside, by reason of the want of acknowledgment, if that were a proper ground; and, if void upon its face, as now contended, the interference of a court of equity would seem to be unnecessary. Phelps v. Harris, 101 U.S. 370, 375. We shall not, therefore, review the various statutes of Maryland, acts of Congress, and authorities referred to by counsel as tending to justify the position that in the District of Columbia a deed is not operative, even as between the parties, notwithstanding delivery, unless it be acknowledged and recorded.
As already stated, nineteen years after the conveyance to Mackall, Sr., seventeen after that to Brand, twelve after the deeds to Hill, and five after Mackall's death, the son charges the father with what his counsel calls "actual, active and intense fraud;" and, in explanation of the delay in seeking to be relieved from the consequences of this conduct on his father's part, says that "soon after the execution of the deeds made in 1874," (the conveyances by Hill and Mackall, Sr., to Leonard Mackall, and by McKelden and Timoney to Casilear, were in 1874,) his father became reconciled to him, and they lived together and shared the benefit of all property possessed by each in common, and his father constantly assured him that he would rectify all that was wrong in said conveyances to the best of his ability, which assurance was relied upon by complainant and was satisfactory to him; that his father drew up forms of reconveyance to him of such property *565 or parts thereof, one of which he signed and delivered to complainant; and that "in February, 1880, he did execute a reconveyance of all his interests in said property, which was entirely satisfactory to complainant, though such reconveyance was attacked by his said brothers and sisters, and a decree was made adjudging the same to be void as to the property herein claimed by complainant, from which decree, however, they claim to have taken an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, and which appeal they claim is now pending, though such claim is not admitted by complainant. While such litigation was pending, however, there was, as believed by complainant, no propriety in bringing suit to enforce what he claimed to have been sufficiently performed by the execution of said deed of his father's to him of February 28, 1880, and such litigation was pending at a very recent date."
As complainant did not appeal from the decree passed against him in favor of his brothers and sisters in relation to this property, it must still stand as a bar, and it is not easy to see why, under the circumstances stated by complainant, that litigation did not include the same matters and things which are drawn in controversy in this suit.
Supposing that the bill of the complainant's brothers and sisters attacked the deed of February 28, 1880, upon the ground that its execution was secured by undue influence, would it not devolve upon the defendant in that case, the complainant herein, to set up that he was in fact the owner of the property; that his father had obtained the conveyance from him under circumstances constituting a fraud upon him; and that the deed of February, 1880, was given by the deceased in order to restore to the defendant, complainant here, what he had been wrongfully deprived of? And as complainant contends such were the facts, why was not that defence set up? If such were not the facts, what becomes of the complainant's bill?
But assuming that the matters relied on here are not necessarily inconsistent with that decree, then according to his own contention complainant occupies this position: having accepted *566 a deed from his father completely condoning the causes of complaint which he alleges he had against him, he now, after his father's death, seeks to go behind that final and satisfactory compromise, because upon some ground, outside of anything litigated in this suit, his brothers and sisters succeeded in defeating the deed in a controversy between him and them. This we think he cannot do; nor can we admit complainant's ideas of propriety in bringing this bill, while that was pending, or in declining to litigate these matters in that action, as furnishing any satisfactory explanation of the laches which has characterized his conduct. If that laches could in any respect be held to be excused by reason of his expectations from his father, we cannot allow him to plead, that because those expectations in part failed of realization through some external cause, therefore he is any the less bound, so far as his dead father is concerned, by a delay which would otherwise be fatal.
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy, which require for the peace of society the discouragement of stale demands. And where the difficulty of doing entire justice by reason of the death of the principal witness or witnesses, or from the original transactions having become obscured by time, is attributable to gross negligence or deliberate delay, a court of equity will not aid a party whose application is thus destitute of conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence. Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. 241; McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161, 168; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U.S. 201; Landsdale v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391; Le Gendre v. Byrnes, 44 N.J. Eq. 372; Wilkinson v. Sherman, 45 N.J. Eq. 413.
The time for this son to have attacked his father on the ground of fraud was prior to that father's death; yet no movement was made to set aside these alleged fraudulent conveyances, until five years after that event transpired. The father died testate, and by his will the property in controversy, subject to the Casilear conveyances, passed to the brothers and sisters of complainant, as the father's devisees, who were natural objects of the bounty of the testator, and, so far as this record shows, entitled to his consideration. The allegations *567 of the bill fall far short of discharging the burden, which rested on the complainant, of satisfying the court that his delay had not operated to the prejudice of these parties.
Without regard to the deed of February, 1880, the rule in question would forbid relief, and, so far as that deed is concerned, complainant could not elect to take under it and then claim that delay was excused while he experimented in trying his case by piecemeal. Of course it must be admitted that an affectionate son would feel a natural reluctance to make a charge of fraud against his father, but where the time consumed in overcoming this is prolonged, as in this instance, we cannot recognize the relationship as sufficient explanation of the laches.
These views are applicable to the defendants Casilear. Casilear purchased at a sale under a trust deed given to secure a note for $3000, in respect to which there is no allegation that the note was not for value received. The excuse for the delay is that complainant protested against Casilear's claim and notified him that he would not submit to the sale; but the mere assertion of a claim, unaccompanied by any act to give effect to it, cannot avail to keep alive a right which would otherwise be precluded. It is said, however, that complainant had been engaged in negotiations from time to time with Casilear, orally and by mutual correspondence in writing, which complainant hoped would result in a settlement and adjustment of their differences in regard to the property held by him; but the bill does not state that Casilear gave any encouragement to such hopes, or ever promised any settlement or adjustment, or ever conceded that his purchase was in any respect doubtful, or ever in any way recognized the claims of the complainant.
Under the circumstances we entertain no doubt that the demurrers were properly sustained and the decree is
Affirmed.
