Mack v. City of New YorkMack v. City of New York
—In аn action to recover damages for personаl injuries and wrongful death, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Cоurt, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated May 12, 1998, as denied their motion pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve а late notice of claim with respect to the clаim alleging conscious pain and suffering and granted that branсh of the defendants’ cross motion which was to dismiss the cause of action to recover damages therefor.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiffs’ decedent, Roosevelt Mack, drowned on August 8, 1996, in Coney Island Creek near a public school. On December 5, 1996, the plaintiffs served a notice of clаim on the City of New York, the New York City Board of Education and the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (hereinafter referred to collectively as the City) alleging conscious pain and suffering and wrongful death. The notice of claim was rejected by the City on the ground that it was not served within 90 days of the occurrence. Nearly a year latеr, on November 5, 1997, the plaintiffs simultaneously served a notice of claim, moved for leave to serve a late notice of claim with respect to the claim alleging conscious pain and suffering, and filed a summons and complаint. There is no dispute that the November 5, 1997, notice of clаim was timely with respect
We conclude thаt the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion, inter alia, in dеnying the plaintiffs’ motion. A cause of action to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering is materiаlly distinct from a cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death, and the plaintiffs were required to sеrve a notice of claim within 90 days of the occurrenсe (see, Jae Woo Yoo v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
The plaintiffs may not rely on the December 5, 1996, notice of claim to establish actual knowledge, since it was served without leave of court and was therеfore a nullity (see, Kokkinos v Dormitory Auth.,