252 Pa. 225 | Pa. | 1916
Opinion by
The plaintiff secured a verdict for damages suffered through the appropriation by the defendant, under its right of eminent domain, of certain real estate belonging to her; judgment was entered accordingly, and the defendant has appealed.
The property was formally appropriated and the defendant’s bond filed on January 12, 1907. Viewers were not appointed until 1913, and the trial on the appeal from their report, taken by the defendant company, did not occur till April 26, 1915. At this trial a blue-print was offered, “showing the plaintiff’s property and the portion thereof appropriated,”- which was accepted in evidence without objection. Subsequently a second blueprint was offered and accepted, under objection and exception to the defendant, and rulings relating thereto are complained of in two assignments of error, which we shall now consider in connection with another assignment. When a certain witness for the plaintiff was upon the stand, he testified that a construction, known as a “erib?” had recently been built out into the river upon
The jury viewed the premises and saw the “crib” referred to in the testimony, and the court below thought that, for this reason, the evidence complained of in the first two assignments was permissible; but we do not know why the testimony covered by the eighth assignment was admitted. When, in cases of this kind, the jury pay a visit of inspection, if a physical change in the immediate surroundings apparently affecting the property in question, appears upon the view, and the change,- in point of fact, took place after the date of the
It is true that the testimony complained of in the first assignment, although objected to, was admitted without an exception being taken; but subsequently, when the second blue-print was offered, “in connection with” the testimony in question, an exception was entered to the ruling then made. Since this plan was not
The fourth and fifth assignments complain of rulings on the evidence. When a Mr. Hamilton, called by the plaintiff, was upon the stand, he was asked if he had not acted for “the railroad company in acquiring a large amount of property in the neighborhood prior to 1907”; this was objected to upon the ground that the witness was being interrogated about acquiring property “for a special purpose.” The objection was overruled and an exception npted. We see no error in this ruling, for, in point of fact, the question did not necessarily indicate any “special purpose.” On cross-examination the witness testified that he knew of the sales of other properties “right in this immediate vicinity,” designating four such other sales. He was then asked this question: “And all of those sales were at a much less figure than the one you mentioned, weren’t they?” the figure referred to being the valuation placed by him on the plaintiff’s property. An objection to the question was sustained, and an exception noted for the defendant. We are not convinced of error in this ruling; such an examination is always largely within the control and discretion of the trial judge, and the present record shows that he permitted liberal cross-examination of several witnesses within the proper limits recently suggested by
The sixth assignment relates to the qualifications of a Mr. McElroy, called by the plaintiff as an expert on real estate values, and the seventh to the admission of his testimony concerning the value of the plaintiff’s property. Perhaps from a technical standpoint, owing to the way in which the lack of qualification of this witness was developed, we should not be justified in sustaining the first of these assignments if it stood alone, but when the whole examination of Mr. McElroy is considered, it seems quite apparent that, when called in this case, he did not have such a knowledge of the holding or selling values of properties in the neighborhood as the subject was reasonably susceptible of; therefore, his testimony could not be characterized as “the best evidence available under the circumstances of the case” to show the market value of the plaintiff’s property, which is the kind of proof required: White v. Western Allegheny R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 534, 537-8; see also Friday v. Penna. R. R. Co., 204 Pa. 405, 409-11; Rea v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. R. Co., 229 Pa. 106, 120, 122. Since, we have already ruled other specifications of error which call for a new trial, both of the present assignments will be sustained.
The judgment of the court below is reversed with a venire facias de novo.