35 F. 604 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1888
By the decree of the district court both vessels were found in fault for the collision which is the subject of this suit, and an apportionment of the loss was decreed. Both the libelants and the claimants have appealed. Although the claimants insist that there was no fault on the part of the steamer, and that the collision was wholly the result of the fault of the bark in making a change of course at a time when
It is not open to fair doubt that after the night became foggy the steamer maintained substantially her full rate of speed, going as she was against the wind, and without sails, until her engines were reversed immediately before striking the bark. The testimony denotes that the wind was blowing from the south-west, or between that point and south-southwest, and that the steamer kept on at a speed of 11 knots an hour. Neither is it open to fair doubt that, at the speed maintained by her at the time, her headway could not be stopped, by reversing her engines, within a distance of an eighth of a mile. When those in charge of the steamer first heard the fog-horn of the bark, they assumed, from the apparent direction of the sound, that her bearing was about one point off the steamer’s starboard bow. Immediately upon hearing the fog-horn the mate ordered the wheel of the steamer put to starboard and hard a-starboard. The order was promptly executed. When the bark became visible to them they discovered that her course was eastward across the steamer’s bow, and then saw her changing her direction and luffing to the starboard of her previous course. Thereupon the mate immediately ordered the steamer’s engines reversed, and her wheel ported. This order was promptly executed, but the steamer’s headway could not be stopped in time to avoid a collision. It is entirely clear that the steamer disregarded both of the injunctions of the twenty-first sailing rule. She did not slacken her speed when approaching another vessel, so as to involve risk of collision; and she did not go at a moderate speed in a fog. That she was approaching another vessel so as to involve risk of collision from the time those in charge heard the first fog-signal of the bark is sufficiently manifest by their conduct in putting her wheel to starboard and hard a-starboard instantaneously upon hearing the fog-horn; and it is conceded by all her witnesses that she kept on at her full previous speed .until the risk of collision became imminent, if not inevitable. That she was not going at a moderate speed in a fog is conclusively established by the fact that she was maintaining such speed that she could not effectually check herself, by reversing her engines, so as to avoid collision within the distance at which in the condition of the fog another vessel could be seen. In stating that the fog was such that vessels could -not discover one another more than an eighth of a mile distant, and that the steamer was not capable, when going at substantially full speed, of stopping her headway through the water within a distance of an eighth of a mile, the most liberal opinion in favor of the steamer has been expressed which can possibly be indulged upon the evidence. As is stated by Capt. Dear-born, one of the expert witnesses, when vessels can be seen in a fog at night an eighth of a mile there is not much of a fog. The committee appointed by the British association to investigate the subject state in their report that “it appears, both from the experiments made by. the committee and from other evidence, that the .distance required by a screw-
The fault imputed to the bark by the claimants is the only one which could plausibly be assigned under the circumstances of the case,—that she changed her course after she became visible to those who were in charge of the steamer. Inasmuch as all the witnesses agree that this took place when the vessels were in plain sight of each other, the case resolves itself into the inquiry how far the vessels were apart when this change was made. The witnesses for the bark, while they differ in the details given, agree that the fog-whistle of the steamer, when first heard by them, seemed to indicate by the direction of the sound that the steamer’s bearing was abeam on the bark’s port bow; that very shortly after hearing her whistle they saw the steamer’s mast-head light, and then her green light, so near as to render a collision apparently inevitable; and that then the mate of the bark told the man at the wheel to port the bark’s wheel, and shouted to those who were below to save themselves. The testimony of the wheelsman, the lookout, and the engineer of the steamer so strongly confirms the of the witnesses for the
It is insisted for the claimant that the hark changed hex course four or five points to the starboard. Doubtless, if this were true, such a change could not have been made when the vessels were within 200 or 300 feet of each other. If it could be demonstrated that at the time of the collision the bark was headed about E., and that her course previous to the change was N. E., the argumeixt for the steamer would he convincing; hut this cannot he demonstrated unless the testimony of the helmsman of’ the steamer, who gives the course on which the steamer -was headed when the bark’s change of course took place, and also when the collision took place, is accepted as correct. It is highly improbable that, in the excitement and confusion of the moment, the helmsman of the steamer looked at his compass so carefully as to accurately xxote the steamer’s course when he was ordered to put his wheel hard a-port, and again when the collision took place. Equally improbable is his testimony that, while the steamer was under a hard a-starboard helm, her course was only
■ “Fault on the part of the sailing vessel at the moment preceding collision does not absolve a steamer which has suffered herself and a sailing vessel to get in such dangerous proximity as to cause inevitable alarm and confusion, and collision as a consequence. The steamer, as having committed a far greater fault in allowing such proximity to be brought about, is chargeable with all the damages resulting from the collision.”