112 Me. 420 | Me. | 1914
Bill in equity to recover from the defendant corporation, upon an accounting, the value of the stumpage cut and taken from certain public lots before their location by commissioners duly appointed by the Court.
The facts leading up to these proceedings are these: Edgar E. Ring, then land agent of the State of Maine, on February 15, 1905, brought a petition, under the statutes, asking that the public lots reserved in the organized plantation of Elliotsville be designated and located. This petition was granted by this Court and the appointment of a Committee to locate the public lots was ordered. Ring, Pet’r, 104 Maine, 544. Subsequently the Committee made the location, dated September 13, 1910, viz: 168 acres in the Saco Free Bridge Tract, and 113.9 acres in the State Tract, but none in the Vaughan Tract, all within the limits of said plantation. The defendant had purchased these three tracts from the Onawa Land and Lumber Company on January 31, 1895, and had operated them more or less extensively up to the time of the location of the public lots, and this bill in equity was brought to obtain an accounting for and recovery of the value of the stumpage cut from these lots. The cause was referred to a Special Master whose report, together with the pleadings, is before this Court on an agreed statement of facts, the Court to determine what sum, if any, is due from the defendant.
The defendant in the first instance sets up the Statute of Limitations and contends that the plaintiff cannot recover for any stumpage which was due for more than six years prior to tfie date of this bill in equity. We will consider this defense in connection with each tract separately.
The Saco Free Bridge Tract.
This tract of 4400 acres was granted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the Trustees of the Saco Free Bridge fund on October 28, 1829, with this condition attached, “Conditioned however, that said grantees, their successors and assigns shall lay out and reserve three lots of fifty-six acres each for the following purposes, viz: one lot for the use of the ministry, one lot for the first settled minister, his heirs and assigns, and one lot for the use of schools within the Township, said lots to average in situation and quality with the lands in said tract.”
State Tract.
This tract, containing, according to the survey of Caleb Leavitt in 1830, 2626 acres, was acquired by the State of Maine directly from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under the Act of Separation and is embraced in the division and allotment made December 28, 1822. Ring, Pet’r, 104 Maine, 549. Then followed general legislation in this State governing the reservation of lots for public uses. “By Statutes 1824, Chap. 280, as revised by Statutes 1828, Chap. 393, the State by general law enacted that there should be reserved in every township, suitable for settlement, whether timber land or otherwise, one thousand acres of land to be appropriated to such public uses, for the exclusive benefit of such town, as the Legislature should there
It appears that when the State conveyed this State Tract, so called, there was no express reservation of lots for public uses. But that was unnecessary. There was a general statute in existence expressly providing for such reservation, and purchasers from the State and their grantees are presumed to have known of its existence and to have taken their deeds subject to the public rights therein provided for. The Statutes of 1824 and 1828 have remained a part of the general law of this State and are now preserved in R. S., Chap. 7, Sec. 11. It was on this ground that the Court held this State Tract to be subject to these public lots in Ring, Pet’r, 104 Maine, 544, supra.
Just here lies the distinction between the effect of this public and general law, ignorance of which excusés no one, and the effect of the Resolve of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed March 26, 1788,. declaring that thereafter in the conveyance of every township of six miles square a reservation of four lots of three hundred and twenty acres each should be made for public uses. That was a mere declaration of policy and did not of itself create any incumbrance upon the lands or any public rights in them, as was held in Union Parish v. Upton, 74 Maine, 545. That case in no wise conflicts with the case at bar.
Coming now to the question of laches raised by the defendant in connection with this State Tract it is to be observed, that while the Court in equity will ordinarily recognize and give effect to the Statute of Limitations affecting actions at law in analogous cases, it obeys the spirit rather than the letter of the statute, and adopts the reason and principle on which it is founded rather than the statute itself. Phillips v. Rogers, 12 Met., 411; Lawrence v. Rokes, 61 Maine, 38; Sullivan v. P. & K. R. R. Co., 94 U. S., 806. The Statute of Limitations is a hard and fast rule applicable to actions at law, but the application of the doctrine of laches in equity is largely a matter of
The only question remaining is that of 'amount. The State’s proportion of stumpage taken from the Saco Free Bridge Tract amounts to $2240.82, and from the State Tract is $838.45, a total of $3079.27 according to the report of the Master, upon the basis fixed by this opinion.
But the defendant sets up a counter claim or offset aggregating over $15,000 covering expenditures claimed to have been made in connection with these two tracts and the Yaughan Tract during the years of operation, of which it says the plaintiff should pay or allow its proportional part. This includes expenditures for taxes, scaling, running lines, fire protection, general management and legal services. We think the true rule to be adopted is this, that the plaintiff should' be charged for its proportional part of all expenses incurred
The net balance due the plaintiff is therefore $3020.27 with interest from the agreed date, July 19, 1909.
Judgment for plaintiff for $3020.27 with interest from July 19, 1909.