*1 1957] Quimby. MacDonald v.
APPEAL OF TenBRINK. Injury. Damages—Pecuniary Death — 1. “pecuniary injury,” act, term as used in the The death right includes the husband’s amended to recover for services, right parent’s loss of his wife’s a to recover for costs, loss of a minor child’s services less maintenance the loss of the and next of kin to the extent that de- legally obligated support to contribute to the ceased 19Í8, (CL 691.582). of them § Pecuniary Voluntary Compulsory 2. Same — -Loss Mother — , Support .... . Son. pecuniary' injury-to A mother’s to recover for her from depend her the tortious loss of son a defendant not does support payments on whether the deceased son made the voluntarily (CL 1948, legal compulsion the mother or under ....... 691.582). § Single 3. Action Same — Deceased’s Administrator. act, 1939, clearly legislature The death as amended -the shows provided wrongful death, for 1 for aetion to be commenced by the estate, avoiding administrator of the decedent’s thus multiplicity (CL seq.). et suits 691.581 § Trustee. 4. Same —Plaintiff Administratrix act, in an under the death plaintiff administratrix aetion , relationship 1939, occupies trust all toward as amended in damages against who for the defendant had a claim (CL death the decedent caused the had seq.). ei 691.581 § [4] [9] [5, [1] [2] [3] 16 Am 16 Am Am 16 Am 16 Aril Am16 Jur, Jur, Jur, Jur, Jur, References Jur, Death"§§ Death Death § Death Death Death § §§'90-107, §§ 266. 108 et 98,'112. 263. seq. Points 182. in Headnotes Reports, ¡[Oct. op 5. Words and Phrases —Next Kin. “next of kin” The term means the nearest blood relation at both law and civil common law. op Kin.
6. Same —Next kin”, term “next of act, used the death means the who nearest blood relations suffer a pecuniary injury and not all those who would take under the statute of distributions (CL 1948, seq.). et 691.581 § op 7. Death —Next Kin. person The death of the whose next of kin is mentioned de- membership termines the who class are the next of kin. op 8. and Words Phrases —Heirs at Law —Next Kin. synonymous “Heirs at law” and “next of kin” are not terms. by Mother—Supported op 9. Death — Son —Heir—Next Kin. petitioning The- that fact mother would be entitled to inherit personal property of her son had he died intestate and childless by and was not so entitled when he survived a wife and children would not eliminate her from the class of next of kin pecuniary injury entitled to recover for under the death (CL 691.582). act § op Ambiguity. 10. Same —Construction Statutes — act, The death amended in providing every amount recovered in action under pe- act “for cuniary injury resulting from such death shall be distribut- surviving spouse ed to next of kin who suffered pecuniary injury proportion and in thereof” and re- quiring judge before whom the case was tried cer- tify judgment court “rep- the amount of the resenting pecuniary by surviving total suffered loss spouse kin, and all of the next of proportion and the of such pecuniary by total loss suffered person” each of the kin next of of such deceased is not am- (CL 1948, 691.582). biguous § Appeal by 11. Error —-Remand—-Intervention in Ac- Mother tion under Death Act. plaintiff-administratrix Action under death act ob- judgment tained a consent from defendant tort-feasor is making sought by remanded for effective the relief mother support, son had contributed toward her deceased by for the loss suffered her reason of the son’s intervene, where her which had been denied Quimby.' MacDonald court, granted (CL Supreme Court circuit seq.). et 691.581 (Harold E.), Appeal Calhoun; from Steinbacher April (Calendar No. 46, J. Submitted 819.) Decided October 7, 1957.
Case Delorez E. MacDonald, administratrix MacDonald, the estate R. deceased, John against Qnimby Chester A. Lubracrome Cor- poration, Michigan corporation, for re- sulting death in from motor vehicle collision, de- priving family support. wife and Eunice H. peti- TenBrink, mother of decedent, claiming for tioned leave to de- intervene, pendent. judgment Petition dismissed. Consent plaintiff. Intervening petitioner ap- entered peals. granted Petition for leave to intervene *3 case remanded. (J. & McAuliffe, Harbert W. of coun McAuliffe
sel), for defendants. Conroy Roger Rtissell W. and Nielsen, H. for in- tervening petitioner. J. Plaintiff, as administratrix, com- Kelly, county an
menced action in the circuit court for the alleging of caused her tervention erred in negligent Calhoun, that defendants’ acts petitioner death.
husband’s The in in- (appellant herein) contends that the court denying her motion for leave to intervene, by her, filed as mother of the deceased who was re- ceiving support from her son at the time his death. question presented previously The has not been be- fore this Court. wife deceased filed her declaration on.
November 10,1955, defendants’ answer was filed of the
on mother Petitioner, November petition for leave to filed her motion and deceased, intervene on December alleging that she 20, 1955, support during receiving his had been lifetime and that she had need of such from her son
support; that attorney to rec- the administratrix and her ognize refused advising appellant if she had this need, any right to it her own action recover would be although appellant had the ad- court, informed prevented action; ministratrix that the statute that a plaintiff settlement between defendants ignore would was imminent and that said settlement her claim. prayed granting her re- Petitioner for an order plaintiff-ad- quest restraining intervene and taking would from action which ministratrix jeopardize petitioner’s rights in court. petition, denying the
Defendants answered she “is mother not included to intervene had because among entitled that class of pecuniary injuries resulting from the recover for plaintiff’s Plaintiff decedent.” death petition. filed also answer to the denying petitioner’s The court entered an order motion and for leave to intervene on Jan- uary February 16, 1956, on 1, 1956, consent judgment plaintiff entered was in favor of. against defendants in the amount of $30,000. On day same the court an entered order for distribution moneys. judgment judg- . Satisfaction of the February proof ment filed on entry judgment service of notice of was filed on February 7, 1956.
Appellant following asks for the relief: granted, “Petition for leave to intervene should be recovery and the had should be held to be for the petitioner legal benefit as well as the heirs John v. Quimby.'- pe- MacDonald, R. deceased, accordance with ‘the ” cuniary loss suffered.’ question presented calls for a construction of PA 1948, (CL 1939,No it 297, as amended PA 1848,No 38 seq.
§ [Stat et Supp 691.581 Ann 1955 Cum seq.]), §27.711 particularly et and more CL (Stat § Supp 27.712), 691.582 Ann 1955 Cum provides: “Every by, brought such action shall he and in personal representatives the deceased of, names of such person, every and in such action the court jury may give damages, or shall jury, such as, the court or just, pecu- deem fair and with reference to the niary injury resulting per- from such to those may damages sons who be entitled to such when re- damages covered and also for the reasonable medi- hospital, expenses cal, funeral and burial for which compensation
the estate is liable reasonable pain suffering, undergone while conscious, by person during period such deceased interven- ing inflicting injuries between the time of the of such person and his death: Provided, however, That such entitled such shall be class who, law, would inherit the entitled to personal property of the deceased had he in- died every testate. The amount recovered action such pecuniary injury resulting for be distributed from such death shall spouse surviving and next of pecuniary injury pro- kin who suffered such and in portion days entry thereto. Within 30 after judgment, judge whom before such case certify probate was tried or his successor shall jurisdiction having court ceased of the estate of such de- person entry the amount and date of thereof, opinion and shall advise the court written representing pe- as to the thereof amount the total cuniary loss suffered and all proportion kin, the next of of such total surviving spouse loss suffered person, each of the next kin of such deceased *5 upon the trial of by introduced the evidence shown payment providing for the After case. such hospital, ex- funeral and burial medical, reasonable penses court shall estate is liable, for which by provided the manner law determine as pecuniary representing the total the amount next of loss suffered share distributed, be kin shall proportionate surviving spouse and thereof to be distributed proceeds of The remainder of the next kin. according to the judgment shall be distributed such laws.” intestate 38,No amendment, PA to the 1939 Previous causing compensation requiring
entitled “An act provided, neglect by wrongful default,” or act, death by PA No 2 thereof, as amended section as follows: brought by, “Every in the such action shall be representatives personal de- such of, the
names ceased every person, amount recovered persons to the action, be distributed shall such provided proportions law to the in relation by persons personal property left distribution dying jury every action the and in such intestate; they may damages give deem fair and shall injury just, result- with reference may ing from such those (CL damages to such when recovered.” entitled 27.712]). [Stat §Ann comparison the 1939 amend- A before .act act establishes the amendment, with the after ment following:
(1) were not mentioned “next of kin” The words and were inserted amendment, in the act before times in the amended section. Approximately
(2) the first half of the amended provide for distribution not discuss section does and in this no reference to heirs-at-law half there is or next of Hn and those entitled to (emphasis ours) described as “class law, who, personal property would be entitled inherit the the deceased had he died intestate.” The word n “class”was not used in the act before amendment.
(3) That the title amended act adds prescribe damages “to words the measure of recov- repeal erable and the distribution thereof; and to acts.” inconsistent
(4) In the amended act when the words “next of they used, Hn” are are in each of the 5 occasions coupled “spouse,” with the word as follows: “sur- viving spouse spouse “surviving next kin;” and all of spouse the next of kin;” “the “surviving spouse kin;” and each of the next of “surviving spouse of kin;” next and the next of “surviving spouse” Hn.” Neither the words or “next of kin” are found in the act before amend- ment. (5) provides The amended act for
pain suffering during period of deceased intervening injury between the time of and death regard pecuniary shall be distributed without loss according but to the intestate laws. Before the n amendment, provision no existed. meaning “pecuniary injury” of the words definitely act
used amended is established Slack, Baker Mich 703, v. 714, as follows: question remaining is, “The what is meant in the by ‘pecuniary injury’ act to decedent’s surviv- ing things or next of kin. Does this include speculative fondly so nebulous as nurtured hope of an inheritance, enhanced redress for dece- suspended by dent’s but the tenuous possible intestacy? Assuredly cord of decedent’s Olney’s Olney (In not. In the Case re Estate, 309 65) recognized beyond compensation Mich to we that, right for husband loss of his wife’s services, the predicated to upon gally for loss must be recover having kin a le- tbe existence some next of support claim to maintenance enforceable by deceased. Olney both the Case and the Grimes Case “In (Grimes 399) pointed King, 311 Mich we out that compensation provision for in the 1939 act for injury’ ‘pecuniary identical with that in old (There change course, as to meth- is, death act. persons of and to whom distribution is made un- od der act.) the old death act in con- the 1939 Under ‘pecuniary injury’ struing term recoverable uniformly that, under the tion to the husband’s we have held in addi- act, recovery right for loss parent’s (or recovery his wife’s services services) of minor after deduction of her loss maintenance child’s recovery further could had costs, only for those who would have been entitled personal property to inherit intestate viving spouse the extent that had he died deceased’s (under changed 1939 act this is sur- only kin), to to and next of and for them *7 obligated legally deceased was any support contribute to the of them.” and maintenance of disputes No one the fact that defendants caused pecuniary injury right petitioning to the does not mother. Her recovery depend question on the support to whether her deceased son made the as voluntarily payments legal compulsion, or under as finding’ Borg-Warner is established our Judis v. Corporation, 313, 339Mich wherein we stated: ground “Defendant claims error on the of submis- jury plaintiff’s sion to the decedent’s of a claim for loss support, alleging proof that there was no obligation support legal of decedent to his fixed being father, nor of the father in need of his son’s support. testimony “There sufficient in the instant case support plaintiff’s to voluntarily claim that his son deceased average assumed to contribute an of $25 v. plaintiff’s support, any a month toward without or- (decedent) requiring der him do, toso and within ruling Laning, of this Court in Clinton v. Mich say, p 360, in which we converse case of voluntarily assuming support a father his adult poor, son without an order of the directors of the “ voluntary assumption ‘We think that the of this duty may fairly regarded performing legal be as a obligation, expenditures proper to a ex- tent, within the limit which laid be down could compulsion, compelled, footing.’ charges they are as valid if had been may be on similar considered as ” clearly legislature pro The statute shows that the wrongful for 1 by vided action for be com menced the administrator or thus administratrix, avoiding multiplicity of suits. We find that the plaintiff-administratrix occupied in this case a trust relationship all toward who had a claim for
against quote approval defendants, we Specific from Wiener NY Bros. Co. Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (83 673); NE2d and Janes v. Sackman (CCA), 177 F2d 928.
In the Case, Wiener the New York court said: only provide “Not does the death statute that the amount recovered for such in- jury surviving spouse ‘shall be distributed to the ([CL § 691.582] and next of kin’ Ann Stat 27.712), Supp § Cum but, prescribes noted, its com- panion distribution statute that, funeral expenses excepted, proceeds ‘such shall not liable he payment charges against for the other ([CL 1948, § 702.115] estate decedent’ Stat [6]). Ann 1943Rev [185], 27.3178 subd considering doubt, “There can no this, all *8 damages Michigan the allowable in for a resulting injury from death referable solely desig- persons to the loss suffered the being recovery so, nated. That the amount of is held Michigan subject special the trust, a administrator recovery seeking is, the same a token, such stat-
utory trustee.” supra, Co.,
In Janes v. Sackman it was Bros. 934): (pp 933, stated pointed discussing “As we have out the earlier in Olney’s Michigan cases, the recent In re Es
issue, tate, 65; Slack, 309 supra, Mich Baker 319 Mich both it make clear the 1939 that amendments unitary death act created a have plain wording for action death survival. intent obvious is to make an statute ad statutory a ministrator for the trustee entire uni tary action.” in This Court November, 1938, handed its down opinion Inin re Estate, Venneman’s Mich legislative following in resulted in action the year passing of the amendment to the sec- appeal. tion under consideration in this In the Venneman this decision, after stat- Court, ing presented previously issue not had been regretfully before the held that Court, the statute required the Court to find that the amount recovered her widow, administratrix estate of brought in husband, a settlement of an action under rights recognize the death must act, of decedent’s marriage adult son former to share in the spite recovered, amount adult so fact that said way upon dependent son was no his father (p support, 373): and stated opinion portion are of the “We may reading every jury statute ‘in such action the give damages they just, shall deem fair and pecuniary injury resulting reference may from such to those be enti- merely pro- tled to such when recovered’ determining vides the manner of the amount of the damages to be recovered. When amount of dam-. *9 31 v. distributed then to it is be ages determined has been provided proportions persons the ‘to prop- personal the distribution in to relation law ” by persons dying erty intestate.’ left signify? 51 of kin” term “next the does "What question as follows: this 453 answers CJS “Primarily, law and the common and under both signifies phrase near- ‘next kin’ the law, the civil legal, technical, the and this is relation; est blood meaning of the term.” and literal in 300 of kin”
A note 15LRA defines “next stat- ing: mean of kin’ blood relatives. “The ‘next words * * * Oliver, 38 NC 369. v.
Jones a the of kin’ will mean near- “The ‘next in words all those who would take blood relations and not est Fargo Miller, v. of distributions. under the statute (22 690); Swasey NE 5 LRA v. 150 Mass 225 65).” (10 Rep Jaques, 135 NE 59 Am Mass (28 Mack, LRA In Clark 161 Mich 479), said: this NS Court question: brings were the “This us Who contrary In the of a intent,
nearest kin? absence gift gift a a to next of kin is to the nearest of kin excluding sense, who, in the strictest under would entitled take distribution, the statute of be by representation. or Thus brother sister would take to exclusion children deceased p 101; Wills, Remsen on brother sister. Jar- ed), (6th p ; on 953 2 Underhill on Wills, man Wills * § Wills, 626; Rood on signifies kin,’ will, ‘nearest of “The term relationship nearest those stand according the rules the civil law for intestate kinship. computing degrees of will there In this suggesting one is take are no words 112.—Reporter. yol 2, p In 6tU Amer (1893), ed representation. Bnt that idea is ex- employed: (cid:127)clnded ‘It then di words shall among They vided the nearest of kin.’ were the brother, sister, G-ilfillin, Walter Coe, Ursula .surviving at the death of the Van Cleve testatrix. per Fossen, v. Van son whose next of kin is 73 Mich 342. The death mentioned determines *10 membership of the class.” Appellees discount the fact that the distribution part of the amended section term contains the “next n ofkin” 5 and that times this term was in not the sec- previous by stating: tion to “It our amendment, n contentionthat at heirs law and of next kin synonymous terms as used in and as the statute indiscriminately .such are used to the mean same .group persons.” of
Appellees layman admit that when uses the term expected of '“next kin” in he his will would “be to degrees kinship refer to of have reference the and meaning according of the term law,” the but civil opposite contend that an the result is reached when term is used in the statute. agree appellees’
We cannot with contention that synonymous at '“heirs law and next of kin are terms,” or that for this Court to rule otherwise inoperative would delete and make the words found in the first half of the amended “that section such person damages entitled to such shall be -ofthat who, law, class be would entitled to inherit personal property the he deceased had died intestate.” petitioning mother of a was would class personal property
be entitled inherit the the of (cid:127)deceased had he died intestate. The fact that she leaving if would not inherit died he intestate a wife n children would not eliminate her from that class. ambiguity is no There the every words of statute provide which amount “the recovered in such v. Quimby.' resulting injury pecuniary from such action spouse surviving distributed shall death injury pecuniary kin who such next suffered of ours.) (Emphasis proportion thereof.” ambiguity provision that “the Nor is there * * * judge such case was tried whom before * * certify court shall pecuniary representing loss the total thereof amount spouse surviving the next all of suffered proportion total kin, and the of surviving and each loss suffered person.” (Emphasis kin such deceased next ours.) brought because of about The amendment supra, brought into focus decision, Venneman part taking injustice wife from the damages dividing said collected marriage of the deceased a former son pecuniary damages who did not suffer because act. the tortious impossible opinion to for the writer of this
It is *11 injustice meeting legisla- in the conclude injustice namely, to hold another ture created — who blameless, concerned, far are one contributing brought to his death son justify support can of his mother. Neither we the in the the statement defendants’ answer to mother’s right petition be- to intervene she had no such among per- not included that class cause she “is sons entitled to sulting injuries re- recover for plaintiff’s from the death decedent.” granting the an circuit court will enter order setting aside for intervention
mother’s judgment The cause certificate. the consent judicially ap- proceed or either to trial shall proved particular attention directed with settlement, Michigan Reports. protection rights
toward of the minor children’s and interests. J., Dethmers, O. Sharpe, Edwards Carr,
JJ., concurred with Kelly, J. (concurring reversal). agree J. I Black, Kelly’s Mr. Justice if in fact verdict. The mother, decedent’s wholly partially dependent on her son support (with when he came to his is children) eligible beneficiary widow and minor an of the cause of action which defendants’ admis Any sion at arose the son’s death. “next of kin,” rightful beneficiary i.e., relative, blood in such provided case he or she is shown have been de pendent in fact or law on the decedent when death statutory and is a occurred member of the “class” from which, variant circumstances succes personal the inheritor or inheritors sion, es dying Consequent tate ly, one intestate are selected. unitedly-viewed provisions statutory our —of good departed for reason from that which 1939— prior obtained in to their effective date (see 368). They In re Venneman’s Estate, 286 Mich similarly vary statutory provisons from common to many other States.* My is more to be said,
There however. Brother give I reaches the conclusion to which assent exelu to which ficiaries and next of kin.” benefit upon class next in line of of virtually fit visions dren are the “§ the other of the first American *12 preferred 107. Preferred Glasses of their natural the action belonging allusion exclusive —that many wrongful first benefieiaries. beneficiaries Jurisprudence preferred preferred; is made may to that dependency preference. be maintained are divided into classes based is, class, (16 is essential class, Generally, then death gives Am Beneficiaries. — upon if follow the and, In other us Jur, there are statutes, if there tho of action to Death, deceased; general design words, next of kin or According inures existence the nonexistence of of none, these action pp for the bene- then of statutes 76, 77) : classes for whose in behalf parents bene- chil- pro- are 35 v. interpretation sively through the so-called death of approved (PA 20, 1939, No June 297, act of 1939 seq. (Stat [CL Ann 1955 Cum 691.581et 1948, 1939 seg.)]); Supp §27.711 at the I arrive et whereas by interpreting 2 1 and sections same destination 115 114 act, death and sections of the mentioned of (PA chapter probate 288, No 1939, 2 code of §§ approved [CL 702.- 702.114, June §§27.3178 (Stat 27.3178 [184], Ann 1943 Rev array together. [185])]), “must statutes These render each con as will receive sistent with construction such the other.”* men- then confessed that the
It be faced and must fraught separately viewed, are enactments, tioned if patent ambiguities. in- For well as latent adjust- probate^approved in the case of stance, and wrongful, an infant sur- death of ment of a cause for solely by parents, of a survived vived wife pro- spouse, distribute how can the court “dependents ceeds under section subd said interpreta- new and flexible of the decedent” absent “de- 2—of said section word tion—assisted pendents”? Correspondingly, com- where suit is by entry judgment for an amount menced followed representing services, does loss decedent’s judge of the recov- circuit recommend distribution “dependents” That ered amount to deceased? conjunc- questions apt arise in nature are something suggest tion with this case is remedially us; that earlier decisions new is before aid; little of this similar afresh are of absence Court thought legislation calls for in other States proceed these allied stat- as we construe Mich People, Office involved, 352; Board, ex rel. purpose Good Roads Federation v. State Board Van 304 Mich is to be ascertained Hughes, May, Antwerp 628; Reed v. legislature, State, v. by reading Mich Secretary where statutes Mich 593. 598; all such v. Palmer State State, Canvassers, statutes 327 Mich pari materia as one. Land 108; *13 Michigan Reports. proceed ground only by that we
utes, and on safe unitary. looking themat as apply only will, course, That which follows type of case before us—that death of an adult dependent dependent male a widow, survived dependent minor children, and a mother. . First: section that the re- Said directs amount pecuniary injury, covered in “shall be circuit, for surviving spouse distributed to the next of kin pecuniary injury propor- such and in suffered having tion thereto.” directed Said section the amount so recovered “shall Tiedistributed in such persons, to such manner, and in such amounts as having provided hereinafter set forth,” no- hearing precedent tice and to the each distribution (death probate requires code) act act for, calls court to: only distributing proceeds “Enter an order such persons dependents to those who were of the dece- dent and in such amounts as to said court shall seem equitable considering damages fair and the relative dependents by each sustained such reason the decedent’s death.” interpretive difficulty appears. So far no “Next (the pecuniary injury” of kin who suffered such dependent qualifies here), mother relative blood “dependents (she of the a decedent” de- pendent allegations para- if decedent graph 3 of her for intervention are estab- lished), concordantly pur- up legislative make pose preambled point, above. Defendants however, proviso section the mentioned death act: person “That such entitled to who, shall be of that class law would be personal property to inherit the of the de- entitled ceased had he died intestate thereby disqualified assert that the mother beneficiary chil- and minor because, widow having an heir
dren she is not decedent, survived personalty. of the decedent’s gather prima
That contention would facie proviso legislature force had the been left is not to be counsel do stand alone denied. While *14 point actuality it not their in is ad such, brief previously-mentioned in oth dressed rules known er into States, which beneficiaries divided secondary consisting primary, classes, alternative of impact groups. The contention loses deferred peculiar to mentioned however, for reasons our here, Pennsylvania (cid:127)enactments of 1939. As in v. Poff (66 749, L Co., 603, R. 327 401 S Ct 90 ed 399, US emphasis dependency 702), on 162 “The 700, ALR congress (in legislature) suggests granted the our case that recovery kin the to such next of of dependent short, In the deceased.”* were on we need not decide— if there be abrasion—which quoted proviso the of 2, the section between (that made 115 command of section distribution decedent”'), “dependents the latter must of the accomplish prevail 2 that that the in order statutes be the above—to we found—and stated have legislature. emphasized purpose This means timely petition to inter for leave mother’s that the appealed granted and that the been have should vene denying must be reversed. order way parenthetical By it not amiss conclusion is of (163 Green, 218 313 Mich Bricker to note that Poff, that See contention cousin of pendent considered In reference to that Federal act Stat sections that Poff 65, legislative Poff Case the ch the deeedent. 149, duplicates, in Federal In [45] supreme court considered and overruled re emphasis USCA, 1Í5. We do Hopps’ Estate, employers’ in By substance § citation of on 51) dependency denied liability find, 324 Mich Poff as the court did otherwise, presently eligibility act we do is ([April controlling. not a infer de 22, in 697), precursive
ALR stands of broad rather than interpretation questions eligibility narrow arising legislation particularly under this of 1939, dependency where actual that it In shown. case was shown that the her decedent, mother survived dependent and 10 husband came children, by wrongful demise husband, act. The having contributorily negligent,* ineligible been and, hence, claim benefici renounced as one aries cause action. The defendant insisted (see question p report) counterstated suffering person the action failed for want of “a pecuniary porting sup part, authority relied, loss” and in on p J, Death, rule 17 C 1215: stated beneficiary prior pre- “The fact that a aof class is recovery from cluded reason of some defense against prosecution available him not does authorize of the action for the benefit subse- quent class.” Reviewing question posed counterstated question testimony 6, this Court ruled show- *15 ing partial support actual of the children the they mother disclosed that “suffered loss untimely reason of her death.” While the writer opinion (excepting pres- of the did not elaborate ently noted), the briefs that 115, show said section pressed upon subd was of the court as indicative legislative proven dependency intent that of fact, dependent depend- of next kin, renders such or eligible regardless presence ents absence rightful other note, beneficiaries. The writer did without reference to the said section that “Under
(death) act as now amended the distribution of is awarded determined (p judge.” report.) ing action [*] See annotation, “Contributory under death or survival negligence statute,” 2 ALR2d 785. beneficiary as affect Having the. was Second: determined that mother suborclinately to in the and now is entitled intervene procedural .questions pending certain remain suit,* summary disposition considering taken for in action following inter denial of the for circuit filed vention. The order denial was entered and January days Ten later the court entered 1956. fiduciary judgment plaintiff a consent favor of against the of $30,000. defendants, sum un the court a certificate On same date executed designating der said section the widow decedent’s minor children as sole distributees.† February Judgment was satisfied record 6th. prepared application In counsel had the meantime January The the order of 16th. for leave review presented required was for concise settle- statement January given 26th, and ment, notice counsel on by Judge hearing Stein- conducted on settlement adjourned January hearing was bacher 30th. Such respectively February 14th and to be filed for briefs pres- question February brief, 29th. counsel did The ently until March was not decided mentioned, delay in settle- intimate no criticism We judge was confront- of concise statement. ment objection ultimately overruled with ed of defendants that briefed and jurisdiction to such state- settle due within lost to nonsettlement ment had been ap- sought following days of the order to be date pealed. fact the court Nevertheless, parte entry judgment so plunged ahead —ex when the moth- , mother was far as the concerned— appeal timely proceeding order of Jan- er’s tending party plaintiff. were brought procedural means † The This is not not judgment to attention filed, however, and certificate say of the court until It is to her February mother claimed are eaeh dated say timely that she has benefactivo status could entitled consideration. January pursued become 26. a con *16 They only : nary pending, necessary 16th was renders it that
proper (g) directions be issued under section 1 (1945). Court Rule No 72 granting An order will enter circuit moth in directing er’s for intervention’ and that the declaration be amended so same include the sub present allegation dependency. stance her judgment The consent and the certificate* will be proceed, set aside cause will either to trial judicially approved adjustment, or as interested parties may approve be advised court shall reject. proceedings, designed In event new adjust pursued before trial are in the court circuit, testimony will take allegation and determine the mother’s dependency. if In such event,,and the the allegation dependency mother’s sustained, is appraise court will and admitted settlement worth of the declared particular
cause anew attention protection of the interests minor bene ficiaries. proceedings for further
Reversed and remanded appellant, against as directed. taxable de- Costs to fendants. JJ., Smith, Edwards and Voelker, concurred-with ’ n - J.
Black, probate pursuant inal ciaries court tution of suit —or determined of distributive sory section follow filed The eireuit questions. rather (subject — certificate interested proportions than subd rights court This was mandatory. to section 114 of said certificate, noted party.” “in and results whether payable ordained, exception) As far requirement absence by judgment called for them sole probably, decides such matters as identity exception, written the cause be chapter concerned, said in eireuit. to insure objections section distributee benefi- provided probate without adjusted uniformity - is advi- thereto insti- court orig- said