64 N.Y.S. 831 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
The defendants appeal from a judgment requiring specific performance of a contract for the exchange of landsj which contract was entered into by them with the plaintiff. The latter stipulated, in consideration of a conveyance of other land to be made by the defendants to him, to grant and convey to the defendants, at a valuation for the purpose of the contract of $16,000, property described in that contract as follows, viz.: “ The house and lot known as 242 East 121st street, being 27 feet front and rear and 100 feet, 11 inches in depth, he the said several dimensions more or less” subject to certain incumbrances by way of mortgage and assessments. The contract also provided as follows : “ On closing of contract. Each of the parties to these presents hereby agrees to convey the property above described as sold by that party * * * and to execute^ acknowledge and deliver to the other party, or to the assigns of the other party, * * * a proper warranty deed containing full covenants, duly executed and acknowledged, to convey and assure to the grantee an absolute fee of said premises.” In addition to the property to be conveyed by the plaintiff in performance of the contract, he agreed to pay the sum of $1,000 on the exchange of conveyances, which, according to'the contract, was to take place at a day named therein. The closing of the contract was postponed from time to time, until finally, on the 30th of January, 1899, the parties attended at the appointed' place. The plaintiff tendered a
The objection to the deed tendered is in effect that there was no privity of contract between the defendants and Mrs. Macdonald, and that a conveyance from her would not be peiformance of the plaintiff’s contract with them. It has been determined in this State that substantial performance of a contract for the sale of land may be made by the vendor delivering to the vendee the deed of a third person, con veying the title, except in a case where the vendee is entitled to a covenant of warranty of the vendor. In such case he may require that covenant, and is not bound to accept that of another person. (Bigler v. Morgan, 77 N. Y. 312.) It does not appear here that the defendants rejected the title upon the ground of the failure of the plaintiff to tender a deed containing his personal •covenant,' but if we may assume that this specific objection is included in the general one that they had entered into no contract with Mrs. Macdonald, then it is in evidence (and the trial judge has found) that the plaintiff at the time he tendered the conveyance from his mother, “duly offered by conveyance in due fonp to join in the covenants of said deed for the purpose of becoming bound thereby.” The defendants rejected the title notwithstanding that offer, and thus prevented the plaintiff from complying with the requirement of his contract as to a personal covenant.
Concerning the encroachment. The evidence relating to it was given by surveyors whose testimony is so unsatisfactory that the trial judge might well have considered that there was no encroach
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Eumsey, Ingraham, McLaughlin and Hatch, JJ., concurred.
' Judgment affirmed, with'costs.