72 Iowa 658 | Iowa | 1887
The parties were married in 1878, and the plaintiff left the defendant in October, 1882. The ground on which a divorce is asked is that the defendant “ is guilty of such inhuman treatment as to endanger the life ” of the plaintiff. After a careful examination of the evidence and argument of counsel, we have reached the conclusion that the evidence fails to show that the plaintiff’s life was endan
She further testifies that in the spring of 1881 the defend-ant “ shook and swore at me. At that time * * * he opened the door, and I remonstrated with him for letting tlio wind blow the dirt. I was sweeping. He went out, and Mildred cried, and he opened the front door, and the wind shut the door, and knocked Mildred down, and he shook me hard. Think it was the irritation hearing the child cry caused him to shake me. I cannot say whether he intended to hurt me. He looked very angry. I never irritated and scolded him for opening the door. I was some angry.” Defendant testifies that he has no distinct recollection of this transaction, but that he did not “ strike her at all.” His recollection is that, after going out and hearing the baby cry, he went back to open the door to “ see what was the matter, when the plaintiff was pushing it shut, and I probably pushed it open again to get in. ” No one was present, and
On cross-examination she states: “ I was some out of patience by bis refusing to carry out tbe sour milk. There was a jar of milk broken. I broke it myself. Threw it out, jar, milk and all. * * * Did not care whether the jar broke or not. * * * He kicked tbe pail over before be struck me. Do not know whether he bit or kicked me. * * * Do not know as I ever complained to him about tbe strike hurting me. I felt it for an hour or two. We were both excited at tbe occurrence.”
The defendant denies that be struck or kicked her. Admits there was a dispute as to which should be taken away first, tbe sour or tbe sweet milk. He was in favor of tbe sour; she of tbe sweet. He bad hold of a jar of the former, and she took it out of bis bands. He “ bung on to it a little, and she spattered some milk on herself, which made her still angrier; and she wrenched it out of my hands and threw it on a pile of stones, and broke it. That is all that happened. * * * I did not kick over a pail of milk.” No one was present. The burden was on plaintiff. There is not a preponderance of evidence that any violence was used, or that the defendant did anything for which he can be justly
In October, 1882, the plaintiff testifies that she was holding “ both the children. * * * Defendant took the eldest, and she cried to come back, and he whipped her. I told him he must not, * • * * and he whipped her; and I gave the baby to mother, and went to take her away from him. He would not let me, and started for the other room. I started after him, and at the door tried to take her, and he struck me with such force as to knock me back * * * over the arm of a chair into the chair.” The defendant states this transaction quite differently, but admits that he pushed the plaintiff away from the door, so that he could pass out of the room with the child. But conceding this evidence of the plaintiff to be correct, the whole difficulty occurred because of her effort to take the child away from him. There is no evidence that he was punishing the child immoderately, or that such was his habit, and he certainly had the- right to punish her reasonably if he thought she deserved it. The plaintiff ought not to have interfered, and is wholly blamable for what occurred. Under the evidence, we are unable to see that defendant could have done differently than he did. Besides this, he did not intend to hurt her. Both were angry, and it was a hasty act which he no doubt regretted, and we have no doubt she regretted the whole occurrence after a brief period, when passion had subsided.
These, we think, are all the acts of personal violence the plaintiff claims were inflicted on her. In addition -to this, she says he threatened violence on more than one occasion, and cursed her in the presence of others, and on one occasion, when she was “finding fault with him about something or other, he said no one but a d-d whore would act as I did.” He denies he used such language, but testifies he said to her it was “ bad enough to scold around the house, but to stand in the door and talk and act as she did was going too
Much evidence was introduced tending to show that the defendant did not provide as well for his family as he ought to have done. On the other hand, there is evidence that he provided for his family as welt as his means would allow, and as well as any reasonable person could ask. And we think he did. This is our conviction; and we are further clearly satisfied from all the evidence that the plaintiff’s health was in no way impaired by anything the defendant did, or omitted to do, and there is not in our opinion the slightest danger, j udging from the past, that the defendant will in the future do or omit to do anything that will have the effect to impair the health of the plaintiff. One cause of the trouble between these parties is that the plaintiff seems to insist that her mother should live with her. To this the defendant objects, because he thinks much of the trouble between him and his wife has been caused by her mother. He has a legal right to insist on such objection; whether he ought to do so is not our province to say. But we think the primary cause of all the trouble is, judging from the letters each have written the other, that both have excitable temperaments and caustic tongues, neither of which have been curbed as the love and respect each should have for the other demanded.
REVERSED.